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VOLUME 10 NO. 1, JANUARY – JUNE 2025

CONTENTS

Foreword

Abstracts

1. Leveraging Indonesia's Renewable Energy Potential for Geopolitical Influence and Regional Cooperation in The ASEAN Power Grid 1 – 24
Claudia Syarifah
2. Navigating The Drivers, Challenges, and Required Institutional Reforms for Indonesia's Accession to The CPTPP 25 – 44
Nabila Dinda Shalsabilla Pinonto'an
3. Indonesia and the Global South: A Constructivist Approach to Diplomatic Leadership in a Multipolar World Order 45 – 77
Krisman Heriamsa
4. Green Debt Diplomacy dan Implikasi Terhadap Kedaulatan Ekonomi: Studi Kasus Sri Lanka, Pakistan, dan Sub Sahara 78 – 95
Marenda Athallah Faras Majid, Abdusyahid Naufal Fathullah, Labiq Yafuz
5. Leader Personality Analysis Of War Decisions (Case Study : Vladimir Putin In The Russia-Ukraina War) 96 – 114
Wahyu Wulandari
6. Comparative Foreign Policies of Indonesia and the Philippines in Responding to Security Instability to Tiongkok 115 – 146
Laode Muhamad Fathun, Audrey Chairunnisa, Nurfarah Nidatya, Pribadi Sutiono, Angga Santa Gideon
7. Penyelenggaraan Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IC-CEPA) Dalam Mendorong Potensi Perdagangan dan Posisi Politik Indonesia di Global South 147 - 169
Baptista Ezra Varani Nabit, Dirk Jotizto Delovedi, Josef Rangga Widyadharna, Hendrikus Nugroho Sidharta, Muhammad Akmal Rinaldi Putra

About Authors

FOREWORD

It is with a great enjoyment to present to you this edition of *Jurnal Hubungan Luar Negeri*, highlighting a selection of articles that explore numerous facets of foreign policy and diplomacy.

The first article delves into Indonesia's renewable energy potential and how this potential can be used to leverage the country's geopolitical influence and regional cooperation in the form of the ASEAN Power Grid.

The second article assesses the drivers, challenges, and required institutional reforms for Indonesia's accession to the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), a trade partnership of 11 countries in the Trans-Pacific region.

The third article is about the existence of the Global South and Indonesia's participation can be approached through a constructive way to diplomatic leadership in Multipolar World Order.

It maybe thought provoking to read **the fourth article** on the green debt diplomacy, and how this new kind of diplomacy has been carried out by creditor countries with deep implications to the economic sovereignties of Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as well as those in the Sub Sahara region. The article explains how countries appear to be eager when offered green loans with relatively loose requirements. Even though this Green Debt scheme seems to be promising innovative development financing solutions, but its implementations have actually been restricted by the power imbalances in the global system, the weakening of countries' fiscal capacities, and the minimum commitments of the developed countries in realizing their climate funding promises. On the other hand, the mechanism also opens up opportunities to strengthen the national development contributions (NDCs) of countries should there be more just and collaborative financial governance taking place.

Moving to issues pertaining conflicts are highlighted in **the fifth article** that shed light into the leader personality analysis on Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, in his decision to bring his country into war with Ukraine.

The sixth article maybe even more interesting. It is about the comparison of Indonesia's and the Philippines's foreign policies through studies on how the respective countries respond to the security situations and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

The last but not least seventh article analyses how the comprehensive economic partnership agreement between Indonesia and Chile, a country in South of the American continent impacts the potential trade relations between the two countries and advances Indonesia's political stance in the Global South.

We highly thank the contribution made by all authors featured in this edition. We are hoping that all articles featured would share valuable insights as well as broaden readers' insights and understanding on various global issues. As this journal may reflects Indonesia's unwavering commitment to adaptive and evidence-based diplomacy in an increasingly uncertain global landscape, it aspires to furnish policymakers and scholars with the tools to craft resilient and visionary foreign policy frameworks by merging academic depth with practical insights.

Have a great reading!

Editors Board – Chief Editor

JURNAL HUBUNGAN LUAR NEGERI

Journal of Foreign Affairs

ABSTRACTS

Leveraging Indonesia's Renewable Energy Potential for Geopolitical Influence and Regional Cooperation in The ASEAN Power Grid

Claudia Syarifah

Indonesia possesses vast renewable energy resources, including geothermal, solar, hydropower, and biomass, positioning the country as a crucial player in the global shift from fossil fuels to sustainable energy sources. This paper examines the barriers that hinder Indonesia's ability to fully tap into its renewable energy potential, such as policy inefficiencies, insufficient infrastructure, and limited financial support. By analyzing Indonesia's energy diplomacy and its participation in regional initiatives like the ASEAN Power Grid, the study explores how the country can enhance its geopolitical influence through leadership in renewable energy. The findings suggest that overcoming these challenges not only allows Indonesia to address its own energy needs but also strengthens its role in shaping global energy policies and contributing to climate change solutions. Renewable energy, geopolitical influence, Indonesia, ASEAN Power Grid, energy diplomacy, energy transition.

Keywords: renewable energy, geopolitical influence, Indonesia, ASEAN Power Grid, energy diplomacy, energy transition.

Navigating The Drivers, Challenges, and Required Institutional Reforms for Indonesia's Accession to The CPTPP

Nabila Dinda Shalsabilla Pinonto'an

This article examines Indonesia's policy direction in pursuing accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). By reviewing relevant literature, policy documents, and official statements, the study addresses two main questions: (1) What strategic, economic, and political motivations drive Indonesia's decision to seek accession to the CPTPP? and (2) What institutional reforms are necessary to align with the multidimensional commitments of the CPTPP? The analysis finds that Indonesia's motivations are driven by the need to increase exports, attract investment, strengthen competitiveness, and deepen integration into global supply chains. However, Indonesia faces challenges in labor, government procurement, state-owned enterprises, and environmental standards. Using a qualitative case study, this study finds that while Indonesia shows partial regulatory alignment with CPTPP commitments, key gaps persist due to protectionist policies and institutional limitations. While the Indonesian government demonstrates political interest and intent, a gap remains between international commitments and domestic preparedness. The article concludes that Indonesia's CPTPP accession plan requires significant regulatory adjustments and cross-sectoral coordination. The findings provide theoretical insight on institutional adaptation and practical guidance for regulatory reform to align Indonesia with CPTPP standards.

Kata Kunci: Indonesia, CPTPP, institutional reform, trade policy.

Indonesia and the Global South: A Constructivist Approach to Diplomatic Leadership in a Multipolar World Order

Krisman Heriamsa

The global power structure has shifted from a unipolar system to multipolarity, marked by the emergence of new powers such as China and Russia and the strengthening of regional cooperation. In this context, the role of Global South countries is becoming increasingly important in shaping a new, more inclusive world order. This study highlights how Indonesia constructs and projects its identity and leadership as a representation of the Global South in the multipolar era. The purpose of the study is to analyze the construction of Indonesia's identity and the diplomatic practices used in forums such as the G20 and BRICS to advocate the interests of developing countries. This study uses a qualitative method with an interpretive approach, based on an analysis of official speeches, diplomatic documents, and scientific literature. Theoretically, this study is based on the constructivism of international relations, especially Alexander Wendt's ideas about the importance of identity and norms in shaping state interests. The results show that Indonesia actively uses normative diplomacy, historical narratives, and multilateral engagement to strengthen its position as a leader of the Global South and encourage reforms to a more just and equal global order.

Kata Kunci: Indonesia, Global South, developing countries, diplomacy, G20, BRICS.

Green Debt Diplomacy dan Implikasi Terhadap Kedaulatan Ekonomi: Studi Kasus Sri Lanka, Pakistan, dan Sub Sahara

Marendra Athallah Faras Majid, Abdusyahid Naufal Fathullah, Labiq Yafuz

Kesenjangan pembiayaan iklim (green debt) yang semakin lebar di negara-negara berkembang menjadi tantangan serius dalam mencapai target pengurangan emisi dan adaptasi terhadap dampak perubahan iklim. Di tengah tekanan utang dan keterbatasan fiskal, konsep diplomasi utang hijau muncul sebagai pendekatan alternatif yang menghubungkan pelunasan utang dengan pendanaan aksi iklim. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengulas secara kritis bagaimana mekanisme diplomasi utang hijau diterapkan di Sri Lanka, Pakistan, dan kawasan Sub-Sahara Afrika, serta mengevaluasi efektivitasnya dalam mendukung pembangunan berkelanjutan. Penulisan dilakukan melalui pendekatan deskriptif kualitatif berbasis studi pustaka, dengan merujuk pada artikel-artikel ilmiah terkini yang terindeks Scopus. Dengan melakukan pendekatan teori modernisasi, temuan utama menunjukkan bahwa meskipun skema ini menjanjikan sebagai solusi pembiayaan inovatif, pelaksanaannya masih terbatas oleh ketimpangan kekuasaan dalam sistem global, lemahnya kapasitas fiskal negara penerima, serta minimnya komitmen negara maju dalam merealisasikan janji pendanaan iklim. Di sisi lain, mekanisme ini juga membuka peluang untuk memperkuat kontribusi nasional (NDCs) jika didukung oleh tata kelola keuangan yang lebih adil dan kolaboratif. Artikel ini merekomendasikan agar reformasi struktural dalam tata kelola utang dan penguatan posisi tawar negara berkembang menjadi agenda prioritas dalam kerangka diplomasi iklim global.

Kata Kunci: Pendanaan Iklim, Diplomasi Hutang, Ketergantungan Ekonomi, alutsista.

Leader Personality Analysis Of War Decisions (Case Study : Vladimir Putin In The Russia-Ukraina War

Wahyu Wulandari

This study explores how Vladimir Putin's personality has influenced his decision-making during the Russia-Ukraine war. While much research has focused on geopolitical, demographic, and socio-political factors, this paper highlights a different perspective: the role of Putin's leadership traits in shaping the conflict. The analysis begins with a historical overview of the Russia-Ukraine tensions, followed by a biographical examination of Putin, identifying key events that have shaped his leadership style. Traits such as assertiveness, self-confidence, and authoritarian tendencies are examined in relation to his strategic choices. Using a qualitative descriptive approach, primarily through content analysis of secondary sources, the study assesses how these traits have influenced his policies and actions. The findings suggest that Putin's centralized and top-down leadership style has played a crucial role in the war, underscoring the broader impact of individual leadership traits on global conflicts.

Keywords: Leader Personality, Vladimir Putin, Russia-Ukraine War.

Comparative Foreign Policies of Indonesia and the Philippines in Responding to Security Instability to Tiongkok

Laode Muhamad Fathun, Audrey Chairunnisa, Nurfarah Nidatya, Pribadi Sutiono, Angga Santa Gideon

This study aims to explore the formulation of Indonesian and Philippines' foreign policies in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite the similar characteristics as archipelagic states, they adopt distinct foreign policy approaches. Employing a qualitative comparative case study method, this research draws on primary data from interviews and observations, as well as secondary data from relevant literature. Data were analyzed through tracking and triangulation techniques. The findings reveal that Indonesia adopts a predominantly diplomatic approach in its Indo-Pacific strategy, whereas the Philippines employs a combination of hard power and legal instruments, particularly through international judicial mechanisms. These differences are rooted in each country's distinct geopolitical posture—Indonesia maintaining a closer orientation toward China, and the Philippines aligning more closely with the United States.

Keywords: foreign policy, Indo-Pacific, Indonesia, Philippines, Comparative Study.

Penyelenggaraan Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IC-CEPA) Dalam Mendorong Potensi Perdagangan dan Posisi Politik Indonesia di Global South

Baptista Ezra Varani Nabit, Dirk Jotizto Delovedi, Josef Rangga Widyadharma, Hendrikus Nugroho Sidharta, Muhammad Akmal Rinaldi Putra

Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IC-CEPA) yang ditandatangani pada tahun 2019 merupakan perjanjian dagang formal pertama antara Indonesia dengan negara Amerika Latin yaitu Chile. Kerjasama bilateral ini bertujuan untuk memaksimalkan komoditas ekspor Indonesia dan juga mengurangi ketergantungan terhadap pasar tradisional guna mendorong performa ekspor yang lebih bermutu, dan meningkatkan reputasi serta posisi tawar Indonesia di Global South. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan praktik Free Trade Agreement untuk mencapai tujuan kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia menggunakan instrumen ekonomi, yang berorientasi pada kawasan ekonomi Global South yang lagi bertumbuh pesat. Kajian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif berbasis data primer dan data sekunder dengan teknik

pengumpulan studi pustaka atau pun dokumen tertulis. Kerangka teori yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah Economic Statecraft oleh David A. Baldwin (1985) dan Pendekatan South-South Cooperation. Hasil kajian ini menunjukkan bahwa kerjasama perdagangan antara kedua negara berhasil berkontribusi terbukanya pasar ekspor Indonesia di kawasan Amerika Latin dan penguatan posisi tawar Indonesia di Global South.

Keywords: Economic Statecraft, IC-CEPA, Diversifikasi, Ekspansi, South-South.

LEVERAGING INDONESIA'S RENEWABLE ENERGY POTENTIAL FOR GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE ASEAN POWER GRID

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Abstract

Indonesia possesses vast renewable energy resources, including geothermal, solar, hydropower, and biomass, positioning the country as a crucial player in the global shift from fossil fuels to sustainable energy sources. This paper examines the barriers that hinder Indonesia's ability to fully tap into its renewable energy potential, such as policy inefficiencies, insufficient infrastructure, and limited financial support. By analyzing Indonesia's energy diplomacy and its participation in regional initiatives like the ASEAN Power Grid, the study explores how the country can enhance its geopolitical influence through leadership in renewable energy. The findings suggest that overcoming these challenges not only allows Indonesia to address its own energy needs but also strengthens its role in shaping global energy policies and contributing to climate change solutions.

Keywords: *Renewable energy, geopolitical influence, Indonesia, ASEAN Power Grid, energy diplomacy, energy transition*

INTRODUCTION

The shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy is one of the most important developments of the 21st century, alongside efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. This energy transition has reshaped geopolitics, economics, and created new opportunities for countries rich in renewable energy. Indonesia, one of the most geographically strategic countries in the world, is at the center of this global change (Grosjean et al., 2021). As a nation with vast renewable energy resources, Indonesia is

positioned to play a key role in the global energy transition.

Endowed with abundant renewable energy resources, including geothermal, solar, hydropower, and biomass, Indonesia can potentially assume a leading position in the race towards global energy transformation. The country is blessed with some of the most considerable geothermal potential in the world, with an estimated 29 GW of unexploited potential (Cavallo et al., 2020), and the highest solar power density, with an annual average of 4.8 kWh/m²/day (Gielen et al., 2019). Indonesia's hydropower resources are estimated at 75

GW, and biomass resources, especially from agricultural waste, have a potential of 32 GW (Susanti et al., 2020). To put this into perspective, Indonesia's hydropower potential alone could supply the electricity needs of the entire island of Java for over 10 years, based on current consumption levels. Similarly, the biomass potential from agricultural waste could provide enough energy to power millions of homes, significantly reducing dependence on fossil fuels. These vast resources highlight Indonesia's capacity to become a renewable energy powerhouse in Southeast Asia.

Despite this potential, Indonesia faces several challenges that limit its ability to fully utilize renewable energy. These challenges include policy inefficiencies, limited infrastructure, regulatory barriers, and insufficient financial incentives for investors. As a result, renewable energy development remains underexploited, particularly in rural and remote areas. Overcoming these challenges is crucial for Indonesia to strengthen its energy security and enhance its geopolitical influence. The country's involvement in regional initiatives such as the ASEAN Power Grid and its energy diplomacy efforts offer opportunities to position itself as a leader in the regional and global transition to renewable energy.

However, policy inconsistencies, lack of political will, inadequate fiscal incentives,

and insufficient infrastructure have kept renewable energy in Indonesia in the shadows until now, particularly in villages and remote areas. Amidst these challenges, there exist unique opportunities within Indonesia's renewable energy resources to meet energy security needs and enhance its regional leadership. Indonesia's involvement in regional energy cooperation, notably the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and South-South cooperation on geothermal energy, showcases the country's potential to lead the regional and even global energy transition.

This article discusses Indonesia's potential to use renewable energy resources to enhance its geopolitical regionally and globally. Specifically, it aims to: (1) Examine challenges hindering the development of renewable energy sources in Indonesia and recommend ways to overcome these hurdles. (2) Assess the extent to which Indonesia's energy diplomacy, especially under regional architecture such as the ASEAN Power Grid, can help enhance its geopolitical leverage. (3) Assess the role of Indonesia in international climate governance and its commitment to sustainable development.

Through tackling the obstacles against the advancement of renewable energy and seeking areas of cooperation, this paper seeks to illustrate how Indonesia can turn itself into a global front-runner on the

transition to renewable energy and a major player in the definition of energy security and climate action.

The central issue this paper addresses is how Indonesia, despite possessing one of the largest renewable energy potentials in the world, has yet to fully capitalize on these resources to enhance its geopolitical influence. The paper argues that by overcoming the existing barriers—such as policy inconsistencies, inadequate infrastructure, and lack of investment—Indonesia can not only meet its domestic energy needs but also emerge as a leader in both regional and global energy transitions. By strategically leveraging its renewable energy resources, Indonesia can strengthen its role in shaping global energy governance and contribute to advancing global climate goals, positioning itself as a key player in the energy and climate action discourse.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study primarily utilizes two key theoretical approaches to analyze Indonesia's renewable energy potential and its impact on the country's geopolitical standing: **Geopolitics of Energy** and **Energy Diplomacy**. These frameworks provide the lenses through which Indonesia's energy transition and diplomatic efforts will be examined, focusing

on both domestic and international perspectives.

1. Geopolitics of Energy

The **geopolitics of energy** framework helps explain how countries with abundant renewable energy resources can use these assets to exert influence over global energy markets and policies (Grosjean et al., 2021). Renewable energy resources, especially geothermal, solar, and wind power, allow countries like Indonesia to strengthen their geopolitical position. These resources become powerful tools in asserting influence internationally, positioning renewable energy as a strategic element in shaping global energy governance.

2. Energy Diplomacy

Energy Diplomacy Theory emphasizes how countries use their energy resources and access to energy networks to influence both regional and global politics (Lee et al., 2020). Indonesia's participation in regional energy initiatives, such as the **ASEAN Power Grid (APG)**, is a prime example of how energy diplomacy can drive regional cooperation. By interconnecting power grids across Southeast Asia, Indonesia can facilitate the flow of renewable energy, enhance regional energy security, and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. Through these regional efforts, Indonesia can

diversify its energy supply, assert its leadership in the region, and strengthen its geopolitical influence.

This theoretical framework, based on **Geopolitics of Energy and Energy Diplomacy**, serves as the foundation for analyzing Indonesia's renewable energy potential and its role in global energy governance. By addressing the challenges to renewable energy development and strengthening its energy diplomacy, Indonesia can enhance its geopolitical standing and position itself as a leader in the global energy transition.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study follows a literature review approach to explore the development of renewable energy in Indonesia. The research process is structured as follows:

The first step involves reviewing existing literature on renewable energy development in Indonesia. This includes academic articles, policy documents, and case studies that provide insights into the technical, financial, and regulatory aspects of renewable energy in the country. The review identifies the barriers, opportunities, and strategies for managing renewable energy resources, focusing on Indonesia's potential for a sustainable energy future.

Following the literature review, the next step is policy analysis to assess the effectiveness of Indonesia's energy policies. This phase involves examining the regulatory frameworks that govern renewable energy, identifying gaps and inefficiencies in policy design, and evaluating how well the government has incentivized renewable energy adoption. The analysis will also look at the role of national and regional policies in facilitating or hindering the transition to a low-carbon economy.

The third step involves analyzing case studies of renewable energy projects, both within Indonesia and in other countries with similar challenges. These case studies serve as evidence of successful strategies to overcome common barriers in renewable energy development, such as financing issues, regulatory hurdles, and infrastructure limitations. Lessons learned from these cases help inform potential solutions for Indonesia's renewable energy sector.

After gathering qualitative data, the next step is quantitative data analysis. This involves analyzing trends in renewable energy investments, focusing on investment flows, foreign capital's role in Indonesia's energy sector, and the economic outcomes of renewable energy projects. This analysis also includes an ex-post facto approach, where historical investment data is reviewed to understand the long-term economic

benefits of renewable energy, such as job creation and energy security.

Finally, the research integrates the findings from the literature review, policy analysis, case studies, and quantitative data analysis. This synthesis provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of Indonesia's renewable energy sector and identifies key obstacles and opportunities. The study will evaluate Indonesia's capacity to leverage its renewable energy resources, assessing its potential to enhance geopolitical influence through energy diplomacy and regional cooperation.

Through this process, the study aims to provide a thorough understanding of Indonesia's renewable energy landscape and its potential to lead the transition to a low-carbon economy while strengthening its geopolitical position.

LITERATURE REVIEW

World Energy Transformation and Geopolitical Reversal

Nations with ample renewable assets are becoming the new “energy princes” equipped to shape the global energy industry, policies, and technologies. Countries characterized by geothermal, solar, and wind energy, like Indonesia, can help transform regional and global energy

systems. The rich presence of renewable pockets in these nations enables them to remix their energy mixes and places them at the heart of global renewable energy governance (Goh et al., 2021; Zhao et al., 2021).

The political value of renewables becomes particularly apparent in light of the security of supply, considering that critical minerals needed to develop renewable energy infrastructure (lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements) are strategic in and of themselves. They are essential to manufacturing solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicle batteries, meaning countries with abundant reserves have tremendous geopolitical weight (Grosjean et al., 2021). For example, countries like Chile or Argentina, which have large lithium reserves, can now also affect the world's supply of critical materials for the energy transition (Jamasp & Nepal, 2020). This new posture has led to changing strategies at the global level as nations have worked to secure supply chains and form alliances with resource-heavy countries.

Aggregate power structures are also changing as we leap into sustainable energy. Oil-exporting countries, including Saudi Arabia and Russia, are investing heavily in renewables as they are now pressured by lowering oil prices, which impacts their geopolitical strategies (Al-Fahed et al.). This

shift underlines the confluence of energy, security, and geo-strategic power in the worldwide energy transition.

The international energy transition is altering international trade and investment flows. Many regions are harmonizing trade policies with climate ambitions, providing new economic opportunities for investors in renewable energy technologies and infrastructures. For example, the European Union is recognized as becoming a global leader in renewable energy policy, co-operating with renewable energy-abundant countries in Africa and the Middle East to tackle climate change and energy security (Elhorst et al., 2020). These partnerships are essential not only for the fight against climate change but also to further diplomatic relations and regional security.

The Worldwide energy transition is rewriting geopolitical rules, creating new players on the global stage when traditional actors are made restless by the global depletion of fossil fuels. In the case of countries like Indonesia, Chile, and Saudi Arabia, their relative influence in global energy governance and the international arena will depend above all else upon their renewable potential, availability of critical minerals, and strategic alliances. These changes are remaking the geographies of global energy security and political power.

The Potential of Renewable Energy in Indonesia

Indonesia's renewable energy potential is abundant, yet underdeveloped due to its geographically strategic location and vast natural resources. For example, the country's geothermal potential remains one of the largest in the world, with an estimated 29 GW of unexploited potential (Cavallo et al., 2020). Despite this, only a small portion has been developed, largely due to technical, financial, and regulatory challenges. Indonesia has the second-highest geothermal resource capacity globally, after the United States, but land-use conflicts and the rugged terrain where many geothermal fields are located have hampered progress (Rini et al., 2020).

However, geothermal energy offers immense potential for Indonesia in the fight against climate change. Once fully developed, geothermal energy could serve as a reliable baseload power source, providing continuous energy that doesn't depend on weather conditions, unlike solar or wind energy. The operational cost of geothermal power is exceptionally low due to the country's favorable geological conditions. Once infrastructure is in place, the ongoing costs of extracting and converting geothermal energy are minimal compared to

fossil fuels, making it a sustainable and cost-effective long-term solution.

Alongside geothermal energy, Indonesia boasts ample solar resources, which is a high priority for the country. Being one of the countries lying along the equator, the country experiences high solar irradiation levels throughout the year, creating good opportunities for solar power electricity generation (Gielen et al., 2019). Nevertheless, solar PV has not been developed as much as it would be due to inefficient regulations, inconsistent policies, and low incentives for the private sector to invest in the country (Sovacool et al., 2020). Against this backdrop, solar energy has the potential to respond to Indonesia's energy access challenges, particularly in rural areas, by way of off-grid energy systems.

Hydropower has further considerable potential but is an underdeveloped resource in Indonesia, where over 75 GW of potential is estimated, consisting of large and small-scale run-of-river hydroelectric plants (Müller et al., 2020). Hydropower expansion has also been hindered by environmental issues, societal dislocation, and bureaucratic delays (Gómez et al., 2021). With Indonesia's persistent transition from rural to urban and agricultural to industrial development, these bottlenecks can be overcome, and environmental and social

governance can be further strengthened to realize the full potential of hydropower.

Wind and biomass energy, including agricultural waste, offer an estimated potential of 32 GW (Susanti et al., 2020), representing an opportunity for Indonesia. One of the world's top palm oil producers, the country has abundant biomass resources like palm oil mill effluent and rice husk for bioenergy production. However, despite this potential, the development of biomass has been restricted by inefficient supply chains, lack of technological improvement, and inadequate policy support for the sustainable production of biomass (Haryanto et al., 2021). Solving these issues and promoting innovation in conversion technologies will be the key to realizing the potential of energy from bio resources.

However, the technical potential and financial viability of renewable sources in Indonesia are not the sole factors dragging the underutilization; they are also due to regulatory and policy restrictions. One significant barrier is the absence of consistent long-term energy policies that provide consultative directions for renewable energy deployment (Sovacool et al., 2020). Furthermore, the continuing existence of fossil fuel subsidies has distorted the energy market, making it unfair for investment in renewable energy (Indrayani et al., 2020). To address these

challenges, Indonesia must introduce far-reaching policy-level reforms, build on regulatory frameworks, and invest in infrastructure and technology.

Despite its high renewable energy potential, Indonesia still faces technical, financial, regulatory, and policy issues that prevent further utilization. Nonetheless, if these obstacles are tackled, Indonesia has the potential to shift towards a sustainable energy future and act as an energy leader within regional and international energy governance.

Obstacles to Renewable Energy

Development:

Barriers The development of renewable energy in Indonesia is hindered by a complex set of barriers, most of which come from a long-standing legacy of policy, financial, and infrastructure-related factors. One of the key barriers to scaling up renewable energy in the country is the persisting dependence on fossil fuel subsidies, which run into billions of dollars each year. Those subsidies also have the effect of biasing the energy market, as they make fossil fuels unnaturally cheap and more competitive than renewable energy sources, undermining the incentive to invest in green technologies (Cavallo et al., 2020). For this reason, renewable energy projects (as a whole, they are more capital-intensive

and have a more extended payback period) are less appealing to investors than the more subsidized fossil fuels sector. This back-to-back situation is a significant obstacle for a balanced energy transition towards a sustainable future. In the longer term, the ongoing fossil fuel subsidies could impede Indonesia from reaping the benefits of its potential for renewable energy, hampering the shift to low-carbon energy systems.

A second important barrier is the shortfall of investment in renewable energy in Indonesia. While Germany has abundant renewable energy resources, the costs associated with infrastructure and technology investments are substantial, and Indonesia faces similar challenges (Zhao et al., 2021). The renewable energy sector in Indonesia continues to suffer from limited financing alternatives and an underdeveloped investment environment. Public sector funding is insufficient to meet the scale of necessary investment, leaving a significant gap for private sector involvement.

In recent years, Indonesia has increasingly relied on foreign investment to fund large-scale renewable energy projects. However, this dependency presents challenges, including currency risk and uncertainties regarding long-term political and regulatory stability. Indonesia's

investment environment remains unstable, with frequent changes in energy policies and regulations, which deters potential investors. Moreover, the country's financing mechanisms, such as subsidies and incentives, have not been sufficiently robust to attract large-scale private capital.

Without substantial private sector investment, especially for critical infrastructure such as energy grids, Indonesia is at risk of missing its renewable energy targets. Additionally, the country's reliance on foreign capital makes it vulnerable to external economic factors, such as exchange rate fluctuations and global economic downturns.

A comparable situation is seen in Mexico, where infrastructure development, especially in upgrading the electricity grid to manage a larger share of renewable energy, has also required large investments. The lack of infrastructure in Indonesia, coupled with the insufficient funding to meet its renewable energy ambitions, exacerbates the challenge of transitioning to a low-carbon economy.

Infrastructure problems in Indonesia are related to the underdevelopment of the energy grid. Indonesia has ample renewable energy resources. However, its existing electricity grid is deteriorated and does not support the integration of renewable sources, specifically, intermittent ones such as solar and wind (Sovacool et al., 2021).

The low penetrational and variable nature of renewable power generation and the near capacity of the grid to accept decentralized energy production only add to the challenges of integrating many renewables. In addition, the absence of storage technologies (e.g., batteries) makes it difficult to control supply and demand and have a reliable renewable energy supply. Those infrastructure problems need to be addressed, and substantial investments in the electric grid will be required, including developing more innovative grid technology and better energy storage that can help make the grid more reliable and flexible.

Regulations play a key role in hindering Indonesia's expansion of renewable energy technologies. Indonesia's national energy policies—which include frameworks like the National Energy Policy (KEN), the Renewable Energy Law (Law No. 30/2007), and various regional plans—have frequently been inconsistent, cumulative, and lack long-term strategic guidance. These shortcomings lead to confusion among potential investors and delay the progress of renewable energy projects (Sovacool et al., 2021).

The permitting process for renewable energy projects in Indonesia is also complex and time-consuming. There is significant regulatory overlap, with different levels of government (national, provincial,

and local) implementing inconsistent rules and requirements. This lack of coordination not only increases the cost and timeline for building new energy infrastructure but also deters investors who are wary of bureaucratic inefficiencies. Moreover, the current regulatory environment fails to adequately address emerging technologies, such as offshore wind, which may require specialized regulatory frameworks to develop successfully.

This regulatory instability does not inspire investor confidence and remains a significant obstacle for both domestic and foreign entities seeking to invest in Indonesia's renewable energy sector. A reform of these policies, along with the establishment of a transparent and predictable regulatory framework, is essential for mobilizing the investments needed to scale up renewable energy projects and meet the country's ambitious energy and climate goals. Streamlining the permitting process, improving intergovernmental coordination, and creating regulations tailored to cutting-edge renewable technologies will be crucial for Indonesia to unlock the full potential of its renewable energy resources.

In addition, Indonesia's fossil-fuel dependence also results in institutional inertia, with vested interests in the energy sector working against reforms that could undermine the fossil fuel industry. This

resistance is evidenced in our ongoing preference for fossil fuel-generated energy, including all its attendant environmental and economic costs. The persistence of this bias in favour of fossil fuels underlines the necessity for more decisive policy actions to speed up the energy transition and reduce the power of vested interests that can oppose the cleaner forms of energy (Cavallo et al., 2020).

The expansion of renewable energy in Indonesia has been capped by several cross-cutting barriers such as the distorting impact of fossil fuel subsidies, the gap between investment needs and investment gap, lack of infrastructure, and regulatory challenges. Breaking through these barriers will require a more coordinated approach between government and industry to harmonize policies, simplify regulations, and scale interest in R&D and the infrastructure to roll out new energy technologies. Only with a robust, multi-dimensional strategy will Indonesia realize its substantial renewable energy endowment and move towards a greener and resilient future.

Cooperation-Based on Energy Diplomacy

Energy diplomacy refers to the use of a country's energy resources and energy policies to influence international relations

and advance its strategic objectives. In an era of rapidly shifting global energy dynamics, as production increasingly moves toward renewable energy sources and traditional power centers lose influence, energy diplomacy plays a critical role in shaping world politics. It enables countries to secure energy supplies, protect national interests, and build international partnerships. Energy diplomacy is not only about securing access to resources but also about using energy as a tool for cooperation, negotiation, and exerting influence in global forums.

Indonesia, endowed with rich renewable energy sources such as geothermal, solar, and biomass, and located strategically in Southeast Asia, places great emphasis on energy diplomacy as a key instrument for achieving its energy security and economic development goals. Through energy diplomacy, Indonesia seeks to forge strategic alliances, increase energy trade, and promote regional energy integration. For example, Indonesia's involvement in the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and partnerships with other countries in South-South cooperation on geothermal energy reflect its efforts to position itself as a regional energy leader. By engaging in regional and global energy initiatives, Indonesia strengthens its geopolitical influence and helps shape the future of

global energy governance, particularly in Southeast Asia (Lee et al., 2020).

One of the most strategic regional projects that further manifests Indonesia's energy diplomacy undertakings is the ASEAN Power Grid. The APG seeks to interconnect the electricity supply networks of Southeast Asia, allowing power to flow across the borders, increasing the overall energy security and reducing this region's dependence on fossil fuels (Chandran et al., 2021). Indonesia's joining indicates its support for and focus on regional energy cooperation, and it has established itself as a key player in the region's energy transformation. Regional power grid interconnections provide opportunities for Indonesia to export and import renewable energy, especially solar and geothermal energy, in response to the varied energy needs of the neighbouring countries. Moreover, the APG is consistent with Indonesia's general policy to accommodate a larger contribution of renewable energy to the national energy mix, resulting in mutually supportive interactions between regional cooperation and national energy policy targets. Active participation in the APG enables Indonesia to increase its regional influence and contributes to its energy security by diversifying the primary energy source and linking to neighbouring countries.

Apart from the regional cooperation in ASEAN, Indonesia's participation in South-South cooperation is important for its efforts in energy diplomacy, including geothermal energy. As one of the countries with the largest geothermal potential in the world, Indonesia has the opportunity to share its expertise and technologies with other developing nations, particularly in the Global South, which faces significant energy challenges (Boussinesq et al.). Indonesia's experience in geothermal development serves as a model for countries in regions such as East Africa and Latin America, where similar natural resources are abundant and could be harnessed for sustainable energy development (Kreuter et al., 2020). Indonesia has developed cooperation with countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Philippines through South-South cooperation, leading to knowledge transfer, technical assistance, and joint investments in geothermal power projects. These partnerships not only expand Indonesia's geopolitical reach but also stimulate economic development within Indonesia and in the countries with which it has forged these partnerships by opening new markets for Indonesian geothermal technology and services.

Furthermore, Indonesia's energy diplomacy is not limited to bilateral cooperation and regional initiatives but


extends to multilateral cooperation at international energy fora. With India's active involvement in the IREN and UNFCCC, the nation's influence over global energy governance has been further strengthened (Nicolau et al., 2020). Through this participation, Indonesia adds its voice to global conversations about scaling up renewable energy, broadening energy access, and addressing climate change, as well as to the call for policy support for the development of cleaner energy technologies in the Global South. Indonesia's participation in multilateral energy diplomacy campaigns allows it to shape global energy agendas, solicit financial support for its renewable energy projects, and attract incoming investment in its energy activities from the rest of the globe.

Indonesia's energy diplomacy initiatives also support its broader foreign policy objectives to promote regional stability and achieve economic growth by developing renewable energy resources. Indonesia is developing closer diplomatic and economic relations with its region and other developing economies by using its renewable resources and its experience in geothermal power generation. Such partnerships are vital to navigating regional energy security challenges and re-elevating Indonesia as a global player in sustainable energy solutions (Kadir et al., 2021). Energy diplomacy is the


centrepiece of the country’s foreign relations policy, signalling its understanding of the energy, security, and economic linkages in contemporary geopolitics.

Energy diplomacy has become an important instrument for Indonesia in addressing the complexity of global energy governance. By being involved in regional initiatives such as the ASEAN Power Grid, South-South geothermal cooperation, and multilateral energy forums, Indonesia is working to establish itself as a significant actor in determining regional and international energy dynamics. Such initiatives will boost Indonesia’s international leverage and help achieve the country’s development objectives by promoting deploying renewable energy technologies. While Indonesia consolidates its energy diplomacy, it could benefit from its potential in renewable energy to take a leadership role in the shift to green energy

RESULT AND DISCUSSION



Indonesia’s RE potential is valuable for domestic and regional energy security. If developed to its full potential, the country’s geothermal capacity could supply a stable baseload of energy to Southeast Asia. Solar energy is auspicious in the eastern provinces



of Indonesia; however, overall, considerable investments in infrastructure and technology are needed to harness its full potential (IEA, 2021). Hydropower is a promising source, especially for off-grid communities, with small to micro and mini-hydro systems (Sovacool et al.) Biomass, which is mainly related to the palm oil industry, is promising in renewable energy provision; however, it is restricted by the land use conflicts and policy barriers that bound the development of the freshwater supply (Zhao et al., 2021).

This renewable energy transition in Indonesia offers a double-edged sword for reshaping the nation’s energy outlook and the regional power play downwards for the island chain. The archipelago’s abundant green energy sources, such as geothermal, solar, hydropower, and biomass, make

Indonesia a major player in the global transition from fossil fuels to renewables. However, many obstacles are impeding the optimal utilization of these resources. These obstacles are entrenched in political, economic, infrastructural, and regulatory constraints. In order to harness its potential in renewable energy sources and realize its energy transition goals, Indonesia should address these challenges through specific policy reforms, strategic interventions, and strengthened energy diplomacy. This article analyses the central barriers and opportunities for Indonesia's renewable energy sector, emphasizing energy diplomacy, regional cooperation, and infrastructure.

Fossil Fuel Subsidies: A Major Obstacle to Renewable Energy Development

One of the root causes of the growth and development of renewable power in Indonesia is the government's ongoing support for fossil fuel subsidies. Indonesia is also home to one of the world's largest fossil fuel subsidy schemes, leading to distortions in the energy market and undermining the competitiveness of renewable energy (Cavallo et al., 2020). They are also de facto subsidies to fossil fuels that make those energy sources artificially inexpensive, hobbling the efforts to switch to cleaner, more sustainable energy systems. In an

energy market dominated by fossil fuels, this represents a heavily skewed playing field for renewable energy projects to operate, particularly as the high initial capital costs and extended return period of renewable energy infrastructure create additional barriers to entry.

Fossil fuel subsidies continue to undermine government support for renewable energy development in Indonesia. While the government has initiated various renewable energy procurement projects, such as providing process incentives and feed-in tariffs, the amount of subsidies directed towards these projects remains relatively small compared to the substantial subsidies that continue to flow into the fossil fuel sector. These fossil fuel subsidies artificially lower the cost of fossil fuels, making them more competitive than renewable energy options, which discourages investment in clean energy technologies.

Eliminating or scaling back fossil fuel subsidies would help level the playing field for renewable energy, encourage greater investment in clean energy technologies, and accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy. However, cutting these subsidies is a politically challenging process. Fossil fuel subsidies are deeply entrenched, both as a popular policy among voters and as a means of addressing broader social and

economic issues such as energy access and affordability. Reducing these subsidies would require addressing the political sensitivity surrounding energy prices and the potential socio-economic consequences, especially for low-income households that rely on affordable fossil fuel-based energy.

Nevertheless, the cut in fossil fuel subsidies represents an opportunity for Indonesia to reorient its energy policy in line with domestic and global goals for sustainability. A phased withdrawal of subsidies, combined with mechanisms to compensate vulnerable groups (like the UK winter fuel allowance), could be the policy approach to bring about this shift. It would also show Indonesia's readiness to mitigate climate change and to become a hero in global climate diplomacy.

Investment Gaps and Financial Constraints

The investment gap is also one of Indonesia's primary obstacles to renewable energy development. The funding for these renewable energy projects—in Although rich in renewable resources, Indonesia has not been able to attract sufficient investment for its development. the scope of **green bonds** and other financial instruments tailored for the renewable energy sector.

Additionally, international financial organizations and private investors should be incentivized to invest in Indonesia's renewable energy infrastructure by providing a clear roadmap for long-term policy stability and consistent regulatory support. Research has shown that the integration of green bonds, climate financing, and stable regulatory frameworks can significantly enhance investment in renewable energy (Zhao et al., 2021; Goh et al., 2021).

Indonesia's renewable energy industry is hampered by an underdeveloped and undercapitalized financing market, which is impeding private sector investment in clean energy projects. "... International Financing Options, such as green bonds and multilateral climate funds, could in principle cover that gap, but in practice their use has been minimal." Moreover, the financing support mechanisms available to renewable energy projects are rigid. They may not fit the specific needs of developers, particularly in the initial phase of project development, where financing risks are significant.

To tackle these issues, Indonesia must focus on forging an all-inclusive financial strategy that embraces both public and private sector investments. Such a strategy should create an enabling

investment environment by offering mechanisms such as currency risk guarantees, protection against political instability, and expanding the scope of green bonds and other financial instruments tailored for the renewable energy sector. Additionally, international financial organizations and private investors should be incentivized to invest in Indonesia's renewable energy infrastructure by providing a clear roadmap for long-term policy stability and consistent regulatory support. Research has shown that the integration of green bonds, climate financing, and stable regulatory frameworks can significantly enhance investment in renewable energy (Zhao et al., 2021; Goh et al., 2021).

The Indonesian government can also explore creative financial approaches, such as **blended finance**, which combines **public resources** with **private-sector investment** to support renewable energy development programs. This strategy could include mechanisms to attract **international financing** for large-scale renewable energy projects, like **geothermal** or **solar power plants**, ensuring that investments are directed toward high-priority areas such as **grid modernization** and **energy storage**. While **blended finance** has not yet been fully implemented in Indonesia's renewable energy sector, it is increasingly

recommended as a promising strategy for mobilizing capital and addressing financing gaps in large-scale projects.

Regulatory Inefficiencies: Streamlining Policies and Improving Governance

Indonesia's regulatory environment for renewable energy development has been fragmented, inconsistent, and slow, presenting substantial challenges for investors and project development. One significant factor is the multi-level and multi-stakeholder permitting framework for renewable energy projects, which results in delays and higher cost (Sovacool et al., 2021). This ineffectiveness leads to decreased investment and thus slows the development of renewable energy infrastructure, aggravating the transition problem.

Moreover, the legal and policy environment for renewables is still underdeveloped in many countries. Although Indonesia has made progress in promoting renewable energy based on various national and regional measures, these attempts are mostly uncoordinated, with no long-term strategic framework. In general, no standard set of regulations exists for such renewable energy technologies as offshore wind and advanced geothermal systems, leading to

fragmentation and confusion in the marketplace, and making it hard for investors to obtain long-term financing and necessary permits for project development.

To address these regulatory issues, Indonesia needs to simplify its energy regulations and create a more consistent and stable regulatory framework. One of the key actions required is streamlining the permitting process for renewable energy projects. The current process is complicated and time-consuming, and simplifying it would help reduce bureaucratic delays, making it easier for both domestic and international investors to engage in the market. This could be achieved by creating a clear, one-stop platform for applications, reducing the number of required permits, and establishing transparent timelines for approvals.

Additionally, the regulatory environment is often burdened with excessive administrative hurdles that increase costs and delays. Reducing red tape by cutting down on overly complex requirements or duplicative paperwork would make the process more efficient and encourage investment in the renewable energy sector.

Another significant challenge is the lack of coordination between national and regional authorities, leading to conflicting regulations that slow down the implementation of renewable energy projects. Improved communication and cooperation between

national and regional authorities is essential to ensure that regulations are aligned and consistent across the country.

Furthermore, Indonesia needs to establish a long-term renewable energy policy with clear, measurable targets and goals. This policy should provide a roadmap for the country's energy transition, including specific targets for renewable energy adoption, such as the share of renewable energy in the national energy mix by a defined year. The policy must also take into account Indonesia's broader development goals, ensuring that the transition to clean energy is aligned with economic, social, and environmental objectives.

The shift to clean energy should be integrated with Indonesia's broader development agenda. It is crucial that renewable energy targets support the country's economic growth, social development, and environmental sustainability. This means that the transition must be carefully planned to avoid negative impacts on local communities or key sectors like agriculture and manufacturing.

Indonesia can also learn from other countries with successful experiences in simplifying renewable energy regulation. For instance, transparent and long-term energy policies in Germany and Denmark have given regulatory assurance and stability, enabling significant investment in renewables. By

introducing complementary policies, Indonesia can foster an enabling environment for renewable energy, stimulating the development of clean energy industries and encouraging foreign investment.

Energy Infrastructure: Modernizing the Grid and Enhancing Energy Storage

Another important obstacle to the effective integration of renewable energy sources into the national grid comes from the condition of Indonesia's energy infrastructure. Although Indonesia holds excellent potential for RE, such as solar, geothermal, and hydropower, the existing grid network is old and not adapted to the decentralized and intermittent way RE is often generated (Sovacool et al., 2021). However, the country's existing grid systems were primarily built to support centralized fossil fuel-based power generation, and they are not well suited to add massive chunks of renewable energy.

The electricity grid is a critical infrastructure that is not well-prepared to deal with Indonesia's renewable energy generation variability. Solar and wind energies are intermittent, depending on the weather and time of day. Indonesia must start developing innovative grid technologies to cope with this variation and maintain stable energy supplies. These technologies

can monitor the energy flow on the grid and allow for real-time management. Intelligent grids are necessary for managing supply and demand, integrating renewable energies, and minimizing power failures.

Energy storage is equally an important pillar of Indonesia's energy infrastructure. If there is insufficient storage in the system, the surplus generated power during peak generation hours (such as on sunny days for solar and wind power generation) cannot be stored and used in low generation hours (at night or on cloudy days). This handicap subsists and deprives renewable energy of expressing itself, harming its expansion. To meet this challenge, Indonesia should invest in state-of-the-art energy storage technologies - big battery-storage facilities that capture surplus renewable energy when needed. Energy storage technology would also provide more flexibility and resiliency to the grid and a more stable energy supply to urban and remote communities.

Beyond the smart grid and storage, Indonesia needs to focus on making energy more decentralized, especially in its remote and underserved regions. Large swathes of Indonesia, particularly those in rural and outlying areas, are not linked to the national grid. Distributed renewable energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics (PV), wind turbines, and biomass, combined into microgrid systems, can be an affordable

and reliable way of bringing energy access to those areas. By encouraging decentralized energy solutions, Indonesia can address access to energy concerns while also building towards its renewable energy targets.

Energy Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation

Indonesia's renewable energy transition offers several opportunities and challenges, which are influenced by the country's engagement in regional collaboration, energy diplomacy, and multilateral cooperation. The country also uses renewable water sources (geothermal, solar, hydropower, biomass) to fulfil domestic energy demand and bolster energy security by increasing its geopolitical power. Here are some of those: [1] Indonesia's pursuit of power from renewable energy sources, matched with real-life cases and proportional analysis of their impact on energy diplomacy and regional cooperation.

1. Energy Diplomacy as a Strategic Tool

Indonesia's role in **energy diplomacy** has emerged as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, enabling the country to harness renewable energy as a **soft power** instrument. According to Nye (2004), **Soft Power** theory suggests that the

power of a nation is derived not from how much military and economic force it can project and use to coerce others, but rather from its ability to attract and co-opt foreign governments and subnational entities through **attraction** and **cooperation**.

Indonesia's position as a leader in geothermal development, combined with its involvement in regional initiatives such as the **ASEAN Power Grid (APG)**, demonstrates the use of renewable energy as a **soft power** tool. By leveraging its renewable resources, Indonesia promotes regional cooperation and enhances its role as an **energy hub** in Southeast Asia.

The **Wayang Windu Geothermal Power Plant** (135 MW) is evidence of Indonesia's early adoption of geothermal technology, which is a key aspect of its renewable energy strategy. Indonesia has set an ambitious target to increase its geothermal capacity to **4.5 GW by 2030** (Cavallo et al., 2020). Through **South-South Cooperation** on geothermal energy, Indonesia shares its knowledge and expertise with countries like **Kenya** and **Ethiopia**, helping these nations develop their own renewable energy capacities. By transferring technical expertise, Indonesia not only addresses its domestic energy needs but also strengthens political relationships, aligning with **Nye's Soft Power Theory**, which emphasizes the

power of attraction and cooperation in international relations.

This aligns with the work of **Joseph Nye**, who characterizes **energy diplomacy** as a mechanism of geopolitical influence. Nye's concept of the "**power of attraction**" is evident as Indonesia enhances its diplomatic influence by sharing its expertise and investing in sustainable energy technologies throughout the **Global South**. Through these efforts, Indonesia not only maximizes its domestic renewable energy potential but also accelerates market development, contributing to its decarbonization targets and shaping global energy policy.

2. Regional Energy Integration: ASEAN Power Grid and Interdependence

Indonesia in the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) mirrors the Interdependence Theory (Keohane & Nye, 1977), which explains the mutual gains from regional cooperation. By promoting energy integration, Indonesia can ensure greater energy security in Southeast Asia while at the same time expanding its geopolitical reach. On the APG, Indonesia can fulfil its domestic energy demand and become a major exporter of renewable energy, particularly geothermal and solar, to neighbouring countries.

Indonesia's East Java Solar Power Project (50 MW) is the best case in point for regional integration—Chinese PV-apg

design (solar as apt). The project is incorporated into the APG system, enabling Indonesia to export the excess solar power during peak generating hours. By selling renewable energy abroad, Indonesia promotes closer collaboration in the region and minimizes reliance on fossil fuels. As an exporter of environmentally friendly energy, Indonesia corresponds with Keohane & Nye's (1977), which suggests that cooperation rather than competition contributes to long-term gains of regional stability.

Furthermore, the work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye on interdependence implies that countries within a region are interlinked by common energy interests, requiring them to cooperate for long-term security. Indonesia's membership in the **ASEAN Power Grid (APG)** contributes to regional energy integration, strengthening Indonesia's energy security and geopolitical influence. This is consistent with **neoliberalism**, which suggests that states, while pursuing their own interests, can benefit from cooperation and interdependence, as they work together to achieve mutual goals (Keohane & Nye, 1977).

However, many obstacles to energy integration at the regional level exist. These comprise the non-uniform regulations, the pricing framework in energy, and the policy

disparities within the ASEAN member countries. As demonstrated by Alexander Wendt's Constructivist theory, states' identities and interests are constructed through social interactions. Indonesia's leadership in pursuing a coordinated energy policy is crucial for ASEAN. If Indonesia can advocate for harmonized policies throughout ASEAN, sustaining cooperation that contributes to Indonesia's regional leadership and energy security will be crucial.

3. Geopolitical Power: Renewable Energy as a Strategic Asset

In global politics, energy supplies—particularly renewable energy—have become a strategic tool that nations use to gain an advantage during times of confrontation. **Vital Energy Theory suggests** that a nation's international relevance is enhanced by its control over crucial energy supplies, making energy a core component of national security (Grosjean et al., 2021). For Indonesia, leadership in geothermal and **solar power** not only bolsters its national energy security but also strengthens its **geopolitical power**. As a nation with abundant renewable energy resources, Indonesia's increasing capacity in these areas positions it as a regional leader and enhances its geopolitical strength, which is increasingly tied to **energy**

independence. Energy independence enables countries to reduce reliance on external energy sources, mitigating risks during geopolitical tensions and securing long-term stability (Sovacool et al., 2021). By leveraging its renewable energy resources, Indonesia not only meets its domestic energy needs but also enhances its strategic position in both **regional** and **global geopolitics**.

Geothermal power's role in achieving energy independence in Indonesia is exemplified by the success of projects like the Sibayak Geothermal Power Plant (11 MW). Having these resources under its control has given Indonesia substantial geopolitical leverage, making it a pacesetter in South-South cooperation in the energy domain. Synergies can be generated that can further strengthen energy security through bilateral arrangements, such as Indonesia's cooperation with Ethiopia and Kenya in geothermal development, which could contribute to sharing energy security, thus creating better diplomacy with these two countries.

According to Mahan's Strategic Theory, if you control the energy resources, you control the power of nations. With that potential as the hub of geothermal energy, Indonesia can have a say about the direction of the world energy and the state of the world shift to a low-carbon future. Indonesia

enhances its international position through energy diplomacy. As an integral part of the sustainable development of the countries of the Global South, Indonesia seeks to position itself as an essential actor in global energy.

4. Multilateral Platforms: IRENA and UNFCCC for Global Influence

Indonesia's inclusion in multilateral frameworks, such as the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), enhances its role in global energy governance. According to Global Governance Theory (Keohane & Nye, 1977), international organizations provide platforms where countries can shape global rules, norms, and agendas. Through participation in these forums, Indonesia can influence global renewable energy policies, attract financing for its energy projects, and encourage international cooperation.

Indonesia's partnership with IRENA, particularly its active participation in the IRENA Assembly, underscores its ambition to play a leading role in international energy dialogue. Through these platforms, Indonesia has advocated for the adoption of financial instruments to support energy transitions, particularly in developing countries. By engaging with IRENA, Indonesia has also secured vital knowledge

and financial support to expand its geothermal capacity, contributing to a more inclusive and sustainable global energy future that aligns with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Moreover, Indonesia's involvement in the UNFCCC allows it to contribute to climate change policy while also utilizing the platform to secure international financing for renewable energy projects, especially large-scale geothermal programs. Through its participation in these multilateral institutions, Indonesia not only promotes its energy priorities but also strengthens its position in shaping global norms and standards related to renewable energy and climate action.

5. Renewable Energy as a Tool for Soft Power and Global Influence

The increasing leadership of Indonesia in renewable energy also displays some aspects of its soft power. According to Nye (2004), the glimmering effect of it, Soft Power can be defined as the capacity of a nation to influence global results by being attractive rather than forcing. Through renewable energy investments, Indonesia helps the world shift to clean energy and strengthens public diplomacy, especially in the South.

The research cooperation between Indonesia and Brazil in the bioenergy field offers a possible model for understanding how energy diplomacy contributes to

Indonesia's soft power. Cooperation projects and technology exchange in bioenergy and biomass have helped Indonesia strengthen its relationship with Brazil and attract renewable energy-related projects. It has additionally been an opportunity to bolster Indonesia's image as a role model for sustainable development and energy transition.

Using renewable power as a diplomatic persuader, Indonesia can exceed its weight in regional and international relations. It builds closer relations with developed and developing countries, promotes energy policies and regional integration, such as Southeast Asia, and presents itself as a global leader in renewable energy pursuit.

CONCLUSION

Energy diplomacy in Indonesia is key for domestic energy transition and broader geopolitics strategy. Indonesia's energy diplomacy underpins its domestic energy transition and broader geopolitical strategy. Indonesia uses its natural access to renewable energy sources to meet energy security requirements and raise its geopolitical profile. For example, the ASEAN Power Grid, South-South collaboration and its membership in IRENA and the UNFCCC, Indonesian renewable energy and energy diplomacy leadership in Southeast Asia and

the Global South are increasingly being constructed.

Indonesia's engagement in multilateral energy forums and regional cooperation replicates the concepts of Keohane and Nye's global governance and soft power, showing how renewable energy changes the scope of international politics. Overcoming obstacles to renewable energy development and involvement in multilateral forums means that Indonesia is well-placed to remain at the forefront of global efforts to transition towards a low-carbon energy future.

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NAVIGATING THE DRIVERS, CHALLENGES, AND REQUIRED INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOR INDONESIA'S ACCESSION TO THE CPTPP

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Abstract

This article examines Indonesia's policy direction in pursuing accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). By reviewing relevant literature, policy documents, and official statements, the study addresses two main questions: (1) What strategic, economic, and political motivations drive Indonesia's decision to seek accession to the CPTPP? and (2) What institutional reforms are necessary to align with the multidimensional commitments of the CPTPP? The analysis finds that Indonesia's motivations are driven by the need to increase exports, attract investment, strengthen competitiveness, and deepen integration into global supply chains. However, Indonesia faces challenges in labor, government procurement, state-owned enterprises, and environmental standards. Using a qualitative case study, this study finds that while Indonesia shows partial regulatory alignment with CPTPP commitments, key gaps persist due to protectionist policies and institutional limitations. While the Indonesian government demonstrates political interest and intent, a gap remains between international commitments and domestic preparedness. The article concludes that Indonesia's CPTPP accession plan requires significant regulatory adjustments and cross-sectoral coordination. The findings provide theoretical insight on institutional adaptation and practical guidance for regulatory reform to align Indonesia with CPTPP standards.

Keywords: *Indonesia, CPTPP, institutional reform, trade policy*

INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a landmark trade pact designed to deepen economic integration and liberalize trade and investment among 11 Asia-Pacific economies: New Zealand, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The CPTPP is the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership

(TPP), which was initially signed in 2016 with strong support from the United States under President Barack Obama. However, after the U.S. withdrawal in 2017 under President Donald Trump, the remaining signatories moved forward without the U.S., revising and relaunching the agreement as the CPTPP in March 2018. It officially came into force on 30 December 2018, following ratification by most of its members (*The Jakarta Post*, 2024).

For Indonesia, a growing economy in Southeast Asia, the emergence of the CPTPP took place amid its growing efforts to expand international trade partnerships. Indonesia's engagement with the CPTPP has been both strategic and deliberate, reflecting its long-standing interest since President Joko Widodo's administration, when the agreement was still known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) before the United States' withdrawal. Although supportive of economic integration, the government at the time initially prioritized Indonesia's involvement in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP is a trade agreement between ASEAN and its partners, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand, covering around 30% of global GDP and population (RCEPSEC, 2024). Indonesia's preference for the RCEP was driven by its more flexible framework, which was better suited to the country's domestic economic readiness. The CPTPP's high standards including binding commitments on tariff elimination, investment liberalization, competition policy, intellectual property protection, and investor safeguards, necessitated a more cautious approach (*The Jakarta Post*, 2024). This cautious yet consistent stance has been maintained under President Prabowo Subianto's leadership, as he shares his predecessor's vision of positioning Indonesia strategically in the global trade landscape. On 19 September

2024, Indonesia formally submitted its request to join the CPTPP through New Zealand as the agreement's depository country (Ministry of Coordinating Economic Affairs, 2024). Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto highlighted that approximately 70% of Indonesia's domestic regulations already align with the CPTPP's 30 chapters, signaling a strong foundation for integration (*The Jakarta Post*, 2024).

Economically, CPTPP membership offers Indonesia significant opportunities. It opens access to markets with which Indonesia currently lacks bilateral trade agreements, such as Mexico, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Peru. Government projections estimate that exports could increase by up to 19%, while Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) could grow by 11%, contributing to the expansion of Indonesia's USD 1.61 trillion GDP (*Kemenko Perekonomian RI*, 2024). In addition to trade, joining the CPTPP is seen as a strategic move to reinforce Indonesia's position within the Asia-Pacific trade architecture and prevent the country from being left behind as other regional players deepen their economic ties through the CPTPP. However, the CPTPP extends beyond purely economic concerns. The agreement includes broader commitments on environmental standards, natural resource conservation, public moral safeguards, and the integrity of financial

systems (Gyanchandani and Mitchell, 2023). These provisions pose significant domestic challenges, as Indonesia will need to ensure that its governance frameworks support not only economic liberalization but also these broader non-economic values. The key challenges will be harmonizing domestic regulations, strengthening institutional capacity, and promoting policy coherence across multiple sectors. Therefore, this study will address two interrelated questions:

1. What strategic, economic, and political motivations drive Indonesia's decision to seek accession to the CPTPP?
2. What institutional reforms are necessary to align with the multidimensional commitments of the CPTPP?

This study is grounded in a dual-theoretical framework combining Rational Choice Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism, both under the broader umbrella of new institutionalism. These theories are used to analyze Indonesia's strategic motivations and institutional readiness in pursuing accession to the CPTPP. Rational Choice Institutionalism is used to analyze the strategic motivations behind Indonesia's pursuit of CPTPP accession, highlighting how actors calculate costs and benefits within institutional constraints. Meanwhile, Historical Institutionalism is employed to

examine the institutional reforms required to meet CPTPP standards and the potential challenges arising from path dependencies, entrenched practices, and institutional inertia. The combination allows for a multidimensional understanding of both decision-making and institutional adaptation processes. Finally, the study will conclude with its findings and offer recommendations.

New Institutionalism

Institutions refer to formally structured political entities such as the legislature, legal system, state, and corporations (James G. March and Olsen, 1990:1). They serve as arenas for political actions and interactions, encompassing patterns of behavior, underlying interests, and shared beliefs. The term 'new institutionalism' was introduced by March and Olsen (B. Guy Peters, 2011:16). This concept includes at least nine distinct approaches: historical, rational choice, sociological, normative, empirical, international, network, constructivist or discursive, and feminist institutionalism. According to Rosamond (2000:203), rational choice institutionalism focuses on how actors utilize institutional settings to advance their interests and how these institutions influence the actors' capacity to realize those interests by minimizing the risks involved in interactions through the reduction of transaction cost.

Actors are autonomous and individualistic who approach each decision-making scenario with the aim of maximizing their personal objectives. Furthermore, institutions are understood as norms that help actors determine who is involved in the decision-making process, how information is organized, what actions should be taken, and the order in which those actions occur. Institutions in rational choice institutionalism are significant because they influence and guide the strategic actions of individuals (Rosamond, 2000).

Using rational choice institutionalism to analyze Indonesia's decision to seek CPTPP accession reveals how institutions shape the choices of key actors, limit their options, and help them use the CPTPP framework for both individual and collective gains. As external conditions change, actors' strategies and institutional constraints shift. The CPTPP functions as a set of rules, with actors making strategic, calculated decisions based on economic, political, and strategic motivations, aiming to maximize their goals, such as economic growth and political influence.

On the other side, historical institutionalism emphasizes the long-term impact of institutional decisions made over time, based on the assumption that actors cannot fully anticipate the future outcomes of their choices. As a result, past decisions tend to constrain or shape future behavior.

This because institutions are created with a specific purpose, in a specific time, under certain circumstances with certain power, duties and responsibilities (Cini and Borragan, 2013:91). Historical institutionalism looks at significant changes in institutions as unexpected shifts. It suggests that long-term stability of institutions is often disrupted by external shocks, which challenge and replace old institutions with new, unforeseen one. Historical institutionalism looks at how past decisions affect the structure of institutions, government systems, and future decision-making.

Researching institutions within the framework of historical institutionalism can help identify the value of past decisions, policy choices, strategic approaches, and specific agreements (such as trade regulations, tariffs, etc.) that can guide future reforms. It will also highlight the challenges that may arise in implementing necessary institutional changes. Past institutional decisions and strategies in trade negotiations can provide insights into the reforms required to meet the CPTPP's commitments, while also pointing out potential obstacles, such as conflicting interests or resistance to change, that could hinder their successful implementation.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research uses a qualitative case study approach which focuses on Indonesia's plan to join CPTPP. A Qualitative approach facilitates a deeper exploration of the meanings and perspectives that individuals ascribe to a social or human issue (Cresswell and Cresswell, 2018). This study revolves around the strategic, economic, and political motivations behind Indonesia's accession to the agreement, as well as the institutional reforms required, and challenges faced. By describing and analyzing the Indonesia's engagement with the CPTPP, the research seeks to identify key factors influencing its strategic shift and the necessary domestic reforms to align with the agreement's multidimensional commitments. To achieve this, the analysis utilizes both primary and secondary data sources. Primary data is sourced from official government documents, reports, agreements, memos, and press releases available online. Secondary data uses scholarly articles, books, and research reports related to Indonesia's trade policies, the CPTPP, and institutional reforms required for its implementation. Dual-theoretical framework is applied under the umbrella of new institutionalism. Rational Choice Institutionalism will be used to understand how actors within Indonesia's political and economic systems make strategic decisions based on their interests and the constraints of existing

institutions. On the other side, historical institutionalism will help to analyze how past institutional decisions shape current strategies, identify necessary reforms, and explore potential challenges arising from path dependencies and entrenched practices.

By combining these two approaches, the study provides a comprehensive understanding of both the decision-making process and the institutional adaptations necessary to align with CPTPP commitments, offering valuable insights into Indonesia's pursuit of CPTPP membership and the reforms needed to ensure its success.

DISCUSSION

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a mega-regional trade agreement which was signed in March 2018 by eleven memberstates: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Viet Nam. With the United Kingdom officially joining on December 15, 2024, the agreement now comprises twelve signatory states. Representing a combined population of 586 million people, or around 7.3% of the global population and accounting for approximately 14.4% of global GDP, the CPTPP plays a significant role in shaping the economic landscape of

the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The agreement is designed to go beyond conventional trade deals. It facilitates economic integration by eliminating 99% of tariff lines upon full implementation, reducing non-tariff barriers, enhancing market access for goods and services, promoting investment and labor mobility, and fostering open government procurement among its members. What differentiates CPTPP with other free trade agreements is its progressive agenda. It includes binding commitments to uphold high labor and environmental standards, establishes clear and consistent rules for a fair business environment, and provides targeted support for small and medium-sized enterprises. Additionally, the agreement promotes inclusive trade, aiming to empower women and indigenous communities through equitable economic opportunities. The CPTPP not only reduces costs for businesses, it also seeks to foster a more sustainable, fair, and inclusive regional trade architecture. Furthermore, the CPTPP is open to new members, as long as they are able to follow its rules, commit to broad market access, and have a good track record of meeting past trade agreements. Any decision to let a country join must be agreed upon by all current CPTPP members. These three conditions, agreed upon by CPTPP Ministers in 2023, are known as the ‘Auckland Principles’. Currently, several countries have formally applied to join the

CPTPP, including China, Taiwan, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Ukraine. Indonesia is the most recent applicant, having submitted its request to join the agreement in September 2024 (APFC, n.d.).

From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, Indonesia’s decision to pursue CPTPP membership is not incidental. However, it is the result of strategic calculations made by key actors within the constraints and opportunities presented by both domestic and international institutions. Actors are seen as strategic, utility-maximizing individuals or institutions operating within constraints. For Indonesia, CPTPP accession is also not simply a symbolic gesture. It is a deliberate strategic move aimed at maximizing national economic interests in a competitive and uncertain global environment. Indonesia’s interest in joining the CPTPP began under President Joko Widodo, when it was still known as the TPP. President Jokowi viewed the move as a strategic step to prepare for post-Cold War global shifts, amid rapidly changing political dynamics and growing waves of free trade and economic integration. For Indonesia, joining the CPTPP is about more than trade. It is about securing a place in an increasingly interconnected global economy (Sekretariat Kabinet RI, 2015).

Previously, Indonesia had been reluctant to join what was formerly known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), choosing instead to focus on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is billed as the world's largest free trade bloc. However, under the leadership of the new president, Prabowo Subianto, who shares the objective of expanding Indonesia's global economic engagement, Indonesia has officially submitted its request to join the CPTPP on 19 September 2024. This move has been further reinforced by the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, led by Airlangga Hartarto, which plays a central role in shaping Indonesia's trade strategy. Support for Indonesia's entry into the CPTPP has also come from the private sector, with Bernardino Moningka Vega, who served as the deputy for international relations at the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (Kadin), stating that Indonesia's participation would bring advantages to the country's business environment (*The Jakarta Post*, 2024). According to Minister Airlangga, the CPTPP offers substantial economic incentives, including expanded market access, increased foreign direct investment, and greater integration into global value chains. These benefits align with Indonesia's ambitions for economic diversification and industrial upgrading. Public statements from the ministry

indicate that a thorough cost-benefit analysis has been conducted, highlighting that over 70% of Indonesia's domestic regulations are already compatible with CPTPP standards. Minister Airlangga emphasized that the move is part of Indonesia's broader strategy to deepen its integration into the global economy and support its bid to join the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). He outlined several projected benefits of CPTPP membership for Indonesia, including access to new markets like Canada, Mexico, the UK, and Peru. Those are countries with which Indonesia currently lacks bilateral trade agreements. The agreement is expected to boost Indonesian exports by up to 19%, attract an 11% increase in foreign direct investment, and raise GDP by approximately USD 1.6 billion (*The Jakarta Post*, 2024).

In addition to these projections, the Ministry of Finance has underscored the strategic significance of the Latin American market, particularly Mexico. According to Indonesia's Ministry of Finance, the Latin American market particularly Mexico holds significant potential. Data from Trade Map indicate that in 2023, Mexico accounted for 42.5% of total imports into Latin American countries. Furthermore, Mexico could serve as a strategic hub for accessing other Latin American markets, especially for

countries in the region that do not yet have trade agreements with Indonesia. This positions Mexico as a gateway for Indonesia to expand its exports and establish new market opportunities in Latin America. The United Kingdom, which joined the CPTPP at the end of 2024, also represents a potential market for Indonesia. The UK holds the largest import share in the European Union (EU 28), accounting for 10.4% of the region's total

imports. By gaining access to new markets, Indonesia can lessen its reliance on traditional markets and broaden its range of export destinations. This strategy can contribute to greater economic stability and lower the risks linked to volatility in specific markets (Kemenkeu, 2024).

Table 1.

Import Market Share in the Latin American and European Union Regions

| IMPORTERS COUNTRY | IMPORTED VALUE IN 2023* (USD \$000) | IMPORT SHARE (%) |
|--|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| Latin america and the caribbean aggregation | 1,407,289,486 | 100.00% |
| Mexico | 598,475,395 | 42.50% |
| Chile | 80,492,407 | 5.70% |
| Peru | 52,163,927 | 3.70% |
| Other latin america and the caribbean (37 countries) | 676,157,757 | 48.00% |
| European union (eu 28) aggregation | 7,607,633,606 | 100.00% |
| Germany | 1,469,735,377 | 19.30% |
| United kingdom | 791,855,400 | 10.40% |
| France | 775,128,724 | 10.20% |
| Netherlands | 664,131,324 | 8.70% |
| Italy | 639,928,812 | 8.40% |
| Belgium | 550,854,786 | 7.20% |
| Other eu countries (22 countries) | 2,715,999,183 | 35.70% |

CPTPP membership is also expected to significantly enhance Indonesia's trade prospects by providing indirect access to the U.S. market through established member states such as Canada and Mexico, while simultaneously reinforcing Indonesia's position as the largest economy in ASEAN and the sole G20 member from the region. Indonesia, which is already ASEAN's largest economy according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2023), is projected to be one of the world's leading emerging markets with the size of its GDP forecast to rise from USD 1.3 trillion in 2022 to USD 4.1 trillion by 2035 (*S&P Global, 2024*). According to Minister Airlangga, Indonesia is prepared to meet the high trade standards required by the CPTPP, which are consistent with the country's ongoing structural reforms and its commitments under the WTO and RCEP frameworks. Indonesia has also received strong endorsements from several

CPTPP member countries, such as New Zealand. The country views its accession as a critical step toward advancing regional economic integration and modernizing the Asia-Pacific trade architecture. New Zealand has also highlighted that Indonesia's membership would significantly contribute to strengthening regional trade ties and modernizing the trade framework in the Asia-Pacific region (*InfoPublik*, 2024). Additionally, the Ministry of Trade, represented by Budi Santoso also emphasized the importance of Indonesia pursuing broader market opportunities, with CPTPP membership identified as a strategic avenue for expanding the reach of Indonesian products (*Bisnis*, 2024).

Indonesia's decision to pursue accession to the (CPTPP) during President Prabowo Subianto's administration, despite the initial interest expressed under President Joko Widodo, reflects a strategic response to institutional constraints. During President Joko Widodo's tenure, Indonesia prioritized its participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's largest free trade bloc, as part of a broader strategy to strengthen domestic institutions and solidify its regional trade position. Only after consolidating its commitments under RCEP did Indonesia formally initiate the process of CPTPP accession. This sequencing illustrates a calculated

approach aimed at maximizing economic and political benefits while minimizing institutional disruption and ensuring coherence with existing international commitments (*The Jakarta Post*, 2024).

Accession to high-standard trade agreements such as the CPTPP is inherently complex and challenging. Indonesia's experience with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) illustrates these difficulties, as the ratification process was delayed due to extensive administrative and technical procedures required to meet its obligations. One of the toughest and most debated decisions for the country's leaders to comply with is economic reform. Although economists and experts usually push for these reforms, they often struggle to find political support. It's also hard to promote reforms because, even if they clearly boost competitiveness, they are controversial and certain groups will lose out. Furthermore, the realization of RCEP's potential benefits remains highly dependent on Indonesia's capacity to harmonize the agreement's provisions with ongoing domestic economic reforms. Indonesia's cautious approach toward deeper economic liberalization and the expansion of free trade agreements reflects longstanding concerns about the potential negative impacts on domestic industries, employment, and economic sovereignty. These apprehensions

continue to shape policy debates and institutional responses, influencing the pace and scope of Indonesia's engagement with international trade agreements. As noted by Damuri and Friawan (2022) negotiations and implementations of FTAs in Indonesia have been accompanied by growing apprehension regarding possible negative effects on domestic production and employment, as well as the risk of relegating the country to the role of a primary commodity exporter. In this context, Indonesia's pursuit of CPTPP membership can be viewed as an effort by key actors to strategically balance the pursuit of economic and political gains with the imperative to mitigate institutional disruption and avoid domestic political backlash. This approach shows Indonesia's broader trade policy orientation, which seeks to incrementally integrate into global trade frameworks while safeguarding national economic interests. Ultimately, Indonesia's move to join CPTPP represents a deliberate balancing of economic opportunity and political caution, shaped by its experience with past trade deals and internal debates over how much economic liberalization the country can handle without harming the local's interests.

The CPTPP is widely regarded as a "high-standard" trade agreement. Indonesia's pursuit of accession to the

agreement signals to global investors about the country's commitment to regulatory reform, legal certainty, and investment protection. By joining the CPTPP, Indonesia would enhance investor confidence through adherence to clearer and more stringent rules on labour standards, dispute settlement mechanisms, and market access. Countries operating under the CPTPP framework have demonstrated the ability to attract higher and more stable flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), largely due to the agreement's robust dispute resolution provisions and non-discriminatory treatment clauses. This trend is seen in memberstates such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, which have raised their investment screening thresholds for private investments originating from CPTPP member states in non-sensitive sectors. Similarly, Vietnam has liberalized its mining sector to encourage greater investment from fellow CPTPP members. Moreover, FDI data from 2015 to 2021 show that since the adoption of the CPTPP, inward FDI among member states has increased by 18.9%, driven primarily by Japan, Singapore, Australia, and Canada (Vaid and George, 2023). Japan, in particular, has emerged as the leading bilateral investor among CPTPP members, maintaining the largest FDI relationships across the bloc. These developments underscore the CPTPP's role not only as a

trade agreement but also as a platform for deepening economic integration and enhancing investor confidence among its members. For Indonesia, accession to the CPTPP thus represents both an opportunity to signal policy credibility to international investors and a mechanism to attract higher-quality foreign investments aligned with the country's economic development objectives (Vaid and George, 2023).

Other than that, The CPTPP also sets out terms and conditions to ensure that the investment procedure will be easier and more transparent for foreign investors. Chapter 9 specifies this matter by describing the mechanisms to protect foreign investment into the CPTPP countries (CPTPP, 2018). Under the CPTPP, an investment is defined to include every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, through a commitment of capital or an expectation to gain or profit. In particular, the agreement requires a contracting country to treat investors from other contracting countries in a fair and equitable manner regarding the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, operation or sale of the investments (ACSV Legal, 2019). The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) also incorporates an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which provides investors with

access to an independent arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes arising from alleged breaches of investment protection provisions, including those stipulated in the Financial Services Chapter. The ISDS mechanism further allows investors to initiate arbitration proceedings (in specific circumstances) involving disputes over investment agreements and authorizations. A practical illustration of this mechanism can be observed in Australia's experience as a CPTPP member. The ISDS provision grants Australian investors the legal capacity to enforce investment protections across many of Australia's principal capital export markets, as well as in emerging economies throughout the Asia-Pacific region (*Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2016*). Additionally, the CPTPP ensures the elimination of discriminatory treatment among its member states. For example, in New Zealand, the CPTPP's investment chapter provides legal certainty for New Zealand investors by safeguarding their investments against grossly unfair or unjust actions by foreign governments, such as expropriation without compensation or discriminatory treatment based on nationality, except where specific exceptions apply (except where exceptions apply) (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.*).

While these provisions present promising opportunities for foreign

investors and signal a strong commitment to legal predictability and investor protection, the ability of prospective members like Indonesia to implement such standards depends heavily on their institutional capacity. Indonesia's current institutional structure represents the cumulative outcome of historical layers of governance, legal systems, and economic policy frameworks that have evolved over decades. These historically embedded patterns exert significant influence on both the necessity and the challenges of implementing reform. From the perspective of Historical Institutionalism, prior institutional arrangements impose constraints on contemporary policy options by creating path dependencies and fostering reform inertia. In the context of Indonesia's accession to the CPTPP, a series of institutional reforms would be required to align domestic practices with the agreement's high standards. However, the implementation of such reforms is inherently shaped and frequently constrained by these deeply rooted institutional legacies. According to Milner and Kubota (2005), reforms involve dismantling long-established systems of redistribution and discrimination, making it difficult to implement lasting change. Additionally, individuals or groups with vested interests in the current system have strong motivations to block reforms, as they seek to maintain their privileged positions. Despite the substantial economic and

political benefits associated with CPTPP membership, accession remains a complex and demanding process due to the rigorous commitments of the agreement. Many current and prospective applicant countries, including Indonesia, face considerable challenges in meeting the CPTPP's high thresholds for trade liberalization, regulatory reform, and governance (Schott, 2025). While technical assistance is available to support domestic policy adjustments and facilitate adaptation to the evolving trade and investment landscape, the process of compliance represents a profound institutional and policy transformation. The effective implementation relies significantly on the strength of domestic governance.

Unlike many other free trade agreements, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) encompasses not only trade in goods, services, and investment, but also broader dimensions of international economic governance, including dispute settlement mechanisms, labor standards, and environmental protection provisions. In the domain of trade in goods, the CPTPP mandates the elimination of approximately 11,000 tariff lines, covering even highly sensitive agricultural products such as rice, wheat, sugar, and meat (Wangke, 2016). In the services sector, the agreement extends its commitments to key industries including

banking, insurance, construction, logistics, and tourism. Regarding investment, the CPTPP guarantees protections such as the right to capital repatriation, fair compensation in cases of expropriation, and the elimination of restrictive measures such as local content requirements. While Indonesia's potential accession to the CPTPP offers considerable strategic, economic, and political opportunities, it also presents substantial challenges, particularly given the current limitations of Indonesia's domestic production base and the relative weakness of its globally competitive industries. Indonesia's economy remains highly dependent on exports of commodities like oil, gas, and agricultural products, making it vulnerable to global price fluctuations and highlighting the urgent need for export diversification (Setkab, 2023).

The CPTPP requires member states to undertake a range of structural reforms, including tax and fiscal policy adjustments. There is also a distinctive feature of the CPTPP, the agreement does not extend preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Wangke, 2016). In the absence of comprehensive domestic preparedness and institutional strengthening, Indonesia risks exposing vulnerable sectors to intensified competition, which could have adverse implications for state revenues and the broader economy. Therefore, accession

would necessitate not only regulatory alignment but also strategic capacity-building to ensure Indonesia's industries and institutions are sufficiently equipped to compete under the CPTPP's high-standard commitments. Indonesia's accession to the CPTPP also presents challenges that require government action and broad support. A key challenge is meeting the complex Rules of Origin (ROO), which determine product eligibility for preferential tariffs under the FTA. Complying with CPTPP's high standards will require Indonesia to adjust regulations and align them with domestic policies, such as downstream processing and export bans posing political and regulatory difficulties that demand strong commitment (RI, 2024).

To fulfill the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership's (CPTPP) multidimensional commitments, Indonesia must embark on comprehensive regulatory and institutional reforms. These reforms entail revising existing legislation to promote transparency, strengthening competition authorities, enhancing labor protections, and ensuring the effective enforcement of environmental and intellectual property standards. Such measures are crucial because Indonesia's legal and regulatory frameworks have historically been characterized by selective law enforcement, bureaucratic fragmentation,

and sectoral protectionism. Protectionism has been a consistent feature of Indonesia's economic policy since the era of President Sukarno, who promoted protective measures to support domestic economic development and limit foreign influence (Sulaiman, 2019). Although Indonesia adopted more liberal economic approaches following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, protectionist tendencies persisted during the administrations of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and were further strengthened under President Joko Widodo (Herdianto, 2023). One notable example is the Domestic Content Level (Tingkat Komponen Dalam Negeri/TKDN) policy during Joko Widodo, which mandates minimum local content requirements for certain strategic products, restricting market access for producers who fail to comply (Chasani, 2018). These protectionist measures have not been applied uniformly across all sectors but have focused on strategic industries to safeguard domestic markets and foster national industrial capacity. The evolution of Indonesia's protectionist policies reflects a response to domestic, regional, and global pressures, underscoring the government's efforts to balance economic sovereignty with global economic integration. However, the persistence of these entrenched practices would undermine the effectiveness and credibility of reform efforts, posing significant

obstacles to compliance with the CPTPP's high-standard obligations.

Lili Yan Ing, an economist at the University of Indonesia, identifies three principal challenges that Indonesia is likely to encounter in implementing the CPTPP (Wangke, 2016). First, government procurement processes must be restructured to guarantee transparency, predictability, and non-discriminatory treatment. Second, labor regulations must be aligned with international standards to adhere the principles of freedom of association, collective bargaining rights, and minimum wage protections. Third, the extension of copyright and patent protections, particularly in the pharmaceutical sector, could delay the introduction of affordable generic medicines, thereby raising concerns over access to essential drugs. Consequently, successful CPTPP implementation requires the dismantling of protectionist practices and the elimination of preferential treatment for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Without addressing these structural constraints, Indonesia will face risks on compromising the potential economic and institutional gains associated with CPTPP membership. Another critical concern raised by Indonesia for Global Justice (IGJ), a civil society organization advocating for trade justice, centers on the inclusion of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

mechanism within the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The ISDS mechanism allows foreign investors from signatory countries to initiate arbitration proceedings against host states before an independent tribunal, such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the World Bank Group, in cases where investors allege violations of investment protections. According to IGJ, Indonesia has already faced multiple lawsuits from foreign investors, particularly in the mining sector, under similar provisions in other bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. The organization warns that Indonesia's accession to the CPTPP is likely to exacerbate these legal vulnerabilities by exposing the country to an expanded scope of investor claims under the ISDS mechanism.

Moreover, IGJ argues that CPTPP membership would put Indonesia into necessary extensive regulatory adjustments, potentially leading to deregulatory pressures that prioritize investor protections over domestic policy space. This concern is rooted from the requirement to harmonize domestic laws with the agreement's investment and dispute settlement standards, which may constrain Indonesia's ability to implement policies in the public interest, particularly in sectors such as natural resources,

environmental protection, and public health. Consequently, from the perspective of IGJ and similar advocacy groups, Indonesia's accession to the CPTPP presents significant risks of reduced regulatory autonomy and increased exposure to international arbitration, warranting careful consideration of the agreement's long-term implications for national sovereignty and development policy (Indonesia for Global Justice, 2024).

Compared to other free trade agreements, the CPTPP establishes more stringent rules governing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), characterized by stronger principles of competitive neutrality, broader coverage, stricter regulations on non-commercial assistance, and enhanced transparency requirements. Nonetheless, in developing countries such as Indonesia, SOEs hold significant economic and political influence, playing a pivotal role in national development strategies (Yang, 2024:83). Historically, SOEs in Indonesia have been deeply embedded as privileged economic and political actors since the developmentalist era, serving both as engines of economic growth and as instruments of political patronage. Their institutional entrenchment has fostered longstanding resistance to market liberalization, driven not only by economic interests but also by institutional path dependencies that reinforce their privileged status. Consequently, reforming

SOEs and advancing broader market liberalization are imperative for Indonesia to align with the CPTPP's high standards. However, these reforms face obstacles, as entrenched interests and institutional inertia create powerful resistance that cannot be easily addressed through incremental policy changes alone. Achieving compliance with CPTPP obligations, therefore, demands comprehensive and politically challenging institutional transformation.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Indonesia's decision to pursue accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is driven by strategic, economic, and political motivations. Strategically, Indonesia sees membership as a means to enhance its global trade position and economic resilience. Economically, the country seeks to diversify trade partners and attract foreign direct investment. Politically, the accession itself reflects Indonesia's commitment to regional cooperation and its leadership role in ASEAN as a way to adjust to the evolving global governance standards. Together, these factors highlight Indonesia's ambition to strengthen its global relevance while addressing domestic economic challenges.

In order to comply with CPTPP commitments, Indonesia must implement comprehensive reforms in trade, investment, intellectual property, labor standards, and environmental protection. These reforms require moving away from protectionist policies and addressing historical constraints. The reform process should be informed by past institutional logics and executed through a carefully sequenced approach. Building broad-based coalitions of government, civil society, and the private sector is essential to ensure support, while aligning domestic incentives with CPTPP obligations and maintaining political stability. Transparency and accountability will be crucial to gaining trust and minimizing resistance. A dedicated task force could monitor and evaluate the alignment of policies with both national and international priorities.

Indonesia's pursuit of CPTPP membership represents a strategic effort to balance global integration with domestic governance realities. A pragmatic approach that integrates historical contexts with future reforms will enable Indonesia to fully leverage CPTPP benefits while addressing the associated challenges. Future research could compare Indonesia's approach with that of other CPTPP members to identify best practices and lessons learned.

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Indonesia and the Global South: A Constructivist Approach to Diplomatic Leadership in a Multipolar World Order

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Abstract

The global power structure has shifted from a unipolar system to multipolarity, marked by the emergence of new powers such as China and Russia and the strengthening of regional cooperation. In this context, the role of Global South countries is becoming increasingly important in shaping a new, more inclusive world order. This study highlights how Indonesia constructs and projects its identity and leadership as a representation of the Global South in the multipolar era. The purpose of the study is to analyze the construction of Indonesia's identity and the diplomatic practices used in forums such as the G20 and BRICS to advocate the interests of developing countries. This study uses a qualitative method with an interpretive approach, based on an analysis of official speeches, diplomatic documents, and scientific literature. Theoretically, this study is based on the constructivism of international relations, especially Alexander Wendt's ideas about the importance of identity and norms in shaping state interests. The results show that Indonesia actively uses normative diplomacy, historical narratives, and multilateral engagement to strengthen its position as a leader of the Global South and encourage reforms to a more just and equal global order.

Key Words: Indonesia, Global South, Developing Countries, Diplomacy, G20, BRICS

INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes Indonesia's role in advocating for and representing the Global South in a multipolar world order. This research is important for several reasons. First, in a multipolar world order, the involvement of the Global South, including Indonesia, is becoming increasingly strategic, especially in determining the

direction of global governance, especially in crucial issues such as economic justice, climate change, and reform of international institutions. Second, this research is important to reflect and critically evaluate Indonesia's role at the international level, including Indonesia's consistency towards the basic principles that have become its historical identity, especially as a pioneer of

Global South solidarity since the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference. Third, the Global South faces various forms of systemic inequality related to representation and influence in various international institutions. Therefore, this research is important to affirm Indonesia's position and role in responding to these inequalities while exploring how Indonesia concretely pushes the reform agenda through its global diplomacy practices. Finally, in addition to providing empirical contributions to the understanding of Indonesian diplomacy, this research is also important to enrich theoretical discourse in the study of international relations through an approach rooted in the experiences and aspirations of the Global South.

The Global South itself refers not to a geographic region but to a political perspective and mindset that arises in opposition to the hegemony of Western powers. Global South frequently encounter common issues such as poverty, systemic global inequality, and heightened susceptibility to climate change while also sharing a history marked by colonialism and exclusion from key global decision-making forums (Aden, 2023). Consequently, the Global South strives to establish its direction in the realms of knowledge, politics, economics, and culture to overcome the colonial legacy and ongoing global injustices.

The Global South often perceives itself as lacking adequate representation in major international bodies like the UN Security Council, World Bank, WTO, and other global institutions. These countries perceive that the structures and rules of such institutions are dominated by the Global North (developed countries). As a result, the Global South consistently pushes for reforms of international institutions to better reflect a multipolar world and to address historical inequalities in global governance. It also views international norms and legal frameworks as embodying the values of developed countries, rather than responding to the actual needs of developing nations. This perception has fueled growing demands to decolonize and reform the global order (Burton-MacLeod & Chaulia, 2011).

The global power structure has transformed a bipolar system—dominated by two major powers (United States, Soviet Union)—into a unipolar system where only the United States is the main global power. The United States subsequently emerged as the most influential global actor economically, militarily, and politically (Toft & Kushi, 2023). However, global dynamics shifted when China, Russia, and several other countries became new powers. They have strengthened their positions in the international system through rapid economic growth, increased participation in global

institutions, and strategic initiatives. This marks the transition toward a multipolar world order (Krishna Pasupuleti, 2024). Moreover, the rise of regionalism and the development of regional organizations have accelerated this shift. Countries across various regions are placing greater emphasis on autonomy and regional cooperation as a means to balance global dominance. This transformation signifies the end of an era of single-power dominance and the emergence of a world managed by multiple competing and cooperating in making a new global order (Muzaffar dkk., 2017).

In multipolar system, Global South face both opportunities and complex challenges. On one hand, the emergence of multiple global power centers creates space for developing nations to expand strategic partnerships, strengthen their bargaining power, and form more equitable alliances in various international forums. Multipolarity also provides opportunities for the Global South to actively shape a more inclusive global agenda, notably on critical issues such as fair trade, development justice, and climate change (Gürçan, 2019). On the other hand, competition among major powers in a multipolar order can weaken the solidarity of the Global South, fragment shared interests, and place developing countries in a dilemma amid geopolitical rivalries. The Global South

continues to struggle to articulate alternative approaches that can enhance their collective standing on the global stage pendekatan alternatif yang mampu memperkuat posisi mereka di kancah global (Stuenkel, 2024). In this context, it is imperative for the Global South to strengthen collective solidarity, define common agendas, and promote platforms for South-South cooperation to ensure that the transition to a multipolar world does not reproduce new forms of inequality.

Indonesia is a developing country in Southeast Asia that is active as a member of various international forums, such as BRICS, G20, ASEAN, and the Non-Aligned Movement. This strategic position provides Indonesia with a significant opportunity to advocate Global South interest in a multipolar world and the tug-of-war of the world's great powers (Samosir dkk., 2024). Indonesia's historical experience as a post-colonial country that has consistently promoted the principle of anti-domination since the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference provides moral and historical legitimacy for Indonesia in its efforts to encourage reforms towards a more just and inclusive global order (Grovoğu, 2011). In addition, Indonesia's relatively stable economic growth—reaching 5.03% in 2024—demonstrates the resilience and

competitiveness of the national economy amidst global uncertainty (Saputra, 2025). This identity allows Indonesia to take advantage of various diplomatic platforms to strengthen the collective voice of developing countries, encourage South-South cooperation, and form alternative blocs in fighting for strategic issues such as climate change, global governance reform, and international economic justice. Thus, Indonesia not only plays a role as a regional actor but also represents the Global South's interest in restructuring the global architecture, which has so far been considered to be more in favor of the interests of Global North countries.

In this regard, in recent times, Indonesia has actively strengthened its diplomatic role to represent the interests of the Global South through various bilateral and multilateral initiatives. For example, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sugiono, emphasizes that multilateralism reform is the main priority of Indonesian diplomacy, with a focus on renewing the global structure to be fairer and more inclusive for developing countries (Ihsan, 2025). In addition, Indonesia also officially joined as a full member of BRICS in January 2025, where one of the strategic issues brought up was efforts to strengthen Global South solidarity and encourage more balanced global governance reform (Diaspora, 2025). Meanwhile, President

Prabowo Subianto, in international forums like the World Governments Summit and meetings with Chinese and French leaders, emphasized the importance of Indonesia as a bridge between the Global North and Global South and voiced support for Palestinian independence and the two-state solution (Prastiwi & Syurgandari, 2025). These steps reflect Indonesia's efforts to strategically shape a more balanced and just world order for all countries.

Based on the above explanation, this study aims to answer the main question: How does Indonesia shape and construct its identity as a leader of the Global South, and how does this identity construction influence Indonesia's diplomatic role and strategy in advocating for the interests of developing countries within the multipolar world order? This study will also highlight the diplomatic strategies employed by Indonesia to ensure that the aspirations of developing countries are effectively represented in the multipolar world order.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Constructivism

Constructivists focus on identity, norms, and social interaction in shaping state behavior in the international system. Constructivists argue that norms, ideas,

identities, and rules are essential elements for understanding the behavior of international relations actors, including how these actors interpret the world and themselves. Based on this argument, Constructivism helps explain how Indonesia's identity as a developing country, a southern country, a postcolonial country, a proponent of anti-domination principles since the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference, and a supporter of inclusive multilateralism is constructed to strengthen its legitimacy and strategic role in a multipolar world. Rather than being understood as a reaction to material interests or military power, Indonesia as a representation of the Global South in a multipolar world is better understood as the result of social interaction, internalization of norms, and articulation of collective identities built through diplomatic practices, history, and South-South solidarity.

Constructivists believe that identity and social norms influence how states act. States not only pursue material interests but are also influenced by values, ideas, and how they understand their role in the world. Therefore, Constructivism emphasizes the importance of norms, ideas, and identities as the main foundations in analyzing state behavior and shaping their interests, including policies and interactions between

actors (Barnett, 2019). In the Indonesian context, the constructivist framework can be used to explain how its historical identity as a postcolonial state and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement shapes its diplomatic behavior, particularly in advocating for the interests of the Global South. Thus, Indonesia's actions in the global arena reflect collective norms and values embedded in its history and ideology, as theorized in the constructivist approach.

Alexander Wendt, an influential figure in Constructivism theory, noted that Constructivism has three central claims. First, although Constructivism differs from realism and liberalism, Constructivism recognizes that the state is the main actor in international politics. Second, the international system is not only shaped by material power, such as military or economic but by shared meanings between states, such as who is a friend and who is an enemy or what is considered legitimate action. In this context, according to Constructivism, ideas, norms, values, culture, and identities determine the structure of the international system. Third, a country's identity and interests are socially constructed through interactions and practices between countries. Countries do not have fixed identities or interests that emerge naturally but are shaped through practices and

relationships between countries and how they interact with other countries (Wendt, 1992). In this case, what is considered a national interest can change depending on how a country sees itself and how it is seen by other countries (Wendt, 1994).

According to Wendt, before an actor can determine their interests, they must first form an identity. Wendt emphasized that identity is not determined by material factors but rather by the similarity of ideas and norms in viewing something or a situation (Wendt, 1992). Identity plays an important role in country interactions because it can influence how countries act and interact. Wendt divides identity into four types. First is personal identity, which is an identity related to an individual's or country's goals and priorities. Second, type identity arises from similarities in behavior, values, opinions, or experiences with other actors. Third, role identity is formed from prevailing culture and norms. Fourth is collective identity, which combines role and type identity (Wendt, 1999).

Regarding interests, this term can be understood as the desires or goals that a country wants to achieve. Wendt explains that interests are formed by identity. However, the concept of interest, according to Wendt, is different from the view of realism. Wendt defines national interests as

objective interests. He further explained that interests are composed of four key elements: physical survival, independence, economic prosperity, and a sense of collective pride. There are negative and positive aspects to these components. Negative aspects can be insults from other countries or the international community, while positive aspects include mutual respect and cooperation between countries (Wendt, 1999). According to Wendt, the explanation of both variables is a vital component of constructivism. Zhan Mengshu abstracted Wendt's idea: desire (identity) + belief (interest) = action.

Starting from the main analysis above, a constructivist approach is used to explain how Indonesia's consistent involvement in various multilateral organizations—as a representation of the Global South—is shaped by its identity and interests. In this context, the author argues that Indonesia's identity as a developing country and a leader of the Global South has long been formed, especially through its historical role as a pioneer of the Asia-Africa Conference. This identity greatly influences Indonesia's perspective on ideal global governance—namely, an inclusive system that considers the interests of Global South countries rather than being dominated by the interests of the Global North. The accumulation of these identities and interests has given rise to

Indonesia's foreign policy practices, which are reflected in active multilateral diplomacy and its consistency in voicing the aspirations of the Global South. Thus, in a constructivist framework, Indonesia's behavior as a leader of the Global South is not solely driven by calculations of material interests but also by historically and normatively constructed identities that shape its preferences for solidarity, justice, and equality in international relations.

One important aspect of social interaction discussed by Wendt is strategic practice, one of the primary mechanisms in forming collective identity among countries. According to Wendt, strategic practice is a country's action in its ongoing interaction with other countries to form, reproduce, or change its identity and interests. Wendt noted that a country's tendency to engage in ongoing cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, can have an impact for country's interests and identity. For example, consistent cooperative actions by a country towards another country can form a shared identity, such as the narrative of "we are allies" rather than "we are competitors." Identities and interests can change during interactions. So, continuous cooperation can create a sense of togetherness that can happen unintentionally (because of frequent cooperation) or intentionally (because of the

desire to form a shared identity). Therefore, according to constructivism, strategic practice can change the egoistic and anarchic international system into a cooperative international community (Wendt, 1994). This approach is important to understand that Indonesia's consistency in voicing the interests of developing countries is not just a pragmatic policy but is part of a strategic practice that shapes and reproduces Indonesia's identity as part of the Global South. This identity then gives birth to appropriate interests, strengthens international solidarity, and encourages the transformation of global norms towards a more cooperative direction.

Global South

From the Global North perspective, the Global South is often seen as a group of underdeveloped countries experiencing economic growth, which are positioned as objects of aid and development intervention. In contrast, from the perspective of the Global South itself, this term represents an epistemic and political position that becomes a field of resistance against Western domination, economic exploitation, and cultural imperialism. Thus, the concept of the Global South does not refer solely to geographical location but to the historical

and structural configuration of global inequality. Countries located north of the equator, such as Bolivia and India, can be included as the Global South, while countries in the southern hemisphere, such as Australia, can be classified as the Global North. Therefore, the Global South also refers to a space of decolonial resistance, where new forms of politics, knowledge, and spirituality continue to be developed in response to the legacy of ongoing coloniality (Mignolo, 2011).

This study adopts an understanding of the Global South from a non-geographic perspective, namely as an epistemic and political construction representing populations and territories that have historically experienced colonialism, exploitation, and marginalization and are now actively resisting this legacy. In this framework, the Global South is a space where individuals and communities critically question, reject, and challenge Western domination in knowledge, politics, and culture (Mignolo, 2011). Thus, the Global South refers to a territorial entity and a historical part of the world system. This means the Global South are those who have been the subjects of the global imperialist project but are now developing alternative ways of thinking, living, and building governance that seek to overcome the impacts of coloniality. Rather than

reproducing a development framework based on the Western paradigm, the Global South is pioneering a universal future—an order rooted in dignity, justice, and values of life that respect each other and transcend the boundaries of colonial modernity.

In line with Walter Mignolo's thinking, according to Paul Amar (2012), the notion of the Global South is founded on the premise that power, knowledge, and global security architecture have historically been dominated by the Global North, especially Western Europe and North America. This domination occurs through various mechanisms, such as imperialism, neoliberal globalization, and humanitarian interventions that are often military. Nevertheless, the Global South is viewed not just as a marginalized region, but as a space capable of exercising agency and fostering innovation. Within this framework, nations like Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa, and Indonesia have increasingly taken on proactive roles in peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian missions, reshaping global norms and international security practices. This development challenges the dominant assumption that only the Global North has the authority to formulate and disseminate a legitimate global paradigm (Amar, 2012).

Trefzer, Jackson, McKee, dan Dellinger (2014) menyatakan bahwa asumsi dasar

tentang Global Selatan berakar pada kritik terhadap pembagian dunia ke dalam kategori Global Utara sebagai yang kaya dan berkuasa, dan Global Selatan sebagai wilayah miskin dan berkembang. Rather than understanding this division as a fixed and homogeneous geographical entity, they argue that the Global South represents spaces of marginalization, economic exclusion, and political powerlessness without relying on geographical location. Thus, the dynamics of the Global South can be found even in developed countries, while elements of the Global North can also be found in societies in developing countries. Furthermore, Trefzer et al. emphasize that the Global South cannot be reduced to a passive entity in the global power structure. Instead, it is an active space for knowledge production, resistance practices, and social and political innovation (Trefzer dkk., 2014).

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses an analytical-qualitative method with an interpretive approach. This method was chosen because the research aims to understand the meaning, messages, and identity construction found in written and visual texts without using statistical models. The data used includes both secondary and primary sources. Secondary data was

collected through a literature review of sources such as academic journals, books, news articles, and official websites of Indonesian government institutions, including the Ministry of State Secretariat, the Presidential Secretariat, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A systematic approach was used to identify and evaluate written materials relevant to the research questions. These include official texts like government speeches and statements about the Global South, Indonesia's leadership in the Global South, and its membership in international forums such as the G20 and BRICS. The goal is to understand the government's intentions and messages in shaping Indonesia's image and identity on the global stage.

Primary data comes from official speeches of the Indonesian government that were published as videos on official YouTube channels, such as those of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Presidential Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and major media outlets like Kompas. The speeches were selected purposefully based on their relevance to narratives of Indonesian leadership in the Global South, foreign policy direction, and historical continuity from Sukarno's era to the Prabowo Subianto administration. Examples include the President's speech at the BRICS High-Level

Dialogue on Global Development, his speech at the 15th BRICS Summit, the 2025 Annual Press Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and remarks at the 49th anniversary of the PDI-P party. These speeches were chosen because they are seen as formal tools for building and expressing national identity to both domestic and international audiences. The analysis focuses on keywords, key themes, and narratives that highlight South-South cooperation, global justice, and Indonesia's role as a bridge-builder in global geopolitics.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Construction of Indonesia's Identity as a Leader of the Global South

Indonesia's identity in Global South is influenced by at least three key factors. The first is its historical involvement in the Asia-Africa Conference and Non-Aligned Movement. Since its independence, Indonesia has positioned itself as an important part of the Southern countries that reject the dominance of great powers and demand a more equitable global order. A pivotal moment in forming this identity occurred when Indonesia took the lead in organizing the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955 in Bandung. The event became a symbol of solidarity among formerly

colonized nations and marked the early foundations of the Non-Aligned Movement (Lee, 2023). The Asia-Africa Conference was the first formal meeting between postcolonial countries that were newly independent or those fighting for independence. In this forum, Indonesia voiced the principles of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, the right to self-determination, equality, and South-South cooperation (Weber & Winanti, 2016). This event became a foundation in creating Indonesia's identity as the Global South's leader, as it highlighted Indonesia's stance as a voice for postcolonial countries that demanded a fairer world order free from the domination of great powers.

Commitment to these principles continued in Indonesia's active involvement at the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. In this position, Indonesia consistently encouraged the creation of a neutral space amidst the polarization of the Cold War and fought for the interests of developing countries so that they would not become objects of exploitation by great powers (Weber & Winanti, 2016). In addition, Indonesia also promoted dialogue between North and South countries and helped address global issues such as poverty alleviation while maintaining its commitment to the interests of the Global South (Hermawan & Habir, 2015). This consistency not only reflects Indonesia's

solidarity with developing countries but also increases Indonesia's bargaining power and position in the international arena (Erfan dkk., 2024). Thus, Indonesia was committed to global stability and security while encouraging cooperation among developing countries. In particular, this active involvement strengthens Indonesia's identity as a leader who fights for the aspirations and Global South interest on the international stage.

Second, national narratives and foreign policies shape Indonesia's identity as a Global South leader. Many statements of the Indonesian government, such as the President, Vice President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other government institutions, emphasize Indonesia's position as a leader of developing countries. In his speech at the 49th Anniversary of the PDI Perjuangan in Jakarta in 2022, the President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, emphasized that through the G20, Indonesia will re-strengthen its leadership that was once carried out in the Sukarno era. In this context, Indonesia will advocate for the Global South interest on the global stage and strive for more inclusive global governance for developing countries (Jingga, 2022).

"Tahun ini Indonesia juga mendapatkan sebuah kehormatan, kepercayaan internasional, yaitu menjadi Presidensi G20 yang ini akan

kita manfaatkan untuk memperjuangkan kepentingan Indonesia, dan juga kepentingan negara-negara berkembang. Indonesia akan terus berjuang membangun tata kelola kesehatan, membangun tata kelola dunia yang adil, yang lebih kokoh dalam menghadapi ketidakpastian dan kompleksitas masalah yang semakin banyak di dunia. Kita akan mengulang dan memperkuat kepemimpinan Indonesia yang dulu pernah dilakukan oleh presiden pertama kita, Bung Karno," (Kementerian Sekretariat Negara RI, 2022).

This statement strongly signals Indonesia's leadership position and aspirations among the Global South countries, historically and in the context of current global challenges.

A similar narrative was also conveyed by Joko Widodo in 2024 in his speech at the Joint Leaders' Forum High-Level Multistakeholder Partnership session and the Second Indonesia-Africa Forum held in Bali. He highlighted that developing countries are always the most affected by global challenges, so new tactical steps are needed to realize more equitable and inclusive development for developing countries (Jingga, 2024). Joko Widodo also emphasized that Indonesia will be at the forefront in defending the interests of the Global South by playing a role as a bridge to fight for the aspirations and interests of

developing countries at the global level (Kementerian Luar Negeri, 2024a). Quoting Joko Widodo's statement:

"Indonesia berkomitmen menjadi bagian dari solusi global, membela kepentingan Global South sekaligus menjadi bridge builder dalam memperjuangkan kesetaraan, keadilan, dan solidaritas dalam mempercepat pencapaian SDGs" (Kementerian Sekretariat Negara, 2024).

This statement contains a message about the strategic role that Indonesia wants to take on the global stage, especially as a leader of the Global South. By emphasizing Indonesia's commitment to defending the interests of developing countries, Jokowi shows global solidarity and emphasizes the ambition of Indonesia in playing role as representative of the Global South in an increasingly multipolar world order.

The narrative about Indonesia's leadership in the Global South did not stop during President Joko Widodo's administration. This leadership continued and was strengthened during the administration of President Prabowo Subianto. When he was still serving as Minister of Defense and at the same time a presidential candidate, Prabowo had given a

signal about the orientation of the foreign policy that he would take if elected President. In an interview with international media, Prabowo highlighted that a core principle of Indonesia's foreign policy is its dedication to supporting the interests and aspirations of Global South nations, which are frequently sidelined in global decision-making. This stance reflects Indonesia's longstanding foreign policy identity, rooted in its role in Non-Aligned Movement (Rizky, 2024). Prabowo Subianto said:

"Indonesia, as you may know, is one of the co-founders of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. So, advocating in favor of the Global South and developing nations, advocating for a world system that does not favor the developed North at the expense of the Global South, is in the DNA of our foreign policy" (O'Connor, 2024).

Furthermore, Prabowo Subianto pledged that Indonesia would actively advocate for reforms to the UN Security Council and serve as a bridge between the Global South and Global North as a commitment to principles of cooperation and dialogue. He said:

"One of the key areas where I will focus our effort is the reform of the United Nations Security Council. However, as president, I will also work hard to expand Indonesia's role as an interlocutor between North and South.

As you may know, one of the tenets of our foreign policy is change in the world through persistence, cooperation and dialogue and I intend to continue in this tradition," (O'Connor, 2024).

This statement shows that the construction of Indonesia's identity in the Global South has been formulated and voiced even before he officially came to power. He wanted to show the continuity of Indonesia's historical identity as a pioneer of the Non-Aligned Movement while indicating that Prabowo actively shaped the narrative of Indonesia's leadership at the global level as part of his foreign policy vision. This narrative continued when Prabowo was elected president of Indonesia. Although he has just started his term, various official government statements and foreign policy directions that have begun to be formulated show that Indonesia's identity as a leader of developing countries remains an important foothold in the orientation of Indonesian diplomacy going forward. Statements from the Indonesian government and official documents outlining Indonesia's diplomatic vision reflect a continued commitment to upholding the country's longstanding role in advocating for the Global South.

At the 2025 World Government Summit, Prabowo Subianto said that Indonesia will continue to play role as a connector between

Global North and Global South, emphasizing the importance of dialogue. This role continues Indonesia's Non-Aligned Movement position, emphasizing principles such as equality, independence, and sovereignty (Susilo, 2025). In addition, during a state visit to the Republic of Turkey in April 2025, President Prabowo emphasized the significant roles that Indonesia and Turkey play in the international arena, particularly as prominent nations within the Islamic world and key leaders of the Global South. He emphasized that Indonesia is committed to being a positive force, leader, and strategic partner for developing countries globally. Quoting Prabowo Subianto's statement:

"Kami harus menjadi kekuatan positif dan kekuatan penting di dunia Islam. Kami juga harus tampil, tanggung jawab kami, tanggung jawab kita berdua sebagai pemimpin dari Global South, juga sebagai mitra strategis dalam tatanan global" (BPPI Setpres, 2025).

Indonesia's identity as a leader of the Global South is also prominently showcased in the 2025 Annual Press Statement delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the statement, Sugiono emphasized that the direction of Indonesia's foreign diplomacy is no longer merely functioning as a bridge between global powers but also has the

ambition to play role as a global leader. This narrative reflects the identity strategy that Indonesia wants to build in the international arena, namely as a developing country that is not only an object of global policy but also helps shape a more just and inclusive global architecture. One concrete manifestation of this strategy is Indonesia's push to change the international system and structure, including the global financial system, to reflect better the interests and leadership of Global South countries (Muhammad, 2025).

"Indonesia juga akan berada di lini depan penggerak reformasi multilateral untuk mendukung dan memperkuat PBB sehingga menjadi lebih fit-for-purpose. Termasuk arsitektur keuangan internasional yang tangguh dan inklusif, dan memberi ruang bagi kepemimpinan Global South" (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2025).

Third, Indonesia's identity as a leader of the Global South countries is formed through its participation in various international forums. In addition to its involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia's position as a leader of the Global South is further strengthened through its participation in various diplomatic initiatives, membership in international organizations, and its active role in multilateral forums. Following the end

of the Cold War, Indonesia emerged as one of the founding members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. Subsequently, in 1994, Indonesia served as the host of the APEC Summit. During this summit, member countries agreed to pursue the shared objective of lowering trade and investment barriers throughout the Asia-Pacific region, leading to an agreement to facilitate greater economic integration (Hermawan & Habir, 2015). When Indonesia hosted the 1994 APEC Summit in Bogor, it helped spearhead what became known as the Bogor Goals—a regional pledge to realize free trade and investment. The timetable called for developed economies to meet this objective by 2010 and for developing economies to do so by 2020. This initiative reflects Indonesia's leadership in promoting fair and open economic integration, which aligns with the aspirations of Global South countries (Feridhanusetyawan dkk., 2009).

Indonesia is also a founding member of ASEAN, an organization established to promote stability in Southeast Asia where the Secretariat of ASEAN located in Jakarta (Sari, 2019). Indonesia is not only among the founding members of ASEAN but is also the de facto leader of the organization, owing to its significant influence, large population, strategic geographic location, and strong dedication to regional integration. Since

becoming an ASEAN member, Indonesia has demonstrated significant leadership. Indonesia often influences the direction of the organization's policies. Indonesia also actively proposes and promotes various joint policies or approaches within ASEAN. For example, promoting the non-intervention principle and peaceful resolution of conflicts, which later became the basis of ASEAN diplomacy to date (Putra, 2015). Indonesia was instrumental in establishing and implementing the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. In it, Indonesia promotes democracy, human rights protection, and comprehensive regional security (Sari, 2019). Indonesia's leadership is also demonstrated through its activeness in maintaining ASEAN's neutrality, pushing for the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties agreement in 2002, and bringing ASEAN's voice to global forums such as the G20 (Saputra, 2025).

The leadership of Indonesia in ASEAN demonstrates its dedication to regional stability and integration and gradually contributes to shaping its identity as a leader among developing nations. By advocating for principles such as sovereignty, non-interference, democracy, and human rights within the ASEAN context, Indonesia enhances its reputation as a nation capable

of representing and reconciling the interests of the Global South in a shifting global landscape. By bringing regional issues to international forums, Indonesia demonstrates its representative capacity as a representative of developing countries, strengthening its position and identity as a leader of the Global South.

After the Asian financial crisis 1997 1998, Indonesia was invited to join the G20, a global economic forum of developed and developing countries. Indonesia is the only country from Southeast Asia to join this forum, which gives it a strategic position to voice the interests of developing countries (Hermawan & Habir, 2015). In this case, Indonesia plays a strategic role in the G20 as a liaison between developed and developing countries, focusing on inclusive and sustainable development. Through its leadership, primarily when serving as the G20 presidency in 2022, Indonesia has emphasized its commitment to global issues such as health, digital transformation, and energy transition, as well as encouraging reform of the international financial system that is fairer for developing countries (Samosir dkk., 2024). This is in line with Joko Widodo's statement that:

"Memastikan G20 bermanfaat tidak saja untuk anggotanya, namun juga bagi dunia, dan utamanya negara-negara berkembang. Let us recover

together, recover stronger," (CNN Indonesia, 2024).

Indonesia's move to join BRICS in 2025 can be interpreted as a strategic effort to reinforce its identity as a leading voice for the Global South. This decision carries symbolic significance and highlights Indonesia's intention to take on a more prominent role in championing the interests of developing nations within the global arena (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2025). This step also shows Indonesia's serious efforts to encourage the creation of a fairer global balance of power and reduce the dominance of institutions and norms that Western countries have dominated. In particular, Indonesia's joining BRICS can reflect President Prabowo's foreign policy vision, which wants to position Indonesia as a "bridge" between the Global North countries and Global South countries (Sulaiman, 2025). BRICS, in this context, is considered a credible alternative platform for international groups predominantly aligned with Western interests. For the Global South, the existence of BRICS offers a new space to fight for common interests, especially on issues of economic inequality, climate change, and global governance reform. Thus, Indonesia's membership in BRICS not only expands its diplomatic network but also strengthens its position as a moral and

political force in the collective struggle of developing countries.

The construction of Indonesia's identity as a Global South leader shows historical continuity and the ability to adapt to changing global dynamics. Indonesia has consistently emphasized its representative role for developing countries since the Asia-Africa Conference and its involvement in global forums such as the G20 and BRICS. Its historical legacy as a pioneer of the Non-Aligned Movement continues to be brought to life through foreign policy narratives emphasized by national leaders, from Soekarno to the era of Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto. Through its policies, state speeches, and institutional positions in various international forums, Indonesia forms its identity not just as a developing country but as a normative actor that brings the aspirations of the Global South to the global stage. Amid an increasingly multipolar world architecture, Indonesia maintains fundamental values such as sovereignty, equality, and solidarity and actively articulates its vision of a more inclusive, just, and participatory global order.

However, Indonesia is not the only developing country striving to play a leadership in the Global South. India, for example, has consistently shown a similar commitment by advocating for the interests

of the Global South in various multilateral forums, including the G20. India positions itself as a strong voice for the Global South (Kumar, 2024). According to Ashok Sajjanhar, former Indian Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Latvia, Global South have often been marginalized in international forums dominated by major world powers. Therefore, India has taken proactive steps to act as a sincere spokesperson for advancing the aspirations and interests of those often overlooked in the global order.

"India has also emerged as a strong and clear voice of the global South. There is a persistent feeling among several small countries that their concerns and problems do not get the attention they deserve" (Sajjanhar, 2023).

In addition, at the G20 forum, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that India has empathy for Global South countries because it shares similar experiences and backgrounds as a developing country. He said: *"These are countries with (Global South) which we empathise. Since we too are part of the developing world, we understand their aspirations,"* (Outlook Business, 2023). This statement indicates that India feels a historical and collective connection with these countries. Therefore,

India sees itself as having the moral and political legitimacy to represent the interests of the Global South in international forums such as the G20.

In 2024, India held the 3rd Voice of the Global South Summit virtually under the theme "An Empowered Global South for a Sustainable Future." This forum served as a platform for countries in the Global South to express shared concerns, exchange experiences, and propose collective solutions to the most pressing global challenges (El-Assasy, 2024). The summit continued a similar initiative launched in January 2023, themed "Voice of the Global South for Human-Centered Development." This forum reflects India's commitment to playing a leadership role in strengthening solidarity and cooperation among developing countries (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2023). The initiative is inspired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's vision of "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas aur Sabka Prayas" (Together with All, Development for All, Trust of All, and Efforts by All). It is rooted in the ancient Indian philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, which teaches that the world is one family (India News Network, 2024).

While both India and Indonesia play an active role in the leadership of the Global

South, they express this commitment through the narrative of a strategic framework for cooperation in the ASEAN and Indo-Pacific regions. In this narrative, India and Indonesia are positioned as equal partners with a common goal—to strengthen regional cooperation and support the Global South agenda. The emphasis on synergy and coordination is a key aspect of their political communication. This was reflected in the joint press conference held by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Indonesian government at Hyderabad House in New Delhi in January 2025. Modi expressed his willingness to work closely with Indonesia to advance the interests and priorities of the Global South countries. Modi said:

"Now we are also welcoming the membership of Indonesia in BRICS. At all these forums, we will work in coordination and cooperation for the interests and priorities of the nations in the Global South" (Modi, 2025).

Indonesian Diplomacy in the G20: Advocacy of Global South Interests

The Group of Twenty (G20) consists of 19 countries and the European Union. It primarily functions as a platform for discussing global economic, financial stability, responding to climate change, and

advancing sustainable development. The G20 consists of the world's largest economies, both developed and developing countries, to encourage cooperation that can produce inclusive and sustainable economic growth (Berawi, 2022). This forum was formed in 1999 as a meeting place for central bank governors and finance ministers. However, after the financial crisis in 2008, the G20 underwent significant changes when countries' leaders became directly involved in its meetings. Based on the inclusiveness and decision-making based on agreement, the G20 does not produce binding legal decisions but instead encourages voluntary commitments from its members to address various global issues (Purohit & Mathur, 2024).

The G20 is a very important platform for Indonesia to mediate between the interests of developed country and developing country. From the beginning of its membership, Indonesia has represented developing countries and consistently advocated for issues that address their specific needs (Ruddyard, 2020). One of the issues raised is global financial inclusiveness. For Indonesia, the global financial system often does not represent the reality and interests of developing countries. Thus, raising this issue in multilateral forums, including the G20, is important. At the 2009 Pittsburgh G20 Summit amid the global

financial crisis, Indonesia urged greater support and attention from industrialized countries, including G20 leaders, to pay much attention to the impact of the crisis on developing countries and the importance of supporting their development (Sen, 2011).

Indonesia then proposed the establishment of an aid fund called the General Expenditure Support Fund (GESF). This fund is intended to help developing and poor countries experiencing financial difficulties after the 2008 global crisis. The aim is to provide financial support from the IMF and World Bank to build infrastructure, create jobs, and achieve Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially non-members of the G20 but have economic potential. This proposal received support from the G20 countries, developing countries in Asia and Africa, and international financial institutions because it was considered a positive step towards a more equitable and inclusive global economic system (Tanaga dkk., 2011). Quoting Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's statement regarding the GESF initiative:

"Mekanisme Global Expenditure Support Fund (GESF) dibuat untuk membantu negara berkembang menangani pertumbuhan ekonomi dan keberlangsungan pembangunannya. Dengan aliran dana ini akan mendorong perkembangan ekonomi khususnya negara-negara di Asia

terhadap pemulihhan ekonomi dunia. Dana ini akan membantu negara-negara berkembang miskin, setidaknya minimal selama tiga tahun." (Tanaga dkk., 2011)

The issue in the Global South that Indonesia also raised at the G20 was the infrastructure problem, which often hinders developing countries' economic growth. At G20 Summit in Mexico, 2012, Indonesia proposed infrastructure investment as a priority agenda at the G20 meeting. Indonesia encouraged G20 member countries to put attention on infrastructure financing in supporting sustainable development and economic growth in developing countries. This initiative not only reflects national interests but also raises the voice of the Global South in creating infrastructure to realize a better economy. Indonesia's proposal received widespread support and was successfully included in the G20 Finance Ministers' communiqué in the same year (Wibisono, 2012).

As a continuation of its initiatives, the G20 established the Study Group on Financing for Investment (SGFI) in February 2013, with Indonesia and Germany as co-chairs. This group aims to study long-term investment financing, including infrastructure, as the main instrument to encourage economic growth and job creation in developing

countries. The first face-to-face meeting of SGFI was held in Bali in May 2013, marking Indonesia's commitment to host a global discussion on financing for development work (Kementerian Keuangan RI, 2013). Since then, the issue of sustainable infrastructure development has become a permanent agenda in the G20 forum, in line with the aspirations of Global South countries to realize equitable, inclusive, and sustainable development.

Indonesia also plays a significant role during the Covid-19 pandemic. This is based on the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted the economies of Global South countries, especially in important sectors such as tourism, trade, services, and investment. This has led to a decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), economic contraction, and increased social and economic vulnerability in the Global South. In addition, limited access to resources and global support has deepened existing socio-economic inequalities (Yadav & Rena, 2024). In response to this situation, Indonesia has taken an active role in voicing the conditions of Global South countries and encouraging developed countries to pay more attention to the economic problems experienced by the Global South due to the pandemic (Hermawan, 2021).

In addition, the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine in Global South countries faces various challenges, mainly due to the policy of vaccine nationalism and vaccine hoarding by developed countries. This condition causes inequality in vaccine access because rich countries prioritize domestic needs and secure excessive amounts of vaccines. As a result, the impact of the pandemic is getting longer in low-income countries, including the Global South (Kelly & McGlasson, 2022). As a form of advocacy for the interests of the Global South in the G20 forum, Indonesia has been actively promoting the importance of equitable access to vaccines and essential medical devices for vulnerable countries. In this context, Indonesia wants to ensure that the G20's response to the pandemic continues to pay attention to the needs of Global South countries (Yadav & Rena, 2024). This is evident in Indonesia's statement at the 2020 G20 Summit, where Joko Widodo as a President emphasized the importance of equitable vaccine distribution. In his statement, Joko Widodo said that:

"Dunia tidak akan sehat kecuali semua negara sudah sehat, dan vaksin adalah salah satu amunisinya. Vaksin harus dapat diakses dan tersedia bagi semua negara tanpa kecuali-- akses terhadap vaksin Covid-19 harus dapat tersedia bagi semua negara tanpa terkecuali. Komitmen politik negara-negara G20 sangat dibutuhkan untuk memobilisasi pendanaan global bagi

pemulihan kesehatan" (Adyatama, 2020).

In 2022, Indonesia will hold the G20 Presidency for one year, starting on December 1, 2021. This position will allow Indonesia to organize a series of international meetings in Indonesia, culminating in the 17th G20 Summit in Bali in November 2022. Indonesia's leadership in this forum shows its increasing role and influence in global dynamics, especially in the context of international economic cooperation (Pramana, 2022). In addition, this momentum is used by Indonesia to expand its strategic role in advocating for the Global South interest. For example, in Joko Widodo's statement said that Indonesia's presidency in G20 will be used to advocate for the interests of developing countries (Kementerian Sekretariat Negara RI, 2022).

One of the priority agendas raised during Indonesia's Presidency is the Exit Strategy to Support Recovery. This agenda is focused on providing support and protection for developing countries still in the process of economic Recovery due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The strategy was designed to anticipate the continued impact of exit policies previously implemented by developed countries, whose economies had recovered more quickly. It is feared that

these policies could pressure the economic stability of middle- and low-income countries (Komarudin & Fadlillah, 2024).

The ideas put forward by Indonesia, such as the Global Economic Security Forum (GESF), inclusive infrastructure investment, fair vaccine distribution, and post-COVID-19 economic recovery strategies, do not only reflect Indonesia's active participation in the G20 forum. Moreover, these initiatives demonstrate Indonesia's role in encouraging the transformation of the global agenda and norms to reflect better the principles of inclusivity, solidarity, and development justice that favor Global South countries. Indonesia's role in the G20 shows that a country's influence in the international system is determined by material strength and the ability to shape relevant identities, values, and narratives in the context of an increasingly multipolar world.

Indonesia in BRICS: Global South Diplomacy

BRICS was first formed in the early 2000s by economist Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs to refer to four countries with great economic potential, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). This initiative began to move from being an investment category to a political forum when Russia hosted the first summit in

2009. In 2010, South Africa this forum and changing the name of this group to BRICS. This forum was established initially to counter the influence of global institutions like the IMF and World Bank, which were seen as overly controlled by Western nations. It also sought to promote reforms in the global economic governance system to create a more balanced power distribution (Patrick dkk., 2024).

Over time, BRICS has evolved into a strategic alliance of developing nations aiming to promote a more equitable and inclusive global order. Demonstrating its commitment, the group established the New Development Bank in 2015 and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement in 2014 as alternatives to the prevailing influence of Western-led financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank (Brics Policy Center, 2018). As global geopolitical tensions increase, especially after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, BRICS is increasingly asserting its position as a symbol of resistance against U.S. and Western dominance in the global power structure. At the 2024 BRICS Summit held in Kazan, Russia, the group officially expanded its membership by welcoming four new countries—Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, marking the transformation of BRICS into a more representative and influential multilateral forum (Patrick, 2024).

As of January 2025, the number of BRICS member countries has reached 10 countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Indonesia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Indonesia. In addition, BRICS has eight partner countries: Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. The main difference between partner and member countries is the right to participate in high-level meetings and formulate strategic decisions. Member countries benefit economically through investment, collaboration, and special trade agreements (Fadilah, 2025). The increasing number of countries involved in BRICS confirms BRICS' intention to become a more inclusive multipolar geopolitical and geoeconomic power, challenging the global system that has so far been centered on Western power. As of January 2025, BRICS nations account for 46% of global GDP and represent 55% of the world's population (Holtzmann & Voort, 2025).

Indonesia expressed its interest in joining BRICS when attending the BRICS Plus Summit in Kazan, Russia, in 2024. Since then, the process towards Indonesia's official membership in BRICS has begun. Foreign Minister Sugiono stated that Indonesia views BRICS as a platform to fight for the common interests of developing countries, known as the Global South. He also emphasized that:

"We will see whether BRICS can act as the right forum to discuss and develop the common interests of Global South countries" (Kementerian Luar Negeri, 2024b). Previously, Indonesia has been involved in several BRICS activities, including at the BRICS Summit level. In its participation, Indonesia also voiced the interests of developing countries. For example, in 2022, Indonesia participated in the Side Event of the BRICS Summit High-level Dialogue on Global Development. There, President Joko Widodo highlighted the importance of considering the interests and voices of developing countries amidst the challenging global situation, especially regarding food and energy security, as well as increasingly difficult financial stability (Sekretariat Kabinet RI, 2022). Quoting an excerpt from Joko Widodo's Speech:

"Berbagai inisiatif yang ada harus saling bersinergi dan saling memperkuat, harus memperhitungkan suara negara-negara berkembang, harus mengedepankan dialog—Kesenjangan pendanaan SDGs yang meningkat dari USD2,5 triliun per tahun sebelum pandemi menjadi USD4,2 triliun per tahun pasca pandemi harus segera ditutup. Pendanaan inovatif harus dimajukan, terutama peranan sektor swasta harus diperkuat. BRICS harus dapat menjadi katalis bagi penguatan investasi di negara-negara berkembang" (Sekretariat Kabinet RI, 2022).

This statement confirms Indonesia's active role in voicing interests in the BRICS forum. By emphasizing the importance of synergy between initiatives and the need to prioritize inclusive dialogue, Indonesia demonstrates its commitment to fighting for global justice, especially in closing the widening gap in SDG funding after the pandemic. The push for innovative funding and private sector involvement reflects Indonesia's progressive approach to addressing development challenges. In this context, Indonesia appears not only as a passive participant but also as a strategic advocate that encourages BRICS countries to pay attention to the interests of the Global South.

In 2023, Indonesia again demonstrated its commitment to advocating for the interests of the Global South by attending the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. In his speech, President Joko Widodo spoke on behalf of Indonesia and as a representative of Global South. He raised the issue of inequality in the global economic order, which is considered to widen the development gap between global north and global south. Jokowi encouraged BRICS to play a strategic role in encouraging reforms to a more just and inclusive global governance and fighting for development justice for developing countries

(KOMPASTV, 2023). This stance affirms Indonesia's position as an important actor that voices the aspirations of the Global South in the global geopolitical arena. Quoting Joko Widodo's statement:

"Kehadiran saya hari ini bukan hanya sebagai pemimpin Indonesia, tapi sebagai sesama pemimpin The Global South yang mewakili 85 persen populasi dunia, yang menginginkan win-win formula. Kehadiran saya di sini juga didasari keinginan untuk terus menghidupkan spirit Bandung yang masih sangat relevan sampai saat ini, di mana solidaritas, soliditas, dan kerjasama antar negara berkembang perlu terus diperkuat—BRICS dapat menjadi bagian terdepan untuk memperjuangkan keadilan pembangunan dan mereformasikan di tata kelola dunia yang lebih adil" (Sekretariat Presiden, 2023).

Following its involvement in BRICS during the period 2022-2024, Indonesia officially became a full member of BRICS on January 6, 2025, under the leadership of Prabowo Subianto (Faridz, 2025). This decision also marks Indonesia's commitment to strengthening its role and identity as a leader of the Global South countries. For Indonesia, BRICS can be a forum to encourage reform of global governance, especially in the fields of economics and international law, to be more inclusive and fair for developing countries. According to Abdul Kadir Jailani, the Director General for Asia Pacific and

Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BRICS has a mission to uphold sovereign equality between countries and strengthen the collective voice of middle-class countries. By joining BRICS, Indonesia confirms its determination to be more active in advocating for the interests of developing countries in multilateral forums (Leba, 2025).

"BRICS merupakan blok negara-negara kelas menengah. Jadi, harapannya adalah kita akan lebih menyuarkan kepentingan negara-negara berkembang" (Leba, 2025).

In May 2025, in a meeting with Ethiopian Ambassador Fekadu Beyene Aleka, Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono emphasized the importance of collaboration within the BRICS framework as a strategic effort to ensure that the aspirations of developing countries have a place in the global decision-making process (Subandi, 2025). This statement is consistent with Indonesia's stance before officially joining BRICS when Foreign Minister Sugiono said that BRICS has the potential to be a platform to fight for the collective interests of the Global South. The statement reflects Indonesia's diplomatic efforts to play a representative role within BRICS by positioning itself as a bridge of interests between developing countries and global structures that are considered less inclusive.

Quoting Foreign Minister Sugiono's statement:

"Kita lihat BRICS dapat menjadi kendaraan yang tepat untuk membahas dan memajukan kepentingan bersama Global South. Namun kita juga melanjutkan keterlibatan atau engagement kita di forum-forum lain, sekaligus juga terus melanjutkan diskusi dengan negara maju" (Putri, 2024).

Indonesia as the Global South's leader in the G20 and BRICS forums reflects how a country's identity, norms, and values can shape and influence the behavior and international system. Indonesia does not only act based on material interests alone but positions itself as a normative agent that actively shapes a more inclusive and just global order, especially for developing countries. Through initiatives such as the General Expenditure Support Fund (GESF), advocacy for fair distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine, and encouragement of global economic governance reforms in BRICS, Indonesia projects its identity as a representation of the voice of the Global South. This approach shows that a country's power in the international system can also be built through social construction—namely, the formation of an image as a "bridge" between developed and developing countries and a disseminator of ideas of

justice and global solidarity. Thus, Indonesian diplomacy emphasizes that power comes from economic or military dominance and the ability to create narratives and shape global norms through multilateral platforms.

CONCLUSION

This research demonstrates that Indonesia's leadership role in the Global South results from a deliberate process shaped by historical legacy, identity formation, and proactive global diplomacy. Indonesia's identity as a Global South leader has not emerged spontaneously; instead, it has been gradually built and reinforced through key historical milestones such as the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference, its leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement, and sustained engagement in multilateral platforms like ASEAN, the G20, and more recently, BRICS. Through the construction of this identity, Indonesia presents itself not only as an ordinary developing country but as a normative actor that upholds the principles of solidarity, global justice, and political sovereignty of Southern countries.

Indonesia's diplomacy in the G20 and BRICS forums demonstrates Indonesia's strategic capacity to influence a more inclusive and equitable global agenda for the

Global South. Initiatives such as the General Expenditure Support Fund (GESF), advocacy for fair distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine, and encouragement of global governance reform in BRICS show that Indonesia can project influence through normative power and position as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South. Although the challenges of multipolarity and fragmentation of interests among Global South countries remain real, Indonesia shows that global influence can be achieved through material power and consistent narratives, values, and political representation. Thus, Indonesia's role in the Global South reflects the transformation of developing country actors into agents of change in an international restructuring system.

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This study enriches the understanding of international relations by offering a Global South perspective, which better reflects the experiences and aspirations of developing countries. This approach complements the dominant narratives from developed countries. However, the study also raises important questions about the effectiveness of forums like the G20 and BRICS in pushing for real reforms in the current international system. Therefore, it opens opportunities for further research to explore how far multilateral organizations involving Global South countries can influence or even change the existing global governance.

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479

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***Green Debt Diplomacy* dan Implikasi Terhadap Kedaulatan Ekonomi: Studi Kasus Sri Lanka, Pakistan, dan Sub Sahara**

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Abstrak

Kesenjangan pembiayaan iklim (*green debt*) yang semakin lebar di negara-negara berkembang menjadi tantangan serius dalam mencapai target pengurangan emisi dan adaptasi terhadap dampak perubahan iklim. Di tengah tekanan utang dan keterbatasan fiskal, konsep diplomasi utang hijau muncul sebagai pendekatan alternatif yang menghubungkan pelunasan utang dengan pendanaan aksi iklim. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengulas secara kritis bagaimana mekanisme diplomasi utang hijau diterapkan di Sri Lanka, Pakistan, dan kawasan Sub-Sahara Afrika, serta mengevaluasi efektivitasnya dalam mendukung pembangunan berkelanjutan. Penulisan dilakukan melalui pendekatan deskriptif kualitatif berbasis studi pustaka, dengan merujuk pada artikel-artikel ilmiah terkini yang terindeks Scopus. Dengan melakukan pendekatan teori modernisasi, temuan utama menunjukkan bahwa meskipun skema ini menjanjikan sebagai solusi pembiayaan inovatif, pelaksanaannya masih terbatas oleh ketimpangan kekuasaan dalam sistem global, lemahnya kapasitas fiskal negara penerima, serta minimnya komitmen negara maju dalam merealisasikan janji pendanaan iklim. Di sisi lain, mekanisme ini juga membuka peluang untuk memperkuat kontribusi nasional (NDCs) jika didukung oleh tata kelola keuangan yang lebih adil dan kolaboratif. Artikel ini merekomendasikan agar reformasi struktural dalam tata kelola utang dan penguatan posisi tawar negara berkembang menjadi agenda prioritas dalam kerangka diplomasi iklim global.

Kata kunci: Pendanaan Iklim, Diplomasi Utang, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Afrika

PENDAHULUAN

Perubahan iklim saat ini acapkali mendatangkan sebuah ketimpangan bagi sebuah negara, khususnya menjadi area permainan papan catur bagi negara yang ingin memanfaatkan situasi dengan memonopoli ketergantungan. Hal ini yang dialami oleh beberapa negara, seperti Sri Lanka, Pakistan, dan negara Sub Sahara. Mereka pada dasarnya ingin melakukan

pembangunan hijau berkelanjutan, namun, sebuah kebijakan yang bertajuk “diplomasi utang” bukannya membuat mereka semakin aman dari perubahan iklim yang terjadi, namun, semakin membuat kompleks isu domestik yang ada

Diplomasi utang hijau (*green debt diplomacy*) merupakan fenomena yang memanfaatkan mekanisme keringanan utang sebagai instrumen untuk mendanai

pembangunan hijau yang berkelanjutan di negara-negara berkembang (Kaur, Kushwah, & Kumar, 2025). Melalui skema ini, negara-negara berkembang yang memiliki kapasitas fiskal terbatas dapat menukarkan sebagian dari kewajiban utangnya dengan komitmen investasi pada proyek-proyek yang mendukung transisi menuju ekonomi rendah karbon dan peningkatan ketahanan iklim. Mekanisme penukaran utang ini tidak hanya memberikan ruang fiskal yang lebih longgar, tetapi juga memungkinkan alokasi sumber daya secara lebih strategis untuk sektor-sektor prioritas yang berkaitan langsung dengan keberlanjutan lingkungan (Fenton, Wright, Afionis, Paavola, & Huq, 2014). Dalam kerangka tersebut, diplomasi utang hijau menjadi instrumen yang menjembatani kebutuhan pembiayaan dengan tanggung jawab kolektif dalam menghadapi krisis iklim global, serta mencerminkan transformasi paradigma dari bantuan konvensional menuju model kerja sama yang lebih adaptif dan berkeadilan (Fenton et al., 2014).

Salah satu aspek utama dari diplomasi utang hijau adalah penyelarasan dengan *Nationally Determined Contributions* (NDCs), yang merupakan komitmen negara dalam kerangka Kesepakatan Paris (*Paris Agreement*) (ESCAP, 2021). Di negara-negara berkembang, NDC umumnya bersifat kondisional, artinya pelaksanaan target

pengurangan emisi dan adaptasi perubahan iklim sangat bergantung pada tersedianya dukungan pendanaan dari negara-negara maju (Pauw, Castro, Pickering, & Bhasin, 2020). Hal ini menjadi tantangan tersendiri, mengingat keberhasilan implementasi NDC sangat bergantung pada ketersediaan dana yang berkelanjutan dan dapat diakses oleh negara-negara yang memiliki kapasitas fiskal terbatas (Iacobuță, Brandi, Dzebo, & Elizalde Duron, 2022). Tanpa skema pembiayaan yang jelas dan terstruktur, banyak negara berkembang kesulitan untuk memenuhi komitmen iklimnya secara efektif. Dalam konteks inilah diplomasi utang hijau menjadi relevan, karena memungkinkan terciptanya mekanisme pendanaan alternatif melalui pengalihan utang kepada proyek-proyek yang secara langsung mendukung target NDC masing-masing negara. Pendekatan ini tidak hanya memperkuat legitimasi internasional terhadap upaya transisi iklim di negara berkembang, tetapi juga meningkatkan transparansi dan akuntabilitas dalam alokasi dana iklim global.

Dalam kasus Sri Lanka dan Pakistan, keterbatasan dalam mengakses *green debt* menjadikan *green debt* sebagai opsi yang paling menjanjikan bagi pembangunan nasional. Melalui mekanisme ini, negara-negara tersebut berpotensi memperoleh pendanaan yang diperlukan untuk melaksanakan komitmen iklim mereka.

Namun, efektivitas pendekatan ini sangat bergantung pada komitmen negara maju dalam menyediakan dukungan keuangan serta implementasi kebijakan keuangan berkelanjutan di tingkat domestik (Fenton et al., 2014). Sementara itu, negara-negara di Sub-Sahara Afrika menghadapi kerentanan iklim yang tinggi dengan kapasitas fiskal yang sangat terbatas. *Green debt diplomacy* dapat menjadi kunci untuk membuka akses pendanaan bagi proyek-proyek adaptasi dan mitigasi di kawasan ini. Terlebih lagi, wacana reformasi sistem keuangan global dan integrasi mekanisme keringanan utang dalam skema *green debt* memberikan harapan bagi peningkatan dukungan terhadap kawasan yang selama ini termarginalkan dalam peta pendanaan iklim global (Xie, Dong, & Wang, 2023).

Hal ini pun mendatangkan sebuah ancaman yang cukup serius bagi kedaulatan ekonomi negara-negara tersebut. Jebakan utang yang dikemas dengan narasi pembangunan hijau telah memberikan ruang bagi datangnya teori modernisasi yang membuat negara-negara tersebut secara tidak langsung mengalami ketergantungan yang masif (Goorha, 2018).

Penelitian mengenai *climate financing* dan *green debt diplomacy* telah berkembang dalam beberapa dekade terakhir, namun sebagian besar kajian masih cenderung membahas aspek ekonomi dan lingkungan

secara terpisah. Studi mengenai *climate financing* umumnya berfokus pada mekanisme pendanaan, efektivitas kebijakan iklim, dan dampaknya terhadap pembangunan berkelanjutan. Sementara itu, penelitian pada topik tersebut yang dikorelasikan dengan diplomasi utang belum menjadi fokus kajian akademik terbaru ini. Hal ini sebagaimana ditunjukkan oleh *Network Visualization* mengenai gap artikel yang dianalisis dengan menggunakan Vos Viewer di bawah ini:



Gambar 1

Analisis gap melalui Vos Viiewer.

Sumber: Analisis Peneliti, 2025

Melalui visualisasi tersebut, terlihat bahwa masih terdapat kesenjangan dalam literatur yang menghubungkan *climate financing* dengan *debt diplomacy* sebagai alat kekuatan geopolitik (Gambar. 1). Sebagian besar penelitian belum secara eksplisit menganalisis bagaimana pendanaan iklim dapat digunakan sebagai instrumen diplomasi untuk memperkuat pengaruh ekonomi dan politik negara kreditor terhadap negara penerima.

Keterbatasan dalam kajian ini menciptakan kebutuhan untuk eksplorasi lebih lanjut mengenai bagaimana mekanisme pendanaan iklim dapat membentuk pola ketergantungan ekonomi yang baru di tingkat global.

METODE PENELITIAN

Artikel ini menerapkan pendekatan kualitatif dengan desain studi kasus komparatif guna menganalisis secara mendalam relasi antara pendanaan iklim (*climate financing*) dan diplomasi utang (*debt diplomacy*) dalam menciptakan pola ketergantungan ekonomi di negara berkembang. Pendekatan ini memungkinkan eksplorasi terhadap konteks geopolitik, dinamika kekuasaan, serta implikasi ekonomi-politik global secara holistik. Desain studi kasus komparatif digunakan untuk mengkaji tiga konteks negara yang menerima pembiayaan infrastruktur hijau dari aktor eksternal: (1) Sri Lanka dalam kerangka Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), (2) Pakistan melalui China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), dan (3) beberapa negara Sub-Sahara Afrika yang menerima pendanaan dari Tiongkok dan lembaga keuangan multilateral. Ketiga kasus ini dipilih untuk menelusuri pola ketergantungan dan dampaknya terhadap kebijakan ekonomi domestik dan kedaulatan nasional. Pengumpulan data dilakukan melalui studi

literatur; serta analisis data dilakukan dengan metode analisis tematik, yang melibatkan proses koding awal, kategorisasi, analisis komparatif antar kasus.

HASIL DAN PEMBAHASAN

1. Global Climate Financing dan

Diplomasi Utang

Hubungan antara *green debt* global dan diplomasi utang mencerminkan pergeseran mendasar dalam cara negara-negara, khususnya di dunia berkembang, merespons perubahan iklim di tengah keterbatasan struktur ekonomi global. Seiring dengan meningkatnya urgensi isu iklim, permintaan terhadap sumber daya keuangan untuk mendukung upaya mitigasi dan adaptasi pun semakin meningkat. Namun, sistem keuangan global saat ini masih memiliki keterbatasan struktural dalam menyediakan *green debt* yang memadai dan adil. Kesenjangan antara kebutuhan dana untuk mencapai target *Paris Agreement* dan jumlah aktual pembiayaan yang berhasil dimobilisasi terus melebar, menyebabkan banyak negara, terutama yang paling rentan terhadap dampak perubahan iklim, tidak memiliki sumber daya yang cukup untuk bertindak secara efektif (Xie et al., 2023).

Salah satu persoalan utama dalam *green debt* adalah celah pendanaan yang terus-menerus terjadi. Meskipun negara-negara maju telah berulang kali menyatakan

komitmen mereka, realisasi dana yang dijanjikan masih jauh dari harapan. Pada awalnya, negosiasi iklim lebih menitikberatkan pada aliran dana dari “Utara” (*Northern countries*) ke “Selatan” (*Southern countries*), di mana negara-negara maju bertanggung jawab untuk membantu pembiayaan mitigasi dan adaptasi di negara-negara berkembang. Namun, wacana terkini telah berkembang ke arah reformasi sistemik, termasuk inovasi mekanisme pendanaan dan pembentukan struktur keuangan global yang mampu meningkatkan mobilisasi dana secara lebih luas di luar anggaran publik semata (Xie et al., 2023). Salah satu solusi yang berkembang dalam konteks ini adalah skema pertukaran utang untuk investasi iklim, yang mengaitkan pelunasan utang dengan komitmen konkret terhadap perlindungan lingkungan (Fenton et al., 2014).

Paradigma yang terus berkembang ini juga menimbulkan perdebatan terkait konsep "utang hijau" (*Green Debt*), yakni anggapan bahwa negara-negara maju memiliki kewajiban moral dan finansial terhadap negara-negara yang memiliki kontribusi historis kecil terhadap krisis iklim namun menanggung dampaknya yang paling berat. Sementara sebagian pihak melihat konsep ini sebagai kerangka yang sah untuk mendistribusikan tanggung jawab,

pihak lain menilai bahwa hal tersebut justru dapat memperkuat polarisasi dan menghambat kerja sama yang efektif (Pickering & Barry, 2012). Sejalan dengan itu, para akademisi dan pembuat kebijakan mengusulkan mekanisme koordinasi global untuk pengurangan beban utang, seperti konsep "*Modern Debt Jubilee*", sebagai upaya memperluas ruang fiskal negara melalui pelonggaran utang dan meningkatkan kapasitas investasi dalam proyek-proyek hijau (Öncü & Sabri, 2020).

Ketidakpastian kebijakan iklim menambah kompleksitas yang tidak sedikit. Tiongkok misalnya, kebijakan lingkungan yang tidak konsisten telah terbukti memengaruhi tingkat utang korporat. Meskipun dalam jangka pendek ketidakpastian ini dapat membantu mengurangi utang berlebih, Tiongkok juga memperketat pembatasan pembiayaan, khususnya bagi perusahaan-perusahaan di sektor padat karbon (Ren, Qin, & Dong, 2022). Di sisi lain, pada sistem keuangan yang lebih matang seperti di Uni Eropa, perusahaan yang memiliki eksposur tinggi terhadap risiko iklim menghadapi biaya pinjaman yang lebih tinggi. Hal ini semakin menegaskan bahwa biaya modal kini semakin dipengaruhi oleh indikator terkait iklim dan ekspektasi pasar terhadap transparansi lingkungan (Trinh, Trinh, Li, & Vo, 2024).

Pada tataran internasional, diplomasi iklim memegang peranan strategis dalam mengintegrasikan isu-isu lingkungan ke dalam kerangka geopolitik dan ekonomi global yang lebih luas. Seiring berkembangnya urgensi perubahan iklim, berbagai forum multilateral seperti G7, G20, World Economic Forum, dan Dana Moneter Internasional (IMF) semakin memainkan peran penting dalam merumuskan arah dan prioritas kebijakan iklim dunia (Rumble & Gilder, 2023). Meskipun demikian, tantangan dalam aspek tata kelola global masih menjadi persoalan yang belum terselesaikan. Perbedaan pemahaman mengenai prinsip tanggung jawab bersama namun berbeda (*common but differentiated responsibilities/ CBDR*), serta variasi pendekatan dalam penyusunan dan pelaksanaan kontribusi nasional (*Nationally Determined Contributions/NDC*), terus menjadi kendala yang menghambat tercapainya kesepakatan kolektif dalam forum negosiasi iklim multilateral (Yu & Zhu, 2015).

Salah satu aktor penting dalam lanskap diplomasi iklim global adalah Tiongkok. Sebagai negara dengan tingkat emisi karbon tertinggi di dunia sekaligus penyandang dana utama bagi berbagai proyek infrastruktur hijau, Tiongkok berupaya mengharmoniskan arah investasi luar negerinya dengan sistem keuangan hijau

yang tengah dikembangkan di dalam negeri. Upaya ini mencerminkan komitmen strategis untuk menjadikan keuangan berkelanjutan sebagai pilar dalam agenda pembangunan nasional dan global. Namun demikian, disparitas pembangunan antar-daerah serta lemahnya koordinasi antar lembaga masih menjadi hambatan struktural yang signifikan dalam memastikan efektivitas dan konsistensi pelaksanaan kebijakan tersebut (Shen, Guo, & Ma, 2024). Adapaun di luar konteks domestik Tiongkok, tren investasi asing langsung dan proses alih teknologi juga memberikan kontribusi positif terhadap meningkatnya minat terhadap penerbitan obligasi hijau. Negara-negara yang berhasil mengintegrasikan kebijakan industri dan lingkungan dengan skema pembiayaan hijau menunjukkan kecenderungan mengalami pertumbuhan signifikan dalam aktivitas pendanaan berkelanjutan. Hal ini mengindikasikan bahwa sinergi antara kebijakan publik dan inovasi finansial dapat menjadi penggerak penting dalam transisi menuju ekonomi rendah karbon. Namun demikian, kondisi ini masih menimbulkan kekhawatiran terkait potensi ketergantungan struktural baru, khususnya di negara-negara berkembang yang belum memiliki kapasitas teknologi maupun infrastruktur keuangan yang memadai untuk menopang transformasi hijau secara mandiri (Christnacht & Mertzanis, 2025).

Keseluruhan dinamika tersebut mencerminkan kompleksitas mendalam dalam upaya pendanaan transisi menuju ekonomi hijau di tingkat global. Terdapat tantangan inheren dalam menyeimbangkan dua tujuan utama: memperkuat ketahanan terhadap dampak perubahan iklim di satu sisi, dan menjaga keberlanjutan fiskal di sisi lain. Untuk itu, dibutuhkan strategi pembiayaan yang tidak hanya bersifat inklusif dan responsif, tetapi juga mampu beradaptasi dengan konteks negara penerima yang sangat beragam. Model-model bantuan konvensional yang bersifat top-down dan bersandar pada asumsi satu pendekatan untuk semua, semakin tidak memadai dalam merespons tuntutan perubahan iklim yang semakin mendesak.

Bagi negara-negara berkembang, tekanan untuk memenuhi target pembangunan berkelanjutan berlangsung di tengah keterbatasan ruang fiskal dan kapasitas tata kelola yang terbatas. Dalam situasi ini, kebijakan *green debt* tidak bisa dilepaskan dari pertimbangan geopolitik, termasuk bagaimana aliran dana, insentif, dan bentuk utang baru diposisikan dalam relasi global. Meskipun *green debt diplomacy* menawarkan peluang untuk mengintegrasikan agenda pelestarian lingkungan dengan kebutuhan fiskal nasional, implementasinya harus dirancang dengan hati-hati. Tanpa pendekatan yang

kontekstual dan reflektif, skema ini justru berisiko mereproduksi pola ketergantungan ekonomi masa lalu dalam wajah yang lebih hijau namun secara struktural tetap asimetris. Oleh karena itu, diperlukan kebijakan yang tidak hanya fokus pada mobilisasi dana, tetapi juga pada pembangunan kapasitas dan kemandirian sistemik dalam jangka panjang.

2. Ketergantungan Utang Melalui Climate Financing

2.1. Studi Kasus 1: Sri Lanka – Diplomasi Utang dalam Proyek Energi Terbarukan

Green debt diplomacy merupakan kebijakan strategis yang memanfaatkan instrumen pembiayaan utang untuk mendukung berbagai inisiatif lingkungan, khususnya dalam sektor pengembangan energi terbarukan. Dalam konteks Sri Lanka, pendekatan ini memiliki peran yang signifikan dalam mendorong transisi energi nasional menuju pemanfaatan sumber daya energi yang berkelanjutan. Strategi ini sejalan dengan kebijakan ambisius pemerintah Sri Lanka yang menargetkan sekitar 70 persen dari total kebutuhan listrik nasional berasal dari energi terbarukan pada tahun 2030, suatu sasaran yang diperkirakan memerlukan investasi sebesar 11 miliar dolar AS selama periode 2023

hingga 2030 (Silva et al., 2024). Komitmen tersebut tidak hanya men-cerminkan respons terhadap kebutuhan energi domestik yang berkelanjutan, tetapi juga merupakan bagian dari agenda yang lebih luas, yakni pencapaian target emisi nol bersih atau net-zero emissions pada tahun 2050 (Koswatte et al., 2024). Pendekatan green debt ini memungkinkan Sri Lanka untuk menjembatani keter-batasan fiskal yang dihadapi negara berkembang, sekaligus tetap menjaga arah pembangunan yang selaras dengan prinsip-prinsip keberlanjutan dan keadilan iklim.

Peran pembiayaan melalui instrumen utang menjadi sangat vital dalam mendukung percepatan transisi energi di Sri Lanka. Dalam skala global, kontribusi utang terhadap pendanaan proyek energi terbarukan mengalami peningkatan signifikan, dari sekitar 23 persen pada tahun 2013 menjadi 56 persen pada tahun 2020 (Kushawaha & Jain, 2024). Angka ini mencerminkan semakin dominannya pembiayaan utang sebagai sumber modal dalam mendukung agenda dekarbonisasi dan pengembangan energi bersih. Namun demikian, relasi antara pembiayaan utang dan pengembangan energi terbarukan tidak bersifat linear. Hubungan tersebut membentuk pola berbentuk huruf U, yang menunjukkan bahwa pada tahap awal, peningkatan utang justru dapat menjadi

hambatan dalam pelaksanaan proyek-proyek energi terbarukan. Hal ini disebabkan oleh beban keuangan yang tinggi dan ketidakpastian pasar yang mengiringinya. Namun, setelah melewati ambang tertentu, pembiayaan utang mulai berperan sebagai katalisator, mempercepat pelaksanaan proyek energi terbarukan seiring dengan stabilitas pasar keuangan yang lebih matang dan peningkatan kapasitas kelembagaan dalam mengelola risiko-risiko fiskal (Kushawaha & Jain, 2024).

Namun demikian, transisi Sri Lanka menuju energi terbarukan tidak lepas dari berbagai tantangan yang cukup kompleks. Salah satu tantangan utama adalah ketergantungan tinggi negara tersebut pada bahan bakar fosil impor, khususnya petroleum dan batu bara. Kondisi ini tidak hanya memengaruhi stabilitas ekonomi, tetapi juga berdampak negatif terhadap keberlanjutan lingkungan jangka panjang (Hemakumara, Athukorala, & Yapa, 2023). Selain itu, tantangan lainnya adalah adanya permasalahan koordinasi antar lembaganya, serta adanya kebijakan pemerintah yang inkonsisten, seperti masih adanya investasi besar dalam pengem-bangan sumber energi konvensional yang bertolak belakang dengan semangat transisi energi hijau (Koswatte et al., 2024). Salah satu implikasi serius dari tantangan tersebut adalah semakin besarnya beban utang publik yang

disebabkan oleh subsidi energi dan kewajiban utang badan usaha milik negara (BUMN) di sektor energi. Situasi ini tidak hanya membatasi ruang fiskal negara, tetapi juga mengancam keberlanjutan utang secara jangka panjang, sehingga perlu ditangani secara hati-hati melalui strategi fiskal dan energi yang lebih efektif (Enders, 2022).

Di tengah berbagai tantangan tersebut, peluang juga terbuka lebar bagi Sri Lanka untuk memanfaatkan *green debt diplomacy* secara efektif. Beberapa kebijakan energi terbarukan yang telah diterapkan oleh Sri Lanka selama ini menunjukkan komitmen nyata negara tersebut dalam mendukung agenda energi bersih. Misalnya, kebijakan berupa sistem *net-metering*, tarif hijau, dan tarif khusus berbasis teknologi yang bertujuan mempercepat implementasi proyek-proyek energi terbarukan (Wijayatunga, 2014). Di samping itu, program-program khusus seperti pemanfaatan panel surya atap (rooftop solar PV) juga digencarkan, tidak hanya untuk mengurangi ketergantungan impor bahan bakar, tetapi juga untuk mendorong pembangunan pedesaan yang lebih berkelanjutan (Enescu et al., 2023; Hemakumara et al., 2023)

2.2. Studi Kasus 2: Pakistan – Pembangunan Infrastruktur Hijau dan Implikasi Geopolitik

Pakistan secara khusus memiliki utang yang diwujudkan melalui proyek *China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)*, sebuah bagian penting dari *Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)* yang diinisiasi oleh Tiongkok. Melalui proyek ini, Tiongkok telah mengalokasikan dana sekitar 62 miliar dolar AS untuk pembangunan berbagai proyek energi, infrastruktur, dan pengembangan ekonomi di Pakistan (Ashraf, 2023). Investasi besar ini ditujukan untuk memperkuat hubungan bilateral dan meningkatkan kesejahteraan ekonomi Pakistan, namun bersamaan dengan manfaat ekonomi yang dijanjikan, muncul kekhawatiran serius terkait dampak lingkungan yang dihasilkan dari proyek-proyek tersebut.

Pada tahap awal pelaksanaannya, CPEC sebagian besar didominasi oleh proyek energi berbasis batu bara yang memiliki dampak negatif terhadap lingkungan, terutama peningkatan emisi karbon yang signifikan. Tercatat investasi asing langsung (FDI) dari Tiongkok dalam proyek-proyek energi berbasis fosil ini secara nyata memperburuk kualitas lingkungan di Pakistan, terutama dalam hal peningkatan emisi karbon dan polusi udara (Raza, Liu, Hussain, Sui, & Liu, 2025). Lebih jauh,

pertumbuhan populasi yang tinggi di Pakistan turut memperbesar tekanan terhadap lingkungan dengan meningkatkan konsumsi energi dan emisi karbon secara keseluruhan.

Menyadari tantangan tersebut, Tiongkok secara bertahap mulai mengubah strateginya dalam implementasi CPEC, dengan lebih menekankan aspek keberlanjutan dan perlindungan lingkungan. Pergeseran ini merupakan bagian dari strategi diplomasi Tiongkok untuk memperkuat citranya sebagai "green soft power", yakni kekuatan lunak berbasis lingkungan yang bertujuan memperkuat pengaruh geopolitik melalui komitmen terhadap isu-isu lingkungan global (Nitz-Makowska, 2025). Dengan mempromosikan CPEC sebagai inisiatif yang saling menguntungkan (*win-win situation*), Tiongkok berusaha menjadikan proyek ini sebagai contoh keberhasilan diplomasi hijau yang sekaligus mempererat hubungan ekonomi dan diplomatik dengan Pakistan.

Meski terdapat peluang besar, implementasi *green debt diplomacy* melalui CPEC tidaklah tanpa hambatan. Salah satu tantangan utama yang dihadapi Pakistan adalah ketidakstabilan politik domestik. Kestabilan politik menjadi faktor krusial yang menentukan keberhasilan CPEC dalam mengurangi dampak negatif lingkungan dari investasi asing serta memastikan bahwa

proyek ini membawa manfaat nyata bagi pertumbuhan ekonomi yang berkelanjutan (Ashraf, 2023). Tanpa stabilitas politik, risiko yang ditimbulkan oleh investasi besar tersebut dapat meningkat, menghambat transformasi CPEC menjadi model pengembangan infrastruktur hijau yang berkelanjutan di kawasan Asia Selatan.

Selain itu, pertumbuhan pembiayaan hijau di Pakistan sendiri masih tergolong moderat jika dibandingkan dengan negara-negara Asia lainnya. Meskipun terjadi peningkatan dalam penggunaan pembiayaan hijau, tingkat pertumbuhannya masih terbatas dengan angka hanya sebesar 0,54, mencerminkan perlunya dorongan lebih besar untuk meningkatkan adopsi keuangan hijau secara nasional (Dai & Xiong, 2023). Namun demikian, potensi manfaat dari skenario pemulihan hijau sangat besar, di mana Pakistan diproyeksikan mampu mengurangi konsumsi energi hingga 10 juta ton setara minyak atau sekitar 9% dari total konsumsi energi nasional, serta mengurangi sekitar 53 TWh konsumsi listrik dan 30 juta ton emisi karbon secara keseluruhan pada tahun 2030 (Zia, Aslam, Zulfiqar, & Ullah, 2023).

Di sisi lain, sejumlah tantangan struktural dalam pembiayaan hijau masih perlu ditangani secara serius, terutama terkait kebijakan pemerintah dan kondisi pasar keuangan domestik. Kebijakan pemerintah

Pakistan dalam pembiayaan hijau masih diwarnai oleh ketidakpastian yang tinggi dan orientasi jangka pendek dalam pengambilan keputusan finansial (Kumar et al., 2022). Selain itu, minimnya dukungan keuangan dan konsultasi bisnis khusus bagi sektor usaha kecil dan menengah (UKM) yang ingin menerapkan praktik berkelanjutan juga menjadi hambatan utama dalam mendorong transisi ke ekonomi hijau secara lebih luas.

Faktor risiko geopolitik juga memegang peranan penting dalam pengembangan *green debt diplomacy*, khususnya dalam konteks penerbitan obligasi hijau. Risiko geopolitik dapat menurunkan daya tarik obligasi hijau secara signifikan bagi investor global, terutama di negara-negara dengan tingkat risiko politik yang tinggi seperti Pakistan (Janda & Zhang, 2024). Oleh karena itu, penting bagi pemerintah Pakistan untuk secara aktif mengelola risiko geopolitik melalui kebijakan yang stabil dan konsisten agar dapat meningkatkan daya tarik investasi hijau internasional.

2.3. Studi Kasus 3: Negara-Negara Afrika Sub-Sahara – *Green Debt Diplomacy* di Kawasan Afrika

Pada kawasan Sub-Sahara Afrika, konsep diplomasi ini menjadi semakin relevan mengingat tingginya beban utang yang dihadapi oleh banyak negara di wilayah tersebut, ditambah dengan kebutuhan

mendesak akan pembangunan yang berkelanjutan. Kompleksitas dinamika utang dan tantangan institusional di kawasan ini menjadikan *green debt diplomacy* sebagai salah satu pendekatan alternatif yang penting untuk dikaji secara kritis.

Salah satu aspek utama dari *green debt diplomacy* di Sub-Sahara Afrika adalah meningkatnya keterlibatan sektor swasta dalam pasar utang, yang membuat keberlanjutan fiskal semakin sulit untuk dijaga. Meskipun Kerangka Keberlanjutan Utang (*Debt Sustainability Framework*) yang dikembangkan oleh IMF dan Bank Dunia telah berupaya menilai keberlanjutan utang negara-negara berkembang, namun pendekatan tersebut belum sepenuhnya mengakomodasi karakteristik utang sektor swasta yang semakin mendominasi (Bonizzi, Laskaridis, & Toporowski, 2019). Ketidaksiesuaian ini menyulitkan penilaian utuh terhadap risiko fiskal jangka panjang, terutama dalam konteks kebutuhan untuk membiayai pengeluaran dasar seperti pendidikan, kesehatan, dan infrastruktur hijau.

Di sisi lain, terdapat bukti empiris bahwa utang publik di Sub-Sahara Afrika dapat memberikan kontribusi positif terhadap konsumsi energi terbarukan. Namun, efek positif ini sangat tergantung pada kualitas tata kelola pemerintahan. Ketika praktik pemerintahan lemah, pengaruh positif dari

utang publik terhadap transisi energi cenderung terhambat, sehingga pembiayaan utang tidak efektif dalam mendorong pemanfaatan sumber daya energi yang berkelanjutan (Onuoha, Dimnwobi, Okere, & Ekesiobi, 2023). Oleh karena itu, peningkatan kualitas tata kelola menjadi prasyarat penting bagi keberhasilan *green debt diplomacy* dalam konteks ini.

Lebih lanjut, peran pembiayaan hijau di Sub-Sahara Afrika semakin penting, mengingat kawasan ini menghadapi tantangan lingkungan yang berat sekaligus peluang untuk meraih pertumbuhan ekonomi berbasis energi bersih dan pertanian berkelanjutan. Konsep pembiayaan hijau, yang mengintegrasikan prinsip-prinsip lingkungan, sosial, dan tata kelola (ESG) ke dalam keputusan investasi, telah terbukti memainkan peran transformatif dalam mendanai proyek-proyek yang berorientasi pada pembangunan berkelanjutan (Mhlanga, 2024). Studi kasus di beberapa negara memperlihatkan bahwa penerapan pembiayaan hijau tidak hanya mendorong ketahanan ekonomi, tetapi juga memperkuat inklusi keuangan yang selama ini menjadi hambatan dalam pembangunan di kawasan tersebut.

Namun demikian, tantangan struktural masih menjadi penghambat utama. Salah satunya adalah tingginya tingkat utang yang dialami oleh negara-negara Sub-Sahara

Afrika. Saat ini, 33 dari 39 negara yang dikategorikan sebagai *Highly Indebted Poor Countries* (HIPC) berasal dari kawasan ini, mencerminkan tingginya beban fiskal yang harus ditanggung (Abubakar, McCausland, & Theodossiou, 2025). Dalam konteks ini, inisiatif penghapusan utang memang telah memberikan ruang fiskal, namun penerapan aturan fiskal yang terlalu ketat dapat secara tidak langsung merusak upaya keberlanjutan fiskal jangka panjang.

Selain itu, persoalan pelarian modal atau *capital flight* juga menjadi tantangan besar yang membatasi efektivitas strategi utang hijau. Lebih dari 700 miliar dolar AS telah keluar dari kawasan ini dalam empat dekade terakhir, sebagian besar berasal dari dana pinjaman yang seharusnya digunakan untuk pembangunan, namun justru berakhir di rekening pribadi di luar negeri (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2011). Fenomena ini tidak hanya melemahkan kapasitas fiskal negara, tetapi juga memperburuk krisis kepercayaan terhadap mekanisme utang luar negeri yang dianggap lebih menguntungkan elite daripada masyarakat luas.

3. Pola Ketergantungan Ekonomi Baru: Munculnya Green Debt Diplomacy

Munculnya *green debt diplomacy* menandai pola baru ketergantungan ekonomi yang semakin kompleks, terutama

di negara-negara berkembang seperti Sri Lanka, Pakistan, dan kawasan Sub-Sahara Afrika. Pola ini ditandai oleh bergesernya bentuk ketergantungan dari sekadar utang konvensional ke arah pembiayaan proyek berkelanjutan dan investasi rendah karbon yang dibungkus dalam retorika keberlanjutan. Dalam banyak kasus, diplomasi utang ini tidak hanya menjadi instrumen pembangunan, tetapi juga bagian dari strategi geopolitik negara kreditur seperti Tiongkok melalui *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI) yang semakin agresif. Negara-negara seperti Sri Lanka dan Pakistan mengalami tekanan ekonomi yang signifikan akibat paparan utang luar negeri, terutama yang berasal dari Tiongkok. Ketergantungan ini diperburuk oleh lemahnya manajemen fiskal, tingginya utang publik, dan sektor ekonomi yang rentan seperti pariwisata yang terdampak hebat oleh pandemi COVID-19 dan konflik Rusia-Ukraina (Sengupta, Saha, Patil, & Yadav, 2024). Lebih dari itu, kebijakan energi yang tidak efisien dan pemberian subsidi yang membebani fiskal turut memperburuk posisi utang mereka, terutama melalui utang BUMN sektor energi yang tidak produktif (Enders, 2022).

Wacana tentang diplomasi jebakan utang yang sering dikaitkan dengan pinjaman Tiongkok masih menjadi isu kontroversial. Namun dalam kasus Sri Lanka, krisis utang lebih banyak disebabkan oleh dominasi

obligasi inter-nasional dan kegagalan negara tersebut dalam mengalihkan ekonomi menuju sektor ekspor bernilai tambah, ketimbang hanya karena pinjaman dari Tiongkok (Nicholas & Nicholas, 2023). Sementara itu, Pakistan juga menghadapi dinamika serupa dengan akumulasi cepat utang dalam kerangka BRI yang menimbulkan pertanyaan mengenai kelayakan ekonomi proyek-proyek yang didanai serta kapasitas domestik untuk mengelolanya (Shah, 2019).

Pergeseran menuju *green debt diplomacy* menambahkan dimensi baru dalam hubungan ekonomi internasional. Negara-negara berkembang, termasuk di Afrika Sub-Sahara, kini semakin aktif dalam mengakses pembiayaan hijau dan proyek-proyek berorientasi rendah karbon. Sumber-sumber pembiayaan ini sebagian besar masih bersifat utang, baik dalam bentuk obligasi hijau maupun investasi langsung, yang sering kali difasilitasi oleh lembaga keuangan Tiongkok dan mitra multilateral lainnya (Sullivan, 2012). Upaya ini mencerminkan kebutuhan untuk menjembatani kesenjangan pendanaan iklim yang besar dan mengatasi dampak perubahan iklim di negara-negara berpendapatan rendah (Bowen, Campiglio, & Herrerias Martinez, 2017).

Namun, mengandalkan instrumen utang sebagai solusi atas tantangan lingkungan

menimbulkan pertanyaan penting terkait keberlanjutan fiskal jangka panjang. Meskipun pembiayaan hijau dapat memperluas ruang fiskal untuk pembangunan berkelanjutan, dalam jangka panjang ia dapat menciptakan bentuk baru ketergantungan ekonomi, di mana negara penerima bergantung pada teknologi, modal, dan bahkan standar kebijakan yang ditentukan oleh negara pemberi (Sullivan, 2012). Hal ini memperlihatkan adanya dinamika kekuasaan yang tetap melekat dalam praktik diplomasi utang, meskipun dikemas dalam semangat kolaboratif dan keberlanjutan.

Untuk menghindari jebakan ketergantungan baru ini, sejumlah rekomendasi kebijakan menjadi penting untuk dipertimbangkan. Pertama, negara-negara seperti Sri Lanka dan Pakistan perlu melaksanakan reformasi fiskal secara menyeluruh, terutama melalui peningkatan penerimaan negara dan rasionalisasi pengeluaran publik, guna mengurangi defisit primer dan memperbaiki keberlanjutan utang (Samarakoon, 2024). Kedua, transisi menuju kebijakan energi berbasis pasar harus dipercepat, karena pendekatan ini terbukti mampu mengurangi beban fiskal dan meningkatkan efisiensi sektor energi, terutama di tengah harga bahan bakar yang relatif rendah pasca-pandemi (Enders, 2022). Selain itu, penting bagi negara-

negara ini untuk membangun basis industri manufaktur yang berorientasi ekspor sebagai strategi jangka panjang guna meningkatkan daya saing dan mengurangi kerentanan terhadap fluktuasi eksternal (Nicholas & Nicholas, 2023). Ketergantungan pada pinjaman luar negeri yang digunakan untuk membiayai sektor non-produktif harus dihindari, dan diarahkan ke sektor-sektor yang dapat memberikan nilai tambah dan menciptakan lapangan kerja.

Dalam konteks *green debt*, keterlibatan sektor swasta melalui instrumen pasar seperti obligasi hijau dan investasi langsung perlu diperluas. Mekanisme ini tidak hanya dapat menjembatani kesenjangan pembiayaan, tetapi juga menciptakan insentif bagi inovasi teknologi dan praktik bisnis yang lebih berkelanjutan (Bowen et al., 2017). Namun demikian, kebijakan pemerintah tetap memegang peran kunci dalam mengatur tata kelola investasi hijau agar tidak hanya menguntungkan investor, tetapi juga memperkuat pembangunan inklusif dan berkelanjutan.

KESIMPULAN

Green debt diplomacy mencerminkan pergeseran paradigma dalam pendekatan *green debt* global, terutama bagi negara-negara berkembang yang terjebak dalam tekanan fiskal dan beban utang yang berat. Lewat mekanisme seperti pertukaran utang

untuk aksi iklim, peluang terbuka untuk mengatasi dua krisis sekaligus: krisis iklim dan krisis utang. Namun, sebagaimana ditunjukkan dalam konteks Sri Lanka, Pakistan, dan kawasan Sub-Sahara Afrika, efektivitas dari pendekatan ini sangat bergantung pada kondisi struktural domestik dan kesiapan institusional masing-masing negara.

Studi ini menegaskan bahwa meskipun diplomasi utang hijau menawarkan prospek yang menjanjikan, implementasinya belum sepenuhnya optimal. Kelemahan pada sisi tata kelola keuangan, kesenjangan dalam kapasitas fiskal, serta ketidakseimbangan dalam sistem keuangan global masih menjadi hambatan utama. Di samping itu, kurangnya konsistensi negara-negara maju dalam memenuhi komitmen *green debt* memperparah kesenjangan tersebut. Dalam hal ini, reformasi sistemik dan kolaborasi internasional menjadi syarat mutlak agar skema ini dapat berjalan adil, efektif, dan berkelanjutan.

Dengan begitu, *green debt diplomacy* bukan sekadar instrumen teknokratis, melainkan bagian dari perjuangan yang lebih luas untuk keadilan iklim global. Keberhasilannya menuntut bukan hanya inovasi keuangan, tetapi juga solidaritas politik, keberanian dalam reformasi kebijakan, dan pengakuan atas tanggung jawab sejarah dari negara-negara

berpenghasilan tinggi. Tanpa itu semua, diplomasi utang hijau berisiko menjadi solusi semu yang tidak menyentuh akar persoalan.

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LEADER PERSONALITY ANALYSIS OF WAR DECISIONS (CASE STUDY : VLADIMIR PUTIN IN THE RUSSIA-UKRAINA WAR)

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Abstract

This study explores how Vladimir Putin's personality has influenced his decision-making during the Russia-Ukraine war. While much research has focused on geopolitical, demographic, and socio-political factors, this paper highlights a different perspective: the role of Putin's leadership traits in shaping the conflict. The analysis begins with a historical overview of the Russia-Ukraine tensions, followed by a biographical examination of Putin, identifying key events that have shaped his leadership style. Traits such as assertiveness, self-confidence, and authoritarian tendencies are examined in relation to his strategic choices. Using a qualitative descriptive approach, primarily through content analysis of secondary sources, the study assesses how these traits have influenced his policies and actions. The findings suggest that Putin's centralized and top-down leadership style has played a crucial role in the war, underscoring the broader impact of individual leadership traits on global conflicts.

Keywords: *Leader Personality, Vladimir Putin, Russia-Ukraine War*

A. INTRODUCTION

One of the most important tragedies that has drawn international attention since Russia's decision to attack Ukraine on February 24, 2022, is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Thousands of people have died as a result of the violence, and infrastructure has been severely damaged, especially in Ukraine. Although the United Nations and several countries have repeatedly attempted to mediate, the conflict in Ukraine still shows no signs of resolution

(Reuters, 2025). There have been several periods of fierce fighting in the ongoing conflict, with heavy losses and destruction on both sides. A humanitarian disaster has also resulted from the conflict, with millions of Ukrainians fleeing their homes and taking sanctuary in nearby nations. A variety of actions have been taken by the international community in response, including as military assistance to Ukraine, economic penalties on Russia, and diplomatic attempts to mediate a settlement.

US and Ukrainian officials have recently held peace negotiations in Saudi Arabia with the goal of resolving the conflict. However, the situation is still unstable, with more casualties and damage being caused by continuous military operations and drone attacks. The war has significant geopolitical ramifications that impact international relations, economic stability, and global security. With the help of its allies, Ukraine persists in resisting and defending its sovereignty in spite of the difficulties. The resilience and determination of the Ukrainian people have been a source of inspiration for many around the world. As the conflict persists, the hope for a lasting peace remains a priority for the international community (The Independent, 2025).

The armed conflict between the two has actually been going on since 2014. The conflict began when a large-scale public protest against the decision of Ukrainian President Viktor Ynukevych to reject the economic integration agreement with the European Union (EU) received a fairly strong response from the state security apparatus. Ukrainian President Viktor was considered more pro-Russian so that this protest led to the fall of President Viktor and then divided Ukrainian society into two, those who were pro-EU and pro-Russia (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023).

The conflict heated up when Russian troops succeeded in controlling the Crimea region of Ukraine in March 2014. Even the Russian defense ministry said that at this time (May 2023) they had controlled a new area east of the city of Bakhmut (Al Jazeera). Some argue that Russia took the opportunity to control Crimea because the strategic location of Crimea could have a good impact on strengthening Russia's influence in the Eastern and Central European regions. So that on March 16, 2014 the Crimean Parliament held a referendum to separate Ukraine and join Russia (Prmono, 2014).

In the case of conflict between Russia and Ukraine, there are several factors causing the war, namely geopolitical factors, demographic factors, and socio-political factors. For instance, Bornu, T.Z (2025) said that The Russian–Ukrainian war, deeply rooted in historical legacies and geopolitical tensions, has had a profound impact on both nations since its initial escalation in 2014 and its intensification in 2022. The conflict stems from Russia's strategic ambition to retain influence over Ukraine, its opposition to NATO's eastward expansion, and the complex cultural and historical ties that connect the two countries. NATO's eastward expansion has consistently been perceived by Russian officials and much of the public as a potential threat to Russian national security. This perception was further

strengthened by NATO's 2004 enlargement, which brought seven new members into NATO, bringing the alliance's borders closer to Russia (Gidadhubli, R. G. 2004).

However, in this study, the author wants to try to analyze from different factors, namely through Putin's personality as a leader who has a big hand in the war conflict. Why is this important? because the figure of Putin as a leader is key in making decisions whether to go to war or stop it. As stated by Capobianco et al (1999), that conflict is actually any situation in which people have incompatible interests, goals, principles, or feelings. What Capobianco said is very closely related to the personality of each individual, where values, beliefs, principles and all of that are attached to a person's character or personality and are able to influence the people around him, especially if he is someone who has power.

Referring to Margaret G. Hermann's (2015) Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), which identifies seven key personality traits that shape how political leaders behave and make decisions, this study argues that Vladimir Putin's personality has significantly influenced Russia's actions in the Ukraine war. Among these traits, Putin demonstrates a high belief in his ability to control events, a strong need for power and influence, and elevated self-confidence—all of which are closely associated with assertive and

authoritarian leadership styles. These personality indicators are drawn from Hermann's framework, not arbitrarily selected, and have been consistently reflected in Putin's decision-making patterns throughout his political career. By examining Putin's background, political trajectory, and behavior in past conflicts, this study analyzes how these traits have shaped his leadership style and contributed to key decisions, including the annexation of Crimea and the escalation of military aggression in 2022. Through this lens, the research highlights how individual personality traits, beyond institutional or strategic considerations, can play a critical role in shaping the course of international conflict.

Given the significance of individual leadership traits in shaping political outcomes, this study seeks to understand the extent to which Vladimir Putin's personality has influenced Russia's decisions during the Ukraine war. In particular, it asks two central questions: Did Putin's personality play a role in the decision-making process surrounding the Russia-Ukraine conflict? And if so, how did his personal characteristics shape the course and outcome of the war?

To address these questions, the study sets out with two main objectives. The first is to assess whether and how Putin's personality contributed to the formulation of

Russia's political and military strategies in relation to Ukraine. The second is to explore how specific traits, such as his self-confidence, desire for control, and need for power, have shaped his decision-making style and influenced the trajectory and consequences of the conflict. By focusing on these aspects, this research aims to highlight the often-overlooked role of individual leaders' personalities in shaping large-scale geopolitical events.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. The Concept of Personality

In general, personality has many definitions, especially when viewed through psychological studies. In terminology, as said Fatwikingasih, N (2020) in his book "Psychology Theory of Human Personality", that personality actually comes from the term personality or charm which means a mask in which the players themselves wear masks according to the roles they play. This article uses the trait paradigm approach where trait is one aspect of human personality that is stable or fixed, has a tendency to behave in a certain way and is carried out consciously. The above opinion is also supported by the statement of David Winter (2015) in Cuhadar, Esra et al (2017) saying that personality can be interpreted as a set of embodied contexts, or characteristics formed

by the environment and experiences that once developed, then survive change or if want to change it takes maximum effort beyond the effort to shape it.

From the concepts above, we can see that what a person does consciously in the context of the nature or behavior he is doing will be closely related to the decisions he makes, including political decisions in the context of leadership analysis. One of the arguments of researchers Ali Muhammad and Mutia Hariati H (2019) said that "personality, motivation, belief and character as well as the policies taken by Putin were able to bring Russia through its gloomy period".

The study by Ali Muhammad and Mutia Hariati (2019) argues that Putin's personality, motivation, belief system, and decision-making helped Russia recover from a difficult and uncertain period, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent years of instability. Their analysis highlights how leadership traits contributed to domestic consolidation and national resilience in the face of internal and external challenges.

While this current study acknowledges the importance of those factors, it builds on that foundation by shifting the focus to a specific international conflict the Russia-Ukraine war. Rather than analyzing how Putin's traits supported national recovery, this

research explores how those same traits, particularly his high self-confidence, strong need for control, and assertiveness contributed to decisions that escalated an international war. In other words, where Ali and Mutia's work emphasizes personality as a stabilizing force, this study examines personality as a driving force behind military aggression and geopolitical confrontation. By situating Putin's leadership traits within the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, this study adds a layer of analysis that emphasizes how personality can both consolidate power domestically and project it externally, even at the cost of global instability.

Based on this perspective, the study hypothesizes that Vladimir Putin's personality traits, particularly his assertiveness, high self-confidence, and strong belief in his ability to control events, have significantly influenced his decisions in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Drawing on Hermann's (2015) Leadership Trait Analysis, these traits are not seen as passive characteristics, but as active forces shaping key decisions. By exploring how these traits are reflected in Putin's leadership style and political behavior, especially during critical moments such as the annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion, this study aims to demonstrate that individual personality can

be a central driver of international conflict, beyond institutional or strategic considerations.

2. The Concept of Leadership and War Decision Making

The concept of leadership is very closely related to decisions or policies made by a leader that produce change. This then also applies in the analysis of Russia's decision under the leadership of Vladimir Putin in attacking Ukraine to date. The domestic political climate of the Russian Federation government also has a significant influence on both the driving and constraining elements in the defense policy development process. The aspect of Vladimir Putin's support in carrying out the defense policy-making process for the government of the Russian Federation comes from the agreement of the parliamentary votes of the upper and lower houses of the Russian Federation government, the support of the Silovinki group who participate in supervising, and support the defense policy-making process of the Russian Federation government, as well as the full support of the people of the Russian Federation. As Herman (2015) said that leadership style is very closely related to the people around him and this also determines how he regulates the interactions, norms, rules or principles he uses.

Vladimir Putin's political opponents who disagree with him are a restraining force in the decision-making process of the government of the Russian Federation on military policy. Vladimir Putin's political opponents use various tactics, such as political tactics, to prevent the confirmation and implementation of the Russian government's military policy, which is in the form of drafting a defense and security budget plan. The Government of the Russian Federation will develop a number of potentials that serve the national interests of the Russian Federation by implementing a Defense Policy in the form of increasing the military budget.

Some of these possibilities include the Military Awakening of the Government of the Russian Federation which has long been in decline after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the development of military doctrine, the approval of the National Security Concept (NSC) document, the increase in the caliber and quantity of personnel and combat fleets, the creation of various new products in the field of defense equipment, development of nuclear weapons systems, modification of nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation, and modernization of nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation government acts as a counterweight in the midst of US domination as a superpower, strengthening

its diplomatic negotiating position. It also strengthens the position of the government of the republic of the Russian Federation in the International Community. The regional and international effects of the Russian government's defense policies are manifested in an increase in the defense and security budget.

C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The goal of the study is to create a personality-based framework for comprehending Vladimir Putin's choices about the escalation of the Ukrainian war. To accomplish this, it combines leadership style research, biographical study, and an investigation of historical and cultural factors. We use secondary data sources, such as published works, documents, and videos, to learn more about Putin's character, leadership style, and the larger geopolitical environment. The study highlights how individual traits, such as assertiveness, self-confidence, and resolve, along with authoritarian tendencies and strategic thinking, shape Putin's actions and decisions in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

In order to analyze the data, we will be looking at it in a very methodical way. Extracting important themes, patterns, and insights relating to Putin's personality, leadership style, and historical/cultural influences will require doing content analysis

of relevant literature, documents, or social media content. The aforementioned theoretical framework will serve as the basis for the analysis' interpretation and subsequent results.

This study will use an analysis of the 3 criteria below, namely:

1. Biographical analysis: biographical analysis was conducted to see how Putin's family background, education, and work have been carried out so far.
2. Analysis of leadership style: an analysis of leadership style was carried out to see how Putin's leadership style was while he was President and what decisions and achievements were made by Putin while in office, including decisions during the Russia-Ukraine war.
3. Historical and environmental analysis: historical and environmental analysis is intended as an analysis in viewing the history of Russia as a country and how the culture built within it can influence and shape the personality of its leaders, especially Vladimir Putin. So that it becomes one of the factors in decision making.

In particular, the paper's study methodology contains some significant gaps that need to be acknowledged. This work has certain potential shortcomings, including possible biases and limits due to the fact that it depends solely on secondary data sources.

These limitations may also affect the paper's ability to generalize beyond its single location and person of focus. That the findings of this study may not be extrapolated to other persons or other locations where the same situation may exist. Overall, this study intends to present a thorough and in-depth examination of Vladimir Putin's character flaws and leadership style, as well as his impact on decisions made during the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

D. RESULT & DISCUSSION

1. Biographical Analysis

Vladimir Putin's leadership cannot be fully understood without tracing the formative experiences that shaped his construction of distinctions between the state, power, and the international world. His childhood in postwar Leningrad, his long career in the KGB intelligence service, and the traumatic experience of witnessing the collapse of the Soviet Union have shaped a very distinctive frame of mind. These three phases of life come together to shape Putin's political identity: a leader who emphasizes militaristic nationalism, places great faith in narrow state control, and has a deep skepticism of the West. These biographical elements not only provide the backdrop but also serve as a primary lens through which to understand

the foreign policy and power strategies he implemented during his leadership.

Vladimir Putin was born on October 7, 1952, in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), a city still in the shadow of World War II (Britannica, 2023). His parents, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin and Maria Ivanovna Putina, were factory workers who survived the Siege of Leningrad (1941–1944), one of the most brutal episodes in modern history, in which over a million civilians died from starvation, disease, and air raids (Gessen, 2012, p. 12). For Putin's family, the war was not just a collective memory, but a personal experience that left deep psychological scars. His father was seriously wounded while serving in the Red Army, while his mother nearly died from starvation during the siege (Myers, 2015, p. 8).

Putin grew up in a household that carried not only the burden of history but also the trauma of loss. His two older brothers died before he was born: Albert died as an infant, while Viktor died of diphtheria and malnutrition during the siege. The memory of the siege of Leningrad has repeatedly surfaced in Putin's public narratives, indicating the significance of the experience in shaping his political and emotional identity. Historian Catherine Merridale (2006) notes that "survivors of the siege internalized a survivalist mentality that equated vulnerability with death" (p. 214). This

mindset seems to explain Putin's tendency to view politics both domestic and international, as a zero-sum arena, where national strength and resilience are the absolute priority in the face of real and imagined threats.

Vladimir Putin's childhood not only shaped his personality emotionally, but also instilled in him a deep-seated belief that Russia is under constant siege. This belief has become one of the main narrative foundations of his political rhetoric. Repeated references to World War II known in official Russian discourse as the "Great Patriotic War" serve not only as a form of historical homage but also as an instrument to legitimize policies of militarization and restrictions on domestic opposition. In a 2019 public speech, Putin stated that the events of Leningrad must never be forgotten and condemned the Nazis' deliberate extermination plan as a crime against humanity. He highlighted the resilience and bravery of Leningrad's residents and stressed that their sacrifice served as a lasting example of loyalty to the Motherland, implying the necessity to remember history to avoid repeating such tragedies (Kremlin.ru, 2019).

This kind of rhetoric is not just historical nostalgia, it plays a strategic role in shaping public opinion and state policy. As Timothy Snyder (2018) notes, "Putin uses the

memory of World War II as a diplomatic tool, equating external threats with internal disloyalty” (p. 72). In other words, the collective memory of past suffering is rearticulated to affirm a national identity based on resilience and absolute loyalty to the state. The siege mentality inherited from his parents’ experiences during the siege of Leningrad has become an ideological framework that justifies placing state security above individual freedom, one of the most prominent features of Putin’s governance practices.

Vladimir Putin’s early education took place at School No. 193 in Leningrad, where he demonstrated steady if unexceptional academic performance. School records note his particular interest in German, a skill that would prove to be an important asset in his intelligence career (Hill & Gaddy, 2015, p. 67). In 1970, he was accepted into the Law Faculty of Leningrad State University (LSU), one of the most prestigious institutions in the Soviet Union at the time. Although not a top-notch student, Putin graduated with honors in 1975 (LSU Archives, 1975), displaying the perseverance that would become his later trademark.

However, Putin’s character formation did not only occur in the classroom. Outside of academic pursuits, he developed a deep interest in martial arts, particularly judo. In 1973, he earned a black belt and later

became active in sports organizations, even leading the Leningrad Judo Federation. This experience, according to Galeotti (2022, pp. 34–35), played a critical role in shaping his leadership philosophy, which emphasized discipline, tactical patience, and the ability to exploit an opponent’s weaknesses as strategic strengths.

After completing his law degree, Putin was recruited by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), the Soviet Union’s main intelligence agency. The recruitment began even before he graduated, indicating that certain attributes about Putin had caught the attention of state security forces (Mitrokhin, 1999). At the KGB, he underwent intensive training in Leningrad and Moscow, covering a range of operational skills such as counterintelligence, wiretapping, and investigation (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999, p. 211).

His German language skills led him to the First Directorate, the unit that handled foreign intelligence and in 1985, he was posted to Dresden, East Germany. This assignment proved to be a deeply personal experience. There, Putin witnessed firsthand the collapse of the communist regime in East Germany and the euphoria of German reunification—an event he described in his memoirs as a “humiliating collapse” (Putin, 2000, p. 78). According to Soldatov and Borogan’s (2010, pp. 89–92) analysis, this

experience strengthened Putin's belief in the importance of state stability and strength, and the dangers of rapid and uncontrolled political change.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a significant turning point in Putin's life. He resigned from the KGB with the rank of lieutenant colonel and entered civilian politics through the Saint Petersburg City Government. Under the guidance of Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, a reformist and his former LSU professor, Putin began to build the administrative skills and political networks that would be essential to his future career (Hill & Gaddy, 2015, pp. 112–115).

In 1996, he moved to Moscow to join the Administration of President Boris Yeltsin. In a short time, he climbed various strategic positions, from Deputy Head of Presidential Property Management, to finally becoming Director of Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB) in 1998. This rapid rise reflected his astuteness in reading the dynamics of post-Soviet politics full of uncertainty (Dawisha, 2014, pp. 156–160).

As head of the FSB, despite only serving for about a year, Putin managed to reform the internal structure of the institution and strengthen his influence among the siloviki, an elite network consisting of former security forces. Sakwa (2015, p. 134) believes that

Putin's closeness to this group was one of the key factors that paved his way to the position of Prime Minister in August 1999, a stepping stone that soon led to the presidency.

When Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned on December 31, 1999, and appointed Vladimir Putin as interim president, many did not fully realize that Russia was entering a new political era. Since then, Putin has not only maintained power for more than two decades, but has also engineered profound transformations in the country's political structure, foreign orientation, and economic configuration.

One of the main features of Putin's rule has been the vertical consolidation of power. Through constitutional reforms and administrative restructuring, he created a highly centralized system of power, a pattern that, according to Richard Sakwa (2015, p. 189), had not been seen since the Soviet Union. This included strengthening state control over the media, limiting regional autonomy, and placing his confidants in key positions in government and security agencies. This structure was not only about bureaucratic stability, but also about building loyalty and ensuring top-down control of the political process.

On the international stage, Putin has demonstrated a decisive leadership style that is oriented toward restoring Russia's

status as a major world power. From the military intervention in Chechnya early in his term, to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and active involvement in the Syrian civil war since 2015, all these moves reflect an assertive and bold foreign policy approach. According to Tsygankov (2016, pp. 215–220), Putin's foreign policy is not simply a response to external threats, but rather an expression of a long-term project to reposition Russia as a global actor respected or feared by the West.

Economically, Putin's government adopted a model that combined free-market elements with state control over strategic sectors, particularly energy, banking, and the military. The result was the emergence of a system that Dawisha (2014, p. 201) calls "oligarchic capitalism with Russian characteristics" in which business oligarchs loyal to the Kremlin profit greatly, while the state retains control over the direction of the national economy. This model offers short-term stability, but at the same time perpetuates dependence on political patronage and narrows the space for healthy economic competition.

Through consolidation of power, aggressive foreign policy, and engineering of an economic-political model, Putin has not only changed the face of contemporary Russia, but also established himself as a symbol of a new era one characterized by

authoritarian stability, strategic nationalism, and the rise of Russia's geopolitical identity on the world stage.

2. Leadership Style Analysis

Generally, state-level leaders will consult with their colleagues and other specialists before settling on a course of action. Policy execution is also governed by legislation at the state level. Decisions about foreign policy should take into account the state, as well as the leader's goals and personality. As a result, it is crucial that we comprehend the president's character, the worldview of domestic institutions, public opinion, national aspirations, and the foundation of the state.

Putin's leadership style is renowned for being dictatorial, populist, and pragmatic. Sakwa, R. (2015) argues, "Putin's style of leadership combines aspects of authoritarianism & populism, allowing him to consolidate control while maintaining popular support." Putin is a leader who tends to emphasize on authority, suppresses opposition, and controls the media. (Sakwa, 2015). He has a reputation for being a powerful leader who isn't hesitant to resort to violence. He's also a skilled politician who knows how to captivate Russia's electorate. As per Hale's (2015) observation, "Putin's leadership exhibits the characteristics of patronal politics, where decision power is in

the hands of a leader and loyalty is valued as an imbalance of political support."

Putin's leadership style is characterized by a strong emphasis on national security, which was a primary concern for him during his presidency. His administration has raised military spending, repressed dissent, and annexed the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine. The government has shown that it is serious about protecting Russia's interests and keeping its territory intact by prioritizing national security and the use of military action. It has been argued by Charap & Colton (2017) that "Putin's leadership style reflects a strong emphasis on national security, as demonstrated by his annexation of Crimea and crackdown on opposing movements."

Vladimir Putin bases his policies on what is in the best interest of the Russian Federation as a whole. When Vladimir Putin took office, the economy, which had tanked under Boris Yeltsin, began to mend and eventually recover. Economic growth and development under Vladimir Putin are characterized by large profits for the government from a variety of investments in natural resources, as well as an increase in both foreign exchange and state treasury receipts. After gaining financial control over the Russian Federation government, Vladimir Putin shifted his focus to military and security planning. This defense and security

strategy is reflected in the annual increases in the Russian Federation's defense and military budget. Putin has made strengthening the country's defenses a primary priority.

The situation at home and abroad will be impacted by the Russian Federation's decision to raise its military spending. As a result of the government of the Russian Federation increasing its military budget, a variety of defense and security capabilities have grown, both in terms of quantity and quality. The state's military budget is prioritized over other state budgets including those for healthcare, social security, and education. The increased military spending of the Russian Federation has improved the country's standing in international negotiations. The Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin's leadership enjoyed a period of economic, military, political, technological, and armaments-related growth and revitalization. Putin sees figuring out a security policy as just as crucial to making the Russian Federation Republic a developed country as economic development.

Setting the Defense and Military Budget with precision and care helps protect a country against threats and security disruptions at home and abroad. Governments are more dedicated to advancing their own national interests with

the help of foresight and deterrence. The steady political and economic scenario has reportedly allowed Vladimir Putin to ally himself with the United States. The government cares more about furthering its own interests than they do that of the people. The steady political and economic scenario has reportedly allowed Vladimir Putin to ally himself with the United States. The government cares more about furthering its own interests than they do that of the people. The steady political and economic scenario has reportedly allowed Vladimir Putin to ally himself with the United States.

Putin's emphasis on traditional Russian values such as patriotism, Orthodox Christianity, and family structure has not only shaped domestic policy but has also played a role in framing the narrative of the invasion of Ukraine. As Laruelle (2019) notes, these values have been instrumental in strengthening Russia's national identity, which Putin has used to justify Russia's reclaiming of territories it considers historically Russian, including parts of Ukraine.

Additionally, Putin's pragmatic yet state-dominated approach to economic policy what Treisman (2018) and Connolly (2020) call "managed marketization" has helped sustain Russia's war effort. By maintaining control over strategic sectors such as energy and defense, Putin has ensured the Russian

state's ability to fund military operations while maintaining resilience amid international sanctions. These strategic moves suggest that Putin's leadership style, rooted in tradition and pragmatism, is directly related to how Russia waged and sustained its war on Ukraine.

3. Historical Analysis

The relationship between Russia and Ukraine has formed and changed over centuries, spanning from the glory days of Kievan Rus' to the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the 9th to 13th centuries, the territories we now know as Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus were united under the federation of Kievan Rus', with power in Kyiv. This federation was ruled by the Rurik dynasty of Varangian (Viking) descent, often cited as the common root of the three nations (Plokhyy, 2006). However, history took them on different paths. When Ivan IV or Ivan "the Terrible" was crowned as the first Tsar of Russia in 1547, Moscow began to emerge as an expansive center of power (Britannica, 2023). On the other hand, the territory of Ukraine at that time was more influenced and under the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was not until the late 18th century, after a series of conflicts and divisions, that most of Ukraine was finally incorporated into the Russian Empire (Subtelny, 2000).

Service (2005) argues that tensions never really subsided. When the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917 due to the Bolshevik Revolution, Ukraine briefly declared its independence. However, in 1922, Ukraine became one of the founding republics of the Soviet Union—along with Russia and other regions—in a socialist federal state. Although formally united, the power dynamics remained unequal, with political dominance favoring Moscow. According to Kramer (2022), the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 marked a decisive turning point. Russia and Ukraine emerged as independent states, not merely through unilateral declarations of independence, but through a constitutional agreement by the leaders of the Soviet republics to end the union. Ukraine itself strengthened its position through a referendum, in which more than 90% of its people expressed support for independence.

The collapse of the Soviet Union not only marked the end of a superpower, but also exposed the fragility of the foundations of the state, which, as Molchanov (1996) argues, was not a true nation-state but a vast multinational empire. The legacy of this empire has left a complex and unresolved imprint on its successor states, especially Ukraine, where questions of political identity, cultural orientation, and self-definition as a

nation still persist. On the other hand Polls from the mid-1990s showed that many Russians in Ukraine still considered the Soviet Union to be their "Fatherland," while most Russians in Russia continued to view Ukrainians and Russians as one nation (Solchanyk, R. 1998).

The historical and cultural setting in which Vladimir Putin made decisions during the Russo-Ukrainian war is crucial to comprehending his actions. Russia takes great pride in its history as the region's dominant state and its unique culture. Russia's opinions and policies towards Ukraine have been impacted by Russia's shifting political regimes and systems of administration, which are reflected in Russia's complicated history. This historical context helps explain why Ukraine is still a sensitive topic in Russia.

Russia has long demonstrated a historical tendency towards territorial expansion and military strength. Some scholars argue that the country has not been able to fully escape the imperialist patterns of the pre-modern era, the era of the Russian empire that focused heavily on military power and territorial expansion as a symbol of glory (Tolz, 2002). This legacy has left a deep imprint on the way Russian politics is viewed, both in domestic policy and foreign strategy. Throughout its history, Russia has been

known to have a tradition of weak limited government, but with a strong and centralized autocratic pattern of power (Yekelchyk, 2013). During the period of power, for example, the space for grassroots political expression in regions such as Ukraine was systematically controlled. Yekelchyk notes that the authorities deliberately restricted access to insurgent materials in order to protect local communities from the influence of radical and nationalist ideologies.

This appears to be in contrast to the practices of other European countries that have moved past imperialism and adopted the notion of the nation state. Russia's sentiments and policies toward Ukraine may be influenced by the country's preoccupation with military force and territorial dominance. Because of its historical significance, Russia now views Ukraine as a key location in its geopolitical goals. Because Russia considers Ukraine to be inside its sphere of influence, it is concerned about any attempts by Ukraine to draw closer to the West, such as its pursuit of stronger connections with the European Union.

Migration patterns and demographic shifts throughout time also have had a significant impact on relations between Russia and Ukraine (Rudnytskiy, 2020). The 1932 famine in Ukraine dramatically altered the demographic make-up of the country just

before World War II. An estimated one-third of Ukraine's 25-million-strong population perished in the years leading up to the end of World War II in 1946. However, by the time of the 1959 census, that number had risen considerably to 42 million. Between 1945 and 1955, 3.5 million Soviet citizens migrated from all around the country to work in factories and mines (Ivanov, S 2018). The population of Ukraine is predicted to have dropped drastically before rapidly growing again after the end of the Second World War. The ethnic make-up and population size of Ukraine were also impacted by the migration of Russians from different parts of the Soviet Union to the country. Industrial areas, like Kiev and Crimea, are where many people of Russian descent live. This has the potential to spark ethnic tensions and political competitiveness between Ukraine and Russia.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine are influenced by a number of variables, including economic issues. After Russia invaded Crimea, Ukraine's economy became extremely vulnerable. Because of this precarious position, even the Russian Democrats were slow to recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state (Larrabee, 1996). The policy of financial independence in Ukraine was limited by the country's dependence on Western aid and support, which was inadequate. Due to limited resources and

economic needs, Ukraine agreed with Russia's rejection of NATO expansion in the mid-1990s (Larrabee, 1996).

Meanwhile, on the other hand, according to Blockmans (2017), Russia also sought to gain hegemony in the Black Sea region after its annexation of Crimea in 2014. This strategic move was not only territorial, but also marked a turning point in Russia's ambitions to strengthen its military dominance and assert control over key energy and trade routes. By militarizing Crimea, Russia increased its naval presence and gained a foothold that allowed it to more strongly influence regional dynamics. As a result, neighboring countries now face higher security risks and strategic vulnerabilities, as most lack the effective military and political capacity to counter Russia's expanding power.

Many Ukrainians are dissatisfied with their government's partnership with Russia, and this discontent is driving them to push for closer ties to the European Union. Prior to joining NATO in 2004, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia took the decision to do so. Russia's borders may be in jeopardy as a result of NATO's presence in the countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Although Russian officials tried to convince themselves that NATO expansion after the Cold War was no longer required, the country's economic woes are a

mirror of Ukraine's instability and are a major factor in the political dynamics between Russia and Ukraine.

Russia's military & political engagement in the Georgian and Ukrainian crises in 2008 and 2014 are instances of the Russian expansionist foreign policy. This might be seen as a prophylactic move against the developing international relations problem and Russia's mounting threat. The yearning for economic, political, and social improvement in Ukraine has now mobilized the people to demonstrate and fight opposing authoritarian authority and corruption. The original purpose of the Ukrainian demonstrations was to put stress on the government in order to develop ties to the European Union, although the protests have now broadened to address a number of other economic, social, and political concerns. Protests and the Euromaidan uprising in Ukraine demonstrated a desire to bring about reform & an end to corrupt regimes in 2013. Russia conquered the Crimean Peninsula & other parts of Ukraine as a consequence of this conflict.

When taken as entirety, this historical viewpoint illustrates the complicated dynamics of Russia-Ukraine ties. Amid the long and often tumultuous history between Russia and Ukraine, Vladimir Putin emerges as a leader who consciously draws on and uses the past to shape Russia's current and

future foreign policy, especially toward Ukraine. Rather than allowing history to remain a backdrop, Putin appears to be actively reinterpreting it, using imperial legacies and Soviet-era memories as tools to justify Russia's territorial ambitions, challenge Western influence, and reassert Russia's position as a global power.

As Mankoff (2014) and Snyder (2018) note, this strategic use of historical narratives is not merely symbolic, it helps Putin legitimize his leadership domestically while also defending his controversial actions internationally, such as the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. To truly understand Putin's motivations and decisions, then, we need to look at how he positions Ukraine not simply as a neighbor but as a key part of Russia's historical identity and geopolitical ambitions.

E. CONCLUSION

To sum up, this study looked at how Vladimir Putin's personality affected the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. By examining his background, leadership style, and historical significance, the author hopes to understand how his personal qualities influenced his decisions and actions during times of conflict. Putin's decision-making was influenced by his upbringing, schooling, and time spent in the KGB. His views on politics

and power, particularly national security, were influenced by his experiences in the military and intelligence community as well as his family's involvement in the World War. This supports both his leadership style and his belief that Russia ought to have more global influence.

In addition, Putin's leadership style has been characterised as pragmatic, populist, and dictatorial. He places a strong emphasis on defence and has demonstrated that he is willing to use force to protect Russia's interests and boundaries. His emphasis on national security has led to Ukraine's annexation of Crimea, higher military spending, and the repression of opponents. Putin's decisions during the conflict were informed by his pragmatic economic policies and his support for traditional values like patriotism and family.

Putin's decisions have been influenced by both his personality traits and the political context of the Russia–Ukraine war. External factors like the geopolitical context and Russia's history as a reasonably powerful nation have played a role in shaping his behavior, but these traits assertiveness, self-confidence, determination, and strong authoritarian tendencies have been more important. The investigation is based on secondary data, and it is well-known that online debates suffer from issues including the spread of misinformation and bias. To

properly understand how Putin's personality affects his combat decisions, more research and primary data collection is required.

The author concludes that Vladimir Putin's personality has influenced his decisions in the Russia-Ukraine war. His upbringing, leadership style, and the historical and cultural influences on his attitude to conflict all contribute to shaping who he is now.

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Comparative Foreign Policies Of Indonesia And The Philippines In Responding To Security Instability To Tiongkok

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Abstract

This study aims to explore the formulation of Indonesian and Philippines' foreign policies in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite the similar characteristics as archipelagic states, they adopt distinct foreign policy approaches. Employing a qualitative comparative case study method, this research draws on primary data from interviews and observations, as well as secondary data from relevant literature. Data were analyzed through tracking and triangulation techniques. The findings reveal that Indonesia adopts a predominantly diplomatic approach in its Indo-Pacific strategy, whereas the Philippines employs a combination of hard power and legal instruments, particularly through international judicial mechanisms. These differences are rooted in each country's distinct geopolitical posture—Indonesia maintaining a closer orientation toward China, and the Philippines aligning more closely with the United States.

Keywords: *Foreign Policy, Indo-Pacific, Indonesia, Philippines, Comparative Study*

INTRODUCTION

The Indo-Pacific region holds significant strategic importance in economic, political, and military dimensions. It has increasingly become the focal point of complex geopolitical interactions involving numerous state actors. This region serves as a central axis for geographical, political, and strategic interests of key powers, including the United States, Japan, India, and Australia (Pedrason, 2021). The Indo-Pacific's economic potential, coupled with its geopolitical salience and evolving security dynamics, has prompted various

countries to formulate and implement strategies aimed at safeguarding and advancing their respective national interests.

From an economic perspective, the development and strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region has attracted global attention, particularly from the United States, which prioritized the region in its foreign policy agenda during the Trump administration. This shift was formally articulated in key documents such as the *National Security Strategy* (2017) and the *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report* (2019), both

of which emphasized the Indo-Pacific as a central arena for geopolitical and economic engagement (White House, 2017; U.S. Department of Defense, 2019). The United States views the Indo-Pacific as a form of geopolitical transformation that plays an essential role in economic, political, and security development. Economically, the Indo-Pacific region is characterized by its vast maritime space and the importance of maritime connectivity for trade and economic activities. Stability and security of the maritime domain are essential to ensure the smooth flow of goods and resources. Countries in the region have a shared interest in maintaining open and secure sea lanes for trade and investment (Nainggolan & Pedrason, 2021).

The Indo-Pacific region encompasses major economic powers such as China, India, Japan, and Australia, all of which play pivotal roles in global trade and investment. Its substantial economic potential and sustained growth have garnered widespread international interest, prompting the establishment of strategic economic initiatives and partnerships, including China's Belt and Road Initiative and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (Pedrason, 2021). Furthermore, the region functions as a critical nexus of global trade, underpinned by strategic maritime passageways essential for the transit of goods and natural resources. It is rich in natural resources, including oil, gas,

minerals, and fisheries, making it an essential region for energy security and economic development (Joyce et al., 2021).

From a political perspective, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a central issue in contemporary international relations. The region is politically defined by a complex web of relationships, strategic alignments, and rivalries among both major and middle powers. It encompasses not only global actors such as the United States, China, India, and Japan but also small and medium-sized states—including ASEAN member countries—that play a pivotal role in shaping the regional political landscape. The Indo-Pacific's political significance is underscored by key issues such as territorial disputes, maritime security challenges, and the ongoing recalibration of power balances among major actors. The Indo-Pacific also reflects the broader effort to construct a regional security architecture centered on maritime governance and connectivity. Its vast geographical expanse, coupled with the strategic value of its sea lines of communication, necessitates cooperative frameworks to ensure regional peace and security. Political contestation in the region is driven not only by competing territorial claims but also by divergent visions of regional order and influence. As Joyce et al. (2021) note, the Indo-Pacific is marked by overlapping geopolitical interests and

strategic rivalries that shape diplomatic engagements and regional alignments. In this context, the Indo-Pacific is not merely a geographical concept but a political construct, reflecting the ambitions of state actors to assert influence and shape the future of regional order.

The Indo-Pacific region has witnessed increasing competition and power dynamics among these countries, leading to the formulation of various strategies and policies to protect and advance their political interests. It includes the Indo-Pacific strategies of countries such as the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, which aim to promote a free, open, and rules-based order (Putro, 2021). The United States views the Indo-Pacific region as necessary to its economic, security, and political interests. With access to the region, the US can protect and advance its interests (Putro, 2021).

In the military domain, the Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a focal point for strategic cooperation and power projection among key global actors. One notable example is the AUKUS security pact; Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which reflect efforts to enhance military capabilities and uphold regional stability, particularly through initiatives such as the development of nuclear-powered submarines. The region hosts several major military powers, including the United States, China, India,

and Japan, all of which possess substantial military assets and strategic interests. As maritime security plays a critical role in Indo-Pacific military strategies, countries have increasingly invested in naval infrastructure and capabilities to secure sea lanes and assert regional influence. Alongside traditional power rivalries, the region also grapples with non-traditional security threats such as maritime piracy, terrorism, and territorial disputes, further complicating the regional security environment (Pedrason, 2021). Military modernization and strategic competition—particularly between the United States and China—have intensified, marked by frequent naval exercises, arms development, and the establishment of new defense alliances. These dynamics underscore the Indo-Pacific's strategic significance and the growing complexity of its security landscape (Joyce et al., 2021).

The Indo-Pacific region is characterized by various security conflicts that significantly affect regional stability and global security. One of the most prominent is the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, where overlapping claims—particularly by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei—have escalated tensions and led to military confrontations, coercive diplomacy, and the militarization of contested maritime features. China's large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial

islands equipped with military facilities have raised serious concerns among regional states and external powers. These actions have increased the risk of armed conflict due to potential miscalculations at sea and have drawn responses from external actors such as the United States through freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), thereby expanding the dispute into a broader regional security concern (Storey, 2017; Kaplan, 2014). Furthermore, these developments challenge the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), particularly with regard to exclusive economic zones and maritime entitlements (Batongbacal, 2016).

Security tensions in the Indo-Pacific are shaped by several factors, among which the South China Sea territorial dispute remains one of the most pressing threats to regional stability. China's extensive territorial claims and construction of artificial islands in the disputed waters have raised tensions with neighboring countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The North Korean nuclear issue is another security conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. North Korea's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities have raised concerns among neighboring countries and the international community. These activities have led to rising tensions and the imposition of sanctions and diplomatic efforts to address the issue.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula can potentially escalate into a major military conflict with devastating consequences (Scott, 2019).

The Indo-Pacific region is marked by complex security dynamics, ranging from terrorism and maritime threats to unresolved territorial disputes. For archipelagic states like Indonesia and the Philippines, these challenges are especially pressing due to their geographic positioning along vital sea lanes. Both countries have responded with a mix of domestic security strategies and regional cooperation mechanisms, including joint patrols, counterterrorism operations, and participation in ASEAN-led frameworks. However, beyond these practical measures, their foreign policy orientations in the Indo-Pacific differ significantly. This paper argues that while Indonesia adopts a diplomatic and multilateral approach rooted in ASEAN centrality and strategic autonomy, the Philippines employs a more assertive and security-driven strategy, closely aligned with traditional allies like the United States. This divergence is shaped by each country's geopolitical posture, historical alignments, and threat perceptions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Philippines' foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region emphasizes an

independent and pragmatic approach aimed at maintaining good relations with major powers, including China. This policy is grounded in the principle of “*Development is Peace, and Peace is Development,*” which highlights the importance of economic cooperation and expanding diplomatic relations (Joyce et al., 2021). With regard to the South China Sea issue, the Philippines has adopted a balancing strategy, attempting to navigate its alliances with both the United States and China. This includes engaging in bilateral talks with China to address overlapping maritime claims in the West Philippine Sea and explore joint resource development, while also maintaining close defense cooperation with the United States (Joyce et al., 2021). Additionally, the Philippines works to sustain cooperative ties with other ASEAN claimant states to prevent the dispute from escalating or damaging broader regional relationships.

Philippine foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific has experienced notable shifts under President Duterte. Observed from a clear departure from the previous administration’s pro-Western posture, highlighting Duterte’s adoption of a more independent and assertive stance (Magcamit, 2020; Gill, 2020). Gill argues that Duterte’s administration initiated a strategic move toward “less America, more China” by reducing emphasis on the U.S.

security alliance and strengthening economic and diplomatic ties with China.

Under President Duterte, the Philippines has been very vocal in criticizing the United States and the European Union, accusing them of treating the country as a colony and representing the remnants of imperialism in Asia. This behavior contrasts with the security-maximizing approach usually adopted by small states. Under Duterte, Philippine foreign policy shifted toward accommodating China’s interests, while distancing itself from U.S. strategic priorities. President Trump has downplayed his country’s territorial disputes with China and sought closer economic and political ties with China. It includes temporarily setting aside the 2016 Hague Tribunal Award on the West Philippine Sea, reaffirming the Philippines’ territorial rights, and invalidating China’s claims (Magcamit, 2020). Philippine foreign policy under Duterte is also characterized by a willingness to criticize major international organizations and their perceived hypocrisy, double standards, and inefficiency. It is a departure from the stance of strongly supporting the principles, norms, and rules promoted by these organizations. Overall, the Duterte administration’s foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific leaned toward accommodating China’s interests, while simultaneously distancing itself from the United States and

questioning the Western-led international order.

During this period, the Philippines and Japan deepened their bilateral relations by institutionalizing two-plus-two dialogues between their defense and foreign ministers. Additionally, following the announcement of the Australia–UK–US (AUKUS) security pact in 2021, the Philippines became the first Southeast Asian nation to publicly voice its support. It shows the Philippines' inclination to diversify its Asian strategic partners and form new defense networks. Duterte's foreign policy approach allows the Philippines to increase its regional diplomatic connectivity (Gill, 2020).

With the election of President Marcos Jr. in 2022 has emphasized the importance of maintaining a balanced approach in the Philippines' strategic equation. Marcos Jr. emphasized the significance of the United States and the treaty alliance in shaping the Philippines' foreign and security policy while emphasizing the continued development of relations with China to avoid exacerbating Southeast Asia's security architecture (Gill, 2020).

Overall, the Philippines' foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific seeks to manage the region's complex geopolitical dynamics and respond to emerging security concerns within its immediate surroundings. Its strategic location—serving as a gateway

between the Western Pacific and broader Asia, and its closeness to critical sea lanes and maritime communication routes—enhances its geopolitical importance in the region. Overall, Philippine foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region under the Duterte administration is characterized by an emphasis on maintaining good relations with major powers, seeking economic cooperation, and balancing its relationship with the United States and China in the South China Sea dispute (Magcamit, 2020; Gill, 2020)

Research on Indonesia's foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region has been explored by several scholars, such as Fathun Nashir (2021), who highlights Indonesia's diplomatic posture in maintaining ASEAN centrality. This research shows that there is a reorientation in Indonesia's foreign policy. It is based on the Indo-Pacific Region, a new regional region that promises maritime, political, and economic interests. Indonesia's foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific Region tends to act as a country with middle power status. Middle-power countries consistently adopt diplomatic strategies to shape and guide their foreign policy. This also aligns with the constitutional mandate in Law/37/1999. Indonesia always acts as a catalyst, facilitator, and manager in building international relations in the Indo-Pacific Region. This reorientation makes Indonesia's foreign policy an ASEAN policy

characterized by the emergence of seriousness by building the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific Cooperation.

Indonesia's foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region continues to prioritize diplomatic engagement and multilateralism (Gideon, 2023). This approach reflects Indonesia's strategic commitment to maintaining ASEAN centrality and neutrality amid rising tensions between major powers such as China and the United States. Gideon highlights that Indonesia applies a poliheuristic decision-making model, which accounts for both rational (cost-benefit) considerations and psychological or cognitive factors—such as Indonesia's historical ties and its perception of regional leadership.

Looking at the broader geopolitical context of the Indo-Pacific, particularly the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, has directly affected regional dynamics and security policy (Souza, et al, 2022). Their study outlines competing claims from Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, China, and the Philippines over the Spratly and Paracel Islands, highlighting the complex and overlapping assertions of sovereignty. For example, while Vietnam and Malaysia have submitted claims based on maritime law under UNCLOS, China relies on historical narratives to justify its Nine-Dash Line. The Philippines, on the other hand, has pursued legal arbitration and multilateral diplomacy to assert its claims, including its

case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016.

These findings underscore the contrast between Indonesia's cautious diplomatic balancing and the Philippines' legalistic and assertive approach in managing Indo-Pacific conflicts. This divergence reflects each country's geopolitical posture, security priorities, and strategic partnerships in the region. Indonesia's foreign policy emphasizes ASEAN centrality, non-alignment, and strategic ambiguity (Nashir, 2021), while the Philippines tends to rely on legal arbitration and deepen security cooperation with the United States, especially in response to maritime disputes (Magcamit, 2020; De Castro, 2020).

METHODOLOGY

This research was conducted using a qualitative methodology with a comparative case study approach, which is commonly used to analyze similarities and differences across specific contexts (Yin, 2018). The comparison is based on the premise that two different actors—Indonesia and the Philippines—exhibit similar responses to China's assertiveness in the South China Sea. Both countries have protested through ASEAN and other international mechanisms in defense of their maritime sovereignty. This study employs primary data obtained through interviews with

representatives from the Indonesian Consulate in Manila, the Philippine Representative at the ASEAN Secretariat, and the Director of ASEAN Political Economy. Secondary data are drawn from scholarly books, academic journals, online databases, and official documents. Data analysis was carried out using triangulation and process tracing techniques to ensure reliability and validity (Patton, 2002; George & Bennett, 2005). Data collection took place in Jakarta.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. Indonesia's Foreign Policy

Response in the Indo-Pacific Region

According to Dr. Siswo Pramono, then serving as Director-General of the Policy Analysis and Development Agency (BPPK) at Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a May 5, 2021 interview with the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia, the Indo-Pacific reflects the Asian Century phenomenon. He noted that, unlike the American and European centuries, the Asian Century is marked by fragility—particularly vulnerable to regional divisions and power contestations (Pramono, 2021). Agreeing with Siswo, Heiduk sees that the current shift from the American-European region to Asia has also expanded the variety of interests of various countries in

the Indo-Pacific region and non-region in order to participate in the arena (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020). Fragility, the emergence of various actors and interests, and the widening geopolitical and geostrategic influence push the Indo-Pacific to become a new land of global attention.

On its way, the concept owned by ASEAN through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) initiated by Indonesia as a key regional actor in 2019 demands inclusiveness, cooperation, and respect for ASEAN centrality. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific was agreed upon in 2019 during the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, Thailand. The document's derivatives of the cooperation domain include maritime, connectivity, SDGs, and cooperation in other economic fields (ASEAN, 2019).

The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (ASEAN, 2019) emphasizes four key areas of cooperation: maritime cooperation, connectivity, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and economic and other possible cooperation. Among these, maritime cooperation is particularly crucial given the Indo-Pacific's strategic geography and the persistence of maritime disputes. ASEAN's emphasis on maritime cooperation reflects its commitment to maintaining peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the region—especially in sensitive areas such as the


South China Sea. This focus underlines ASEAN's effort to promote a rules-based order and to serve as a neutral platform for dialogue among conflicting parties. The complexity of the South China Sea issue lies in the involvement of not only ASEAN claimant states but also major external powers, including the United States and its democratic allies. These powers often assert their presence under the banner of promoting a "free and open Indo-Pacific" and balancing China's assertiveness. Thus, ASEAN's cooperative approach in the maritime domain is both a diplomatic tool and a strategic response to prevent escalation and preserve regional autonomy.

| Code | Policy | Component |
|------|----------------------|--|
| A1 | Indonesia Hard Power | a) Move independently according to national interests (can make cooperation is multilateralism and bilateralism) b) Affirming the concept of free actors in the sense of independent (anti-annexation of territory) |
| A2 | Indonesia soft power | a) Promote ASEAN centrality policy based on TAC and Bali Concord b) Cooperate through AAIOP and ARF to synergize diplomatically |

Source: Researcher, 2023

The table above shows alternative foreign policy considerations that Indonesia must take to respond to China's aggressiveness in the region of Indo-Pacific, especially the North Natuna Sea theoretical area, which

belongs to Indonesia. This means that calculations using a hard power approach by creating open conflict must be calculated for profit and loss. It is, likewise, using soft power.



| Rank | Country/Territory | Score | Trend | |
|------|-------------------|-----------|-------|---|
| 1 | United States | 80.7 | ↘ | |
| 2 | China | 72.5 | ↘ | |
| 3 | Japan | 37.2 | ↘ | |
| 4 | India | 36.3 | ↘ | |
| 5 | Russia | 31.6 | ↘ | |
| 6 | Australia | 30.9 | ↘ | |
| 7 | South Korea | 29.5 | ↘ | |
| 8 | Singapore | 25.1 | ↘ | |
| 9 | Indonesia | 19.4 | ↘ | |
| 10 | Thailand | 18.7 | ↘ | |
| 11 | Malaysia | 18.0 | ↘ | |
| 12 | Vietnam | 17.5 | ↘ | |
| 13 | New Zealand | 16.8 | ↘ | |
| 14 | Taiwan | 15.2 | ↘ | |
| 15 | Pakistan | 13.9 | ↘ | |
| 16 | Philippines | 12.8 | ↘ | |
| 17 | North Korea | 10.6 | ↘ | |
| 18 | Brunei* | 10.0 | ↗ | |
| 19 | Bangladesh | 9.1 | ↘ | |
| 20 | +2 | Cambodia | 7.8 | ↗ |
| 21 | -1 | Sri Lanka | 7.5 | ↘ |
| 22 | -1 | Myanmar | 7.5 | ↔ |
| 23 | Laos | 6.4 | ↗ | |
| 24 | Mongolia | 5.0 | ↘ | |
| 25 | Nepal | 4.2 | ↘ | |
| 26 | Papua New Guinea | 3.3 | ↘ | |

Source: Lowy Institue , 2023

Based on the two figures above, it shows that the position of Indonesia and China are much different from the comprehensive level of power. Indonesia is in ninth place, while China is in second place. So, based on the accumulated power value, the categories of Indonesia and China are different. China became a Superpower country with 72 points, while Indonesia is in the Middle power status with 19 points. It means that from the difference in points alone, the two countries are very different / Thus, it is difficult for Indonesia to carry out hard power policies against China.

a) The size of the accumulated order of state power above is measured based on fundamental economic capabilities, indicators like purchasing power

parity, the country's influence on the global stage, level of technological development, and its integration into worldwide networks.

b) Military capability, refers to conventional armed strength which is assessed through defense resources, military personnel and structure, weaponry and equipment, specialized abilities, and the strategic military stance within Asia.

c) Resilience, a country's ability to withstand or prevent real or potential external threats to its stability, evaluated through factors such as institutional strength, resource security, geoeconomics and geopolitical stability, and nuclear deterrence.

- d) Future Resources: Projected future distribution of resources and capabilities, which play a role in current perceptions of strength; measured in terms of economic, defense, and broad resource forecasts by 2030, as well as working-age population and labor dividend forecasts for 2050.
- e) Economic Relations, refer to the ability to wield influence and leverage through mutual economic dependence, as reflected in trade partnerships, investment ties, and economic diplomacy efforts.
- f) Defense Networks, partnerships across Asia function as force multipliers for independent military capabilities, evaluated through the strength of alliances, regional defense diplomacy, and arms transfers.
- g) Diplomatic Influence, the level and standing of a country's foreign relations, measured in terms of diplomatic networks (Lowy Institute, 2023). Some of the variables above show a concrete measure of the state's ability in international relations. The author's analysis based on the political and security domains is the two most critical factors influencing interactions among countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

Indonesia's military strength is shown in the table below:

| Key Indicators | Specific Indicators | Total Score of Special Indicators | Total Score of Key Indicators | Strength Score |
|---------------------|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|
| Economy Capability | <i>GDP Size</i> | 12.5 | 9.0 | 19.4 |
| | <i>Intern Specificational Leverage</i> | 1.0 | | |
| | <i>Technology</i> | 7.1 | | |
| | <i>Connectivity</i> | 8.7 | | |
| Military Capability | <i>Defence Spending</i> | 2.0 | 14.8 | |
| | <i>Armed Forces</i> | 26.0 | | |
| | <i>Weapons & Platforms</i> | 7.5 | | |
| | <i>Signature Capabilities</i> | 14.5 | | |
| | <i>Asian Military Posture</i> | 32.6 | | |

| | | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|------|------|
| Resilience | <i>Internal Stability</i> | 48.1 | 36.8 |
| | <i>Resource Security</i> | 58.1 | |
| | <i>Geoeconomic Security</i> | 84.8 | |
| | <i>Geopolitical Security</i> | 31.5 | |
| | <i>Nuclear Deterrence</i> | 0.0 | |
| Economic Relationship | <i>Regional Trade Relations</i> | 5.3 | 12.3 |
| | <i>Regional Investment Ties</i> | 4.0 | |
| | <i>Economic Diplomacy</i> | 24.8 | |
| Security Networking | <i>Regional Alliance Network</i> | 0.0 | 29.6 |
| | <i>Regional Defence Diplomacy</i> | 29.6 | |
| | <i>Global Defence Partnerships</i> | 2.2 | |
| Diplomacy Influence | <i>Diplomatic Network</i> | 60.4 | 54 |
| | <i>Multilateral Power</i> | 45.9 | |
| | <i>Foreign Policy</i> | 41.1 | |
| Cultural Influence | <i>Cultural Projection</i> | 11.9 | 15.9 |
| | <i>Information Flows</i> | 2.4 | |
| | <i>People Exchanges</i> | 25.9 | |
| Future Resources | <i>Economic Resources 2030</i> | 9.3 | 11.6 |
| | <i>Defence Resources 2030</i> | 4.1 | |
| | <i>Broad Resources 2030</i> | 17.3 | |
| | <i>Demographic Resources 2050</i> | 19.1 | |
| | | | |

(Fathun, Gideon , 2023).


The author outlines and explains these two dimensions in the Poliheuristic analysis contained in the following table:

| Code | Dimension | Evaluation Criteria |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| D1 | Politics | Does policy A (1/2) affirm Indonesia's position with free active politics and align with President Joko Widodo's 4+1 foreign policy? |
| D2 | Security | Can policy A (1/2) ensure the defense and security of Indonesia that provides a sense of security for Indonesian citizens through strengthening defense-free and active politics? |
| Dimension/ Alternative | Indonesia moves to respond to North Natuna with Hard Power (A1) | Indonesia moves to respond to North Natuna with Soft Power (A2) |
| Political Dimension (D1) | Bargaining arena to prove RI as anti-realism and unilateral claims: 1. Concentric expansion of Indonesia's New Mandala regional policy by creating alliances or security qualia. 2. Initiation of the concept of total war. 3. Utilize security cooperation at the ASEAN level and lobby countries with territorial interests. | 1. ASEAN remains the pillar of Indonesia's foreign policy through ARF, AIO, or the ASEAN Political Security Committee. 2. Actualization of leadership in Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN to promote a dialogue approach and adherence to the Code of Conduct in the region. 3. Engaging international bodies, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ) |
| Security Dimension(D3) | a) Potential to create limited conflict between the two countries. b) There is a tendency for the involvement and intervention of other countries. c) Not following RI's foreign policy line, namely free and active politics with a diplomatic approach. | a) Commitment to the Treaty of Amity & Cooperation and code of conduct b) Is able to serve as a platform for Confidence Building Measures among Indo-Pacific countries, as the AOIP also promotes security cooperation through mechanisms through ADMM and ARF. c) The South China Sea presents major challenges stemming from conflicting national interests between China and |

| | | |
|--|--|---|
| | | <p>several ASEAN member states.</p> <p>d) Disputes in the East China Sea and North Natuna Sea impact the regional stability in the Indo-Pacific area.</p> |
|--|--|---|

The table above clearly illustrates the various foreign policy options pursued by Indonesia must be logical and have rational considerations and psychological cognition. It shows the quality of the

country's resilience from the possibility of open conflict that can come at an unexpected time. The following is state resilience data based on its capabilities.



(Lowy Institute, 2023)

The two figures above show China's quality in defending against possible attacks. If there is a tendency for open conflict with Indonesia, China's qualifications and strengths are above Indonesia's. So, it is not rational for

Indonesia to choose the challenging power route to counter China's assertiveness in the North Natuna Sea. Furthermore, it is very far from Indonesia's military capabilities when viewed from China's military power. Seen in the following table:

| Main Capacity | Military Variable | TOTAL |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Strategic Model | Personnel | 3.134.000 |
| | Defense Budget | \$230.000.000.000 |
| | Total Border | 22.457 km |
| Land Forces | Tank | 5250 |
| | Armored | 35000 |

| | | |
|------------|--------------------------|------|
| | Self-Propelled Artillery | 4120 |
| | Pull Artillery | 1734 |
| | Rocket Projector | 3160 |
| Air Forces | Fighter/Inceptors | 1200 |
| | Combat | 371 |
| | Transport | 286 |
| | Special Missions | 399 |
| | Refueler | 114 |
| | Helicopter | 912 |
| | Training | 399 |
| | Fighter Helicopter | 281 |
| Navy | Destroyer | 2 |
| | Frigate | 1 |
| | Corvette Ship | 41 |
| | Submarine | 49 |
| | Patrol Ship | 70 |
| | Destroyer | 79 |
| | Frigate | 152 |
| | | |

(Fathun, Gideon, 2023).

Indonesia advances its national interests in numerous diplomatic platforms, with a particular focus on preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific region, as outlined in the table below:

| Number | Activity | Years | Point of Meeting |
|--------|---|-------|--|
| 1 | <i>International Symposium on "Fostering Regional Connectivity in the IndoPacific Region"</i> | 2018 | The critical role of connectivity as a catalyst for economic and social progress at the level of transportation corridors, economic corridors, and corridor continuity is in line with ASEAN MPAC 2025 for the Indo-Pacific. |

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|---|---|-----------|---|
| 2 | <i>International Focus Group Discussion on “Connecting the Connectivities in the Indo-Pacific: Indian Ocean and Rim Chapter</i> | 2019 | The discussion covered various Indo-Pacific strategies put forward by countries like the United States, Japan, India, and ASEAN member states, highlighting ASEAN and the East Asia Summit as key platforms for regional cooperation. Furthermore, connectivity initiatives in the Indo-Pacific can align with existing frameworks such as the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), and the EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy. |
| 3 | <i>International Seminar on “Indo-Pacific Connectivity Outlook”</i> | 2019 | This second-track seminar discusses the importance of the rise of the Asian Century, which makes the Indo-Pacific a world growth center—on the same occasion, it also presented Indonesia's proposal through maritime cooperation, connectivity, and SDGs for Indo-Pacific cooperation priorities. |
| 4 | <i>High-Level Dialogue on Indo-Pacific Cooperation: Towards a Peaceful, Prosperous, and Inclusive Region</i> | 2019 | A platform was established for countries in the Indo-Pacific to exchange views and ideas on regional cooperation, grounded in the principles of openness, inclusivity, transparency, and adherence to international law. The forum brought together ministers and high-ranking government officials, serving as a continuation of in-depth discussions on the ASEAN Collective Concept: An Indo-Pacific Outlook. |
| 5 | Konsultasi dengan Pemangku Kepentingan di Dalam dan di Luar Negeri | 2017-2019 | A dialog process between Indonesian Ministries/Institutions, foreign governments, think tanks, and other stakeholders related to the Indo-Pacific. |
| 6 | <i>ASEAN SOM Retreat</i> | 2019 | The meeting agreed on the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook concept terminology as ASEAN's standard nomenclature. |
| 7 | <i>ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting</i> | 2019 | This forum discussed the AOIP draft, emphasizing the importance of ASEAN centrality. The name of the draft was changed to ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. |
| 8 | <i>34th ASEAN DeSummit</i> | 2019 | ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as a framework for the region's engagement and collaboration within the Indo-Pacific. The AOIP highlights key principles such as ASEAN centrality, inclusiveness, a strong commitment to cooperation and adherence to international law through ASEAN-led mechanisms. |

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| 9 | Diseminasi AOIP di <i>East Asia Summit</i> 2019 | 2019 | The dissemination of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) serves to highlight ASEAN's role in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity across the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. One example of this is Indonesia's initiative to host the upcoming Indo-Pacific Infrastructure and Connectivity Forum. |
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(Fathun, Gideon, 2023).

Thus, from several explanations above, both from political and security considerations that show a response to assertive China in the North Natuna Sea, diplomatic policy is favorable for Indonesia. It is also a cognitive and psychological consideration because it will not be very balanced to compare the capabilities of China and Indonesia if there is an open conflict. It means that the diplomatic path is rational rather than causing total defeat. The author also argues that it is difficult for China to expand to Indonesia. The consideration is that the two countries, culturally and bilaterally, have been in contact for a long time and very well. Therefore, the rational choice is to withdraw from high escalation. As for China's assertiveness, it has just returned to the rules of international law as an excellent judge to consider territorial ownership.

2. Philippine Foreign Policy Response in the Indo-Pacific Region

Based on an interview with Samosir (2023), the 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 7, states that the Philippines shall follow an independent foreign policy. In dealing with other nations, key priorities include national sovereignty, territorial

integrity, national interests, and the right to self-determination. Republic Act No. 7157, also known as the "Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991," tasks the Department of Foreign Affairs with advancing the three main pillars of the country's foreign policy: (a) safeguarding and strengthening national security, (b) promoting economic security, and (c) protecting the rights and advancing the welfare and interests of Filipinos abroad. President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. adopted the foreign policy principle of being "a friend to all and an enemy to none," highlighting the nation's commitment to an independent stance. In his State of the Nation Address on July 24, 2023, President Marcos stated that this independent approach has effectively supported the country's goals in peacebuilding and mutually beneficial cooperation. Within his first year in office, this policy direction has attracted an estimated total investment of 3.9 trillion pesos (approximately USD 71 billion), with promising prospects for further economic growth.

Border issues between the Philippines and China are characterized by the escalation of border conflicts, especially in the South China Sea (SCS) or West Philippine Sea (WPS). The construction of shoals in the disputed area by China in the

early 1990s triggered the Philippine Government to station 2 military vessels already used at two points, namely Scarborough Shoal (BRP Benguet) and Ayuing Shoal (BRP Sierra Madre), in May 1999. One month later, BRP Benguet was removed by the Philippine Government. Relations with China have heated up since the Scarborough Shoal standoff on April 10, 2012. The Philippine Navy ship BRP Gregorio Del Pilar, which tried to arrest 10 Chinese fishing boats, was intercepted by Chinese Marine Surveillance vessels and conveyed that the area was Chinese territory. The Scarborough Shoal standoff continued with the submission of claims regarding the validity of China's nine-dash line claim to the Chinese Government through the International Court of Arbitration on January 22, 2013. On July 12, 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China) unanimously rejected the validity of the Chinese Government's claim to the nine-dash line.

In 2016-2023, the Philippine Government sent more than 485 diplomatic notes of protest to the Chinese Government regarding incidents of violation of the International Court of Arbitration's decision. The intensity of sending protest notes has

increased dramatically since 2020. A total of 445 protest notes were sent, including 97 diplomatic notes during the administration of President Ferdinand "BBM" Marcos. During the 7th Meeting on the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on March 24, 2023, in Manila, both sides emphasized diplomatic engagement on maritime issues in the LCS/WPS. Undersecretary for Bilateral Relations and ASEAN Affairs of the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Teresa Lazaro, said that the Philippines and China agreed that maritime issues do not affect the overall diplomatic relations between aforementioned countries. However, maritime issues remain a serious concern for the Philippines.

Incidents of trespassing continue and are considered to have threatened the safety of local fishermen and interfered with Philippine sovereignty. In this regard, the Philippine Government "embraced" its alliance, in this case, the United States (US)-Australia, to conduct joint maritime exercises as a multilateralism approach in order to collectively focus the international community's attention and pressure on China's aggressiveness in the LCS/WPS. In addition, the Philippine Government is also maximizing the presence of law enforcement agencies in the LCS/WPS maritime disputed area, including by planning to integrate

maritime patrols between the Philippine Navy (PN) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) in the vicinity of the LCS/WPS maritime border area Addition of US Military Base locations within the framework of EDCA.

In the 2014 EDCA agreement, it was agreed that we would manage ten military bases in the Philippines. A further five military bases were agreed in 2015. Four additional military bases were agreed upon in October 2022 but only announced by the Philippine Government in April 2023. In general, cooperation under the EDCA umbrella is not projected only for military activities and offensive operations but also to assist and respond quickly when the Philippines needs assistance related to natural disasters. Internally, in the Philippines, the central discourse of EDCA cooperation is the US re-entry into Philippine territory after the expiration of Clark and Subic Military Bases in 1992. Increased Chinese provocations in the LCS/WPS after the inactivity of Clark and Subic became the backdrop for the Philippines to develop closer military cooperation with the US.

The US military presence in EDCA guarantees the Philippines to “mitigate” China's aggressiveness. However, some in the Philippines believe that selecting EDCA's new location is less about protecting the Philippines' needs in the WPS and more

about anticipating a China-Taiwan conflict. The Chinese government responded to the addition of EDCA bases as a policy to secure US hegemony and geopolitical interests to “encircle” China through military alliances with countries around China, including the Philippines. The Chinese Government considers the participation of the Philippines in the US geopolitical dispute map to be very detrimental to the national interests of the Philippines. It undermines peace and stability in the region.

The development of the economic power of Filipino citizens of Chinese descent also creates social friction with the local population. Despite the participation of mixed ethnic Chinese in the revolution against Spain, negative sentiments towards ethnic Chinese continued to grow during the US leadership in the Philippines. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Sr, Philippine-Chinese trade relations were re-established. In fact, in 1974, the mass naturalization law of ethnic Chinese Filipinos was enacted. Since the administration of Ferdinand Marcos Sr, China has become the Philippines' leading trading partner, especially in the importation of petroleum and its derivative products.

Anti-China sentiment is growing again after various incidents in the LCS/WPS, starting from the Mischief Reef Incident in

1996, the Chinese Naval Incursion in 2011, the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012, and China's nine-dash line claim. Apart from political tensions, China is the Philippines' leading trading partner, the third-largest partner for exports, and the most significant partner for imports. Since the opening of diplomatic relations in 1974, every Philippine President has made a state visit to China. China is also the third country President Ferdinand "BBM" Marcos Jr. visited within the framework of a State Visit after Indonesia and Singapore in January 2023. If we look back at the data presented in the figure above, it can be concluded that the qualifications and abilities of the Philippines are still below Indonesia. It means that even Indonesia, which has the capabilities shown in the table above, has yet to be able to keep up with China. It means that the rational choice for the Philippines is to lobby and negotiate to convince China of the ownership of the claimed territorial dispute. Another mechanism is the ICJ as a court institution to decide the territorial dispute. It means that if the Philippines uses military force rationally, total defeat is inevitable. The comparison of the two countries is very far between military capabilities, economic quality, military cooperation, and other variables.

The Philippines' alternative policy is to rebuild its military qualifications with other

countries that are its strategic partners. It means that one of the advantages of the Philippines over Indonesia is that it has military qualification partners who might be able to help if China's assertiveness gets stronger. However, that argument only sometimes compensates for China's increasing capabilities.

3. Comparative Modeling of Indonesia - Philippines Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region

The response of bilateral cooperation and collaboration is also a reason to maintain security stability in the Indo-Pacific Region, especially the South China Sea conflict. Even though Indonesia is not related to the South China Sea, the security and stability of the region is Indonesia's commitment to contribute to world peace. Meanwhile, the Philippines does have a conflict with China. The Philippines and Indonesia do not have border issues, considering the two countries signed an Exclusive Economic Zone agreement in 2014, effective in August 2019. The enforcement of the Indonesia-Philippines EEZ boundary took about 25 years. For 20 years, the negotiation process from 1994-2014, and 5 years for the internal settlement process of each country.

According to (2023), the Staff of the Indonesian Consulate General in Manila said that Indonesia-Philippines Diplomatic Relations Politically, it can be said that the Philippines places Indonesia as a priority in foreign political relations. The selection of Indonesia indicates this as the first destination country of the State Visit of the Philippine President, both President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (September 8-10, 2016) and President Ferdinand “BBM” Marcos Jr (September 5-7, 2022). Indonesia and the Philippines have had a harmonious relationship for 74 years since the opening of diplomatic relations on November 24, 1949. The two countries have no political, border, or security issues. Every issue, such as boundary negotiations and border security issues, can be discussed peacefully at the negotiating table.

The relationship between Indonesia and the Philippines remains burdened by past border conflicts. However, the advantage is that both countries feel free from the need to be as assertive and aggressive as China does to either Indonesia or the Philippines. Thus, it can be concluded:

- 1) Indonesia and the Philippines share a mutual concern regarding China's expansive territorial claims in their respective maritime zones. China asserts sovereignty over the North Natuna Sea,

which overlaps with Indonesia's exclusive economic zone, and large portions of the South China Sea, encroaching on areas claimed by the Philippines. On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines, concluding that China's assertions of historical rights, including the nine-dash line claim, lack legal foundation under international law. The tribunal determined that while various countries, including China, have historically accessed features in the South China Sea, there was no conclusive evidence that China had ever exercised exclusive authority or effective control over those territories and their associated maritime resources.

- 2) China continued to defy and disrespect the decision after the decision. On the other hand, in 2016, the Philippines changed its President, Rodrigo Duterte, who is known for being “anti-american” but “pro-China,” which is the reason for the change in Philippine foreign policy, where the Philippines decided to renegotiate with China on this matter. Indonesia and the Philippines can work together to build collaboration by using a diplomatic approach to pressure China to comply with international law. Alternatively, force China to obey the Code of Conduct that has been agreed

upon. In the ASEAN forum, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other ASEAN countries agreed to encourage a peaceful resolution of the LCS / WPS conflict through a diplomatic forum with China. The signing of the RI-Philippines Bilateral Cooperation Action Plan or Plan of Action (PoA) 2022-2027 in Indonesia. This Action Plan includes various strategic activities in politics, law and security, economy, culture, tourism, consular, protection, and mutual support for candidacy in international institutions.

- 3) Indonesia and China bring the issue of territorial conflict to the ICJ Institution to get a balanced and rational court to adjudicate the dispute. They can choose one or more ways to resolve the dispute through UNCLOS, including a) The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, Germany. B) The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, The Netherlands, c) Ad hoc arbitration (following Annex VII of UNCLOS). D) A “special arbitral tribunal” constituted for specific categories of disputes (established under Annex VIII of UNCLOS). And e) Permanent Court of Arbitration (Tribunal) - South Sea Arbitration (Souza et al., 2022).

The Philippines brought its dispute against China commencing on January 22, 2023. The requests that the Philippines

submitted for resolution fall into four categories, including:

- a. Disputes over natural resource rights and maritime rights in the LCS.
- b. Disputes over maritime zone rights under UNCLOS based on maritime features claimed by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands.
- c. A series of disagreements regarding the legality of China’s activities in the South China Sea (LCS).
- d. According to Souza et al. (2022), the Philippines asserts that China has intensified and widened the dispute during the arbitration by limiting access to a Philippine marine detachment and undertaking extensive artificial construction and land reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands.

However, in this case, the negotiations conducted by the countries concerned could be interpreted as a failure; therefore, UNCLOS can be a platform, especially for countries that are weak in the face of state power, such as China, which prefers to conduct bilateral negotiations (one by one) rather than multilateral because it is considered more profitable for them. When the Philippines submitted this issue to the court, China firmly rejected the results, even though it was obvious that China lost, or it could be said that China's claim to the LCS

was historically unfounded. Therefore, the presence of UNCLOS in this dispute became ineffective due to non-compliance and lack of international law enforcement. According to (2023), RI and the Philippines have good maritime security cooperation. Both countries are members of the trilateral cooperation with Malaysia for maritime security in the Sulu Sea. Also, the two countries' cooperation is related to maritime borders in the southern part of the Philippines or the northern part of Indonesia, especially on the island of Miangas. Perwita also said, unlike the Philippines, Indonesia is not a claimant state in the dispute. So, Indonesia always encourages the immediate completion of the Code of Conduct for the region. With the completion of the COC, the two countries can force China to follow the rules and regional orders in the region.

In line with what was conveyed by Fortuna Anwar (2023), the RI-Philippines relationship as a whole is perfect. In maritime security, there is RI-Mal-Fil trilateral cooperation in the Sulu Sea. BIMP -EAGA sub-regional economic cooperation involves the southern Philippines and North Sulawesi. Many Indonesians live in the southern Philippines. RI supports the integrity of UNCLOS in principle. However, Indonesia did not explicitly support the 2016 PCA ruling that affirmed the Philippines' ownership of part of

the LCS following UNCLOS. RI/ASEAN normatively affirmed that UNCLOS is the only legal basis for ownership in the LCS, so the PRC's claim is baseless. However, the Philippines is disappointed that RI/ASEAN is hesitant to openly criticize the PRC for its aggression in the LCS, including actions against the Philippines' claims.

Then, Mr. Marty (2023), an analyst from the Philippines, said that bilateral relations between the Philippines and Indonesia have a long history and great untapped potential. The Indonesian people are brothers to the Filipino people in terms of history and cultural heritage. There is much to be won in the future for both nations. Both countries can build it together. As the world's two largest archipelagic states, the Philippines championed the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea together, and the Philippines navigated issues of marine resources and conservation together. The Philippines stands together in the region's evolving economic, strategic, and geopolitical significance.

Philippine policy has always been based on dialogue and an ongoing commitment to uphold international laws and treaties. The potential for conflict in the Indo-Pacific only spurs us to continue advocating for peaceful resolution. Like the above, the Philippines believes in engaging China through dialog

based on international law. Presenting the legal underpinnings of Philippine territorial integrity and forming a solid case from it has been our response, alongside building our physical capabilities to monitor and respond to situations at sea. Our law-based approach culminated in the 2016 Arbitral Award in The Hague. Since then, we have continued to engage with China on this issue while conveying incidents to the global community - which also places great importance on freedom of navigation in the region - with transparency and precise nuance. Thus, showing that maritime security cooperation between Indonesia and the Philippines is excellent.

Furthermore, it could create collaboration to pressure China not to make unilateral claims to both countries based on historical experience so that it will disrupt the stability of the security of the Indo-Pacific Region and create polarization between those who support and reject. That is why collective security is essential to overcome the regional security dilemma. Collective security refers to each activity having the same interest in cooperation, recognizing that the complexity of security cannot be resolved independently, and building collaboration with multiple channels.

Comparative Analysis: Indonesia vs Philippines in Maritime Security

Philippines

Maritime policy under the Marcos Jr. administration is anchored in the **rule-of-law**, with a layered strategy involving legal, diplomatic, and capability-building initiatives:

- In **July 2024**, Manila ratified a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan that facilitates military cooperation and interoperability and is viewed as a strategic step toward reinforcing a rules-based Indo-Pacific order (Reuters, 2024).
- The country has implemented a **transparency initiative**, publicly documenting Chinese coast guard incidents in the South China Sea—such as water cannon and collision episodes—to garner international support and defend navigational rights (AP News, 2025; Reuters, 2025).
- Philippine officials have regularly condemned incidents like water cannon use near Sandy Cay and Second Thomas Shoal, reinforcing freedom of navigation through international forums (AP, 2025b; AP, 2025c).
- The country has modernized maritime enforcement via legislation like the 2024 Maritime Zones Act and through joint law-enforcement exercises with allies,

including the United States (Reuters, 2025).

Indonesia

Indonesia emphasizes **ASEAN-based diplomatic cooperation and soft-security measures**:

- It has participated in **trilateral patrols** with the Philippines and Malaysia in the Sulu–Celebes Sea to counter piracy and militant threats, such as those posed by Abu Sayyaf/ISIS-affiliated groups (Reuters, 2017; GMA, 2017).
- In 2023, Indonesia helped lead the **ASEAN Coast Guard Forum**, designed to strengthen capacity building, information sharing, and confidence among ASEAN maritime law enforcement agencies (Da Costa, 2023). It hosted the **2025 Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK)**, featuring **38 nations and 19 foreign warships**, aimed at bolstering maritime cooperation, disaster response capabilities, and regional interoperability (*30+ navies*) (Reuters, 2023; Reddit, 2025; Modern Diplomacy, 2025).
- Indonesia helped launch the **ASEAN Coast Guard Forum**, enhancing regional law enforcement collaboration and capacity building (Da Costa, 2023)

CONCLUSIONS

The Indo-Pacific region is a regional area that has several opportunities and challenges. The seriousness of countries to utilize the region has led to the creation of alliances, qualia, and security cooperation to create inclusive and exclusive regional cooperation. It means that the Indo-Pacific regional area is very strategic because it provides the potential for maritime cooperation that produces large profits. On the other hand, control over the region is evidence of how the country's political and security capabilities can master and manage the region in an integrated manner. Therefore, the cooperation carried out is extensive to prioritize the national interests of each country.

The emergence of competition in the management of the Indo-Pacific Region is evidence that future maritime security challenges are still very promising. This is evidenced by the shift in many countries' foreign policies from nationalistic to regional foreign policies. It means that many countries have foreign policy orientations oriented towards regional areas. For example, China with BRI, the United States with FOIP policy, ASEAN with AIOP policy, India with SAGAR, the creation of the AUKUS alliance and the Quad, and several other collaborations. This condition shows that the attractiveness of the

Indo-Pacific regional area has the potential to be managed by several countries.

However, on the other hand, is the emergence of competition in the region to compete for political influence and security. The emergence of the above regional policies allows conflicts in the region, specially creating conflict gaps to expand the region and control the territory. It can be seen as China's assertiveness in the ASEAN Region. It means that China conflicts with several regions in the ASEAN regional area, which, at a macro level, is still part of the Indo-Pacific. This condition can be seen as a conflict in the South China Sea involving China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other countries. This conflict has been too long but has a meeting point until now because each country is consistent with their respective interests. This fact shows that almost all territorial conflicts involving China are unilateral, based on historical claims.

The Philippines is one of the countries that is also involved with China in the conflict. China's assertiveness to date is still consistent in making the area part of its territory that has existed since the days of its empire. Nevertheless, in the Philippines, based on the legal facts of UNCLOS, the contested area belongs to them. Regarding Philippine foreign policy, applying the

complex power method will be complicated because China's capabilities are superior. That is why what can be done is through international law, bilateral or through the judiciary, and bilateral or multilateral mechanisms as a method of conflict resolution.

Indonesia also experienced the same thing. At the same time, Indonesia was the initiator and catalyst for creating the code of conduct for the South China Sea conflict. However, China's claim is magnified by trying to claim Indonesia's North Natuna sea area. Although not part of the vortex of the South China Sea conflict, this conflict has also heated relations between the two countries. Regarding foreign policy, Indonesia tends to have the same way as the Philippines by using bilateral, multilateral, judicial, or.

In conclusion, Indonesia can only go through diplomatic channels because China's military capabilities are far above Indonesia's. That is why, if forced with hard power, it will make it difficult for Indonesia to win. In addition, Indonesia still has economic interests in China, so it will be challenging to use complicated power methods. Thus, the conflict between the two countries must understand each other and resolve it together and without unilateral interests.

Based on the two cases above, it shows that the Indo-Pacific region leaves a significant conflict that has the potential to disrupt regional stability. The above conflicts are only a tiny part of the conflicts involving large countries. Therefore, diplomatic mechanisms must be intensified so that each country does not claim each other's territories to be able to create conflicts in the region.

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Penyelenggaraan Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement IC-CEPA) Dalam Mendorong Potensi Perdagangan dan Posisi Politik Indonesia di Global South

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Abstrak

Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IC-CEPA) yang ditandatangani pada tahun 2019 merupakan perjanjian dagang formal pertama antara Indonesia dengan negara Amerika Latin yaitu Chile. Kerjasama bilateral ini bertujuan untuk memaksimalkan komoditas ekspor Indonesia dan juga mengurangi ketergantungan terhadap pasar tradisional guna mendorong performa ekspor yang lebih bermutu, dan meningkatkan reputasi serta posisi tawar Indonesia di *Global South*. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan praktik *Free Trade Agreement* untuk mencapai tujuan kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia menggunakan instrumen ekonomi, yang berorientasi pada kawasan ekonomi *Global South* yang lagi bertumbuh pesat. Kajian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif berbasis data primer dan data sekunder dengan teknik pengumpulan studi pustaka atau pun dokumen tertulis. Kerangka teori yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah *Economic Statecraft* oleh David A. Baldwin (1985) dan Pendekatan *South-South Cooperation*. Hasil kajian ini menunjukkan bahwa kerjasama perdagangan antara kedua negara berhasil berkontribusi terbukanya pasar ekspor Indonesia di kawasan Amerika Latin dan penguatan posisi tawar Indonesia di *Global South*.

Kata Kunci: *Economic Statecraft*, IC-CEPA, Diversifikasi, Ekspansi, *South-South*

LATAR BELAKANG

Dalam kajian hubungan internasional kontemporer, istilah *Global South* telah menjadi rujukan penting dalam memahami dinamika ketimpangan global, relasi kuasa, dan konfigurasi politik-ekonomi internasional yang diwariskan dari sejarah kolonialisme dan imperialisme. Konsep dari *Global South* tidak dapat dibatasi hanya pada dimensi geografis. Sebaliknya, konsep ini

merepresentasikan konstruksi sosial-politik yang mencerminkan posisi negara-negara berkembang yang pada umumnya merupakan bekas koloni dalam menghadapi sistem dunia yang didominasi oleh negara-negara Barat (Lukman-nul Hakim, dkk., 2021: 3-4).

Kemunculan istilah *Global South* berkaitan erat dengan upaya kolektif negara-negara berkembang untuk menegosiasikan posisi mereka dalam tatanan global yang

asimetris. Dalam hal ini, *Global South* menjadi simbol dari solidaritas transnasional, semangat perlawanan terhadap dominasi kapitalisme global, serta artikulasi aspirasi akan keadilan dan kedaulatan dalam pengelolaan urusan global (Lukman-nul Hakim, dkk., 2021: 5). Dalam konteks Indonesia dan negara-negara di Asia, Afrika, dan Amerika Latin, konsep ini relevan untuk merefleksikan bagaimana warisan kolonial masih membentuk struktur ketimpangan ekonomi, politik, dan kultural yang dihadapi hingga saat ini. Melalui pemahaman ini, studi mengenai *Global South* menawarkan kerangka kritis yang dapat memperkaya studi hubungan internasional dari perspektif yang lebih inklusif, reflektif, dan transformatif (Lukman-nul Hakim, dkk., 2021: 9–10).

Dalam konteks ekonomi, posisi Indonesia di *Global South* merefleksikan peran ganda sebagai negara berkembang yang menghadapi tantangan struktural dalam tatanan ekonomi global, sekaligus sebagai aktor strategis yang memiliki upaya untuk merekonstruksi peranannya melalui inisiatif kolektif negara-negara Selatan (Prabowo, 2021: 111-112). Penguatan posisi Indonesia di *Global South* dapat memberikan kesempatan yang lebar untuk mencapai kepentingan nasional. Indonesia memiliki kepentingan terutama dalam *South-South cooperation*, yakni untuk mewujudkan dan mendukung cita-cita Indonesia terutama dalam hal meningkatkan kesejahteraan masyarakat dan membangun struktur perekonomian yang semakin maju dan kokoh. Sejalan dengan kepentingan tersebut, Indonesia bercita-cita menjadi acuan pertumbuhan ekonomi yang stabil dengan kesejahteraan masyarakat yang tinggi di ranah global. Selain itu, Indonesia juga ingin menjadi negara yang independen

dan memiliki pengaruh yang besar terutama di kawasan Asia-Pasifik. Guna mewujudkan cita-cita ini, posisi Indonesia dalam *Global South* sangat penting terutama untuk meningkatkan peluang pasar dan memperluas akses terhadap sumber daya serta konektivitas ekonomi regional maupun global. Demi menjaga stabilitas dan pertumbuhan ekonominya, Indonesia dapat memanfaatkan kerjasama Selatan-Selatan untuk membuka peluang perdagangan dan investasi (Aknolt, Triwibowo, dan Apresian, 2025: 35). Hal ini juga dilakukan Indonesia agar diversifikasi pasar dapat dilakukan guna meminimalisir ketergantungan terhadap pasar tradisional seperti Amerika Serikat dan China sekaligus membuka peluang untuk menembus pasar non-tradisional. Penguatan posisi Indonesia di *Global South* memberikan peluang untuk meningkatkan posisi tawar Indonesia, mendorong kerjasama, dan meningkatkan kekuatan ekonomi domestik Indonesia (Aknolt, Triwibowo, dan Apresian, 2025: 39).

Penguatan posisi Indonesia di *Global South* tercermin dari kerja sama perdagangan *Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement* (IC-CEPA) pada 2017. Melalui perjanjian ini, kedua negara bersepakat untuk menghapus tarif bea masuk atas sebagian besar produk yang diperdagangkan, sehingga mendorong peningkatan volume perdagangan bilateral secara signifikan (Al-Husin, 2024: 458-463). IC-CEPA merupakan kesepakatan Perdagangan Bebas bilateral antara Indonesia dengan Chile yang diratifikasi pada tahun 2019 oleh kedua belah negara. IC-CEPA merupakan perjanjian perdagangan pertama Indonesia dengan negara dari Amerika Latin. Perjanjian

tersebut bertujuan untuk meningkatkan perdagangan antara Chile dan Indonesia dengan menurunkan tarif-tarif untuk beberapa komoditas yang sering diperdagangkan antara kedua negara. Komoditas yang tidak terkena pajak sama sekali dari Chile termasuk: Tembaga, gas batubara, minyak bumi, dan komoditas mineral hasil pertambangan lainnya. (Direktorat Jenderal Minyak dan Gas Bumi, 2019) Di tahun 2024, kementerian perdagangan Chile dan Indonesia mengekspansi kerjasama tersebut untuk meningkatkan investasi antar negara dan meningkatkan perdagangan di sektor-sektor selain pertambangan. Sektor-sektor lain yang dimaksud adalah pangan, pariwisata, perhotelan dan perumahan. Mantan wakil Menteri Perdagangan Jerry Sambuaga mengatakan salah satu tujuan dari IC-CEPA dan ekspansinya adalah penetrasi pasar baru di Amerika Latin, dimulai dengan Chile. (Revanda and Shakira, 2024) Komoditas Indonesia yang tidak mendapatkan tarif di Chile termasuk tapi tidak terbatas pada: Kopi, teh, rerempahan, sawit, bahan perkebunan lainnya; produk perikanan dari tiram sampai ikan Tuna; dan produk manufaktur seperti peralatan militer, produk kertas, dan alas kaki. Serangkaian alasan Indonesia memilih Chile untuk CEPA adalah posisi pelabuhan-pelabuhan Chile yang berjumlah banyak dan dapat menampung perpindahan barang dalam skala global. Akibat lokasi geografisnya juga, Chile menjadi tempat pemberhentian komoditas di Amerika Latin. (Free Trade Agreement Center, 2022:4-10) Perjanjian tersebut dapat dikatakan sebagai bentuk kerja sama Selatan-Selatan antara negara yang sama-sama ingin melaksanakan perdagangan yang lebih adil dan merefleksikan keinginan kedua negara untuk berkembang.

Perkembangan yang dimaksud merujuk pada perluasan pasar non-tradisional Indonesia.

Pasar non-tradisional dalam konteks perdagangan antar negara merupakan pasar atau negara yang memperdagangkan komoditas yang bukan ekspor utama dari negara pengekspor. Sebaliknya pasar tradisional merupakan negara-negara yang sudah lama menjadi target pasar. Secara spesifik, pasar tradisional merupakan negara-negara dengan relasi ekonomi yang kuat selama 40 tahun, konsumsi merupakan 50% dari PDB, dan ekspor hanya menghasilkan 5% dari PDB. Pada konteks Indonesia, dapat disebutkan juga bahwa pasar tradisional merupakan negara-negara yang sudah memiliki relasi ekonomi yang tua dengan Indonesia, komoditas yang diperdagangkan merupakan ekspor utama Indonesia pada pasar global. Dari pengertian itu, pasar non-tradisional bagi Indonesia adalah negara-negara dengan prospek perdagangan yang besar, yang sebelumnya belum mendapatkan komoditas Indonesia. Komoditas yang diekspor juga tidak terpaku pada ekspor utama Indonesia seperti Sawit atau Migas (Aisyah and Renggani, 2021:3-4).

IC-CEPA, sebagai persetujuan antara Indonesia dan Chile merupakan jalur alternatif bagi Indonesia untuk menjelajahi pasar-pasar baru. Ekspor utama Indonesia secara tradisional merupakan batubara, sawit, dan migas. Industri di Indonesia harus melakukan untuk tetap tahan dalam perdagangan global, yang mengurangi ketergantungan terhadap pasar global untuk mendatangkan devisa negara, yang akan membolehkan ketahanan Indonesia dalam skenario krisis ekonomi global. Sejalan yang dikatakan oleh Hong (2021), negara-negara Asia Tenggara memiliki potensi besar untuk

mendiversifikasi industri dan ekspor dalam rangka mengurangi risiko eksternal akibat fluktuasi pasar global. Hong (2021) juga membicarakan salah satu koridor terbaik negara-negara dengan pendapatan menengah ke bawah seperti Indonesia untuk mengembangkan industri-industri non-tradisional adalah dengan melakukan kerjasama ekonomi dengan negara-negara Selatan. Dengan harga input yang lebih murah, Indonesia dapat memproduksi produk ekspor yang lebih murah juga, sehingga dengan mudah mengembangkan industri barang jadi di Indonesia. IC-CEPA merupakan upaya Indonesia dan Chile untuk memaksimalkan kegunaan koridor Selatan-Selatan untuk mendapatkan potensi perkembangan industri domestik paling besar. IC-CEPA merupakan salah satu alat yang digunakan oleh pemerintah Indonesia untuk mencoba mendiversifikasi ekspor Indonesia, dan akhirnya mendiversifikasi industri domestik dalam negeri. Walaupun salah satu komoditas yang dibebaskan dari tarif adalah sawit, tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa bahan jadi lainnya seperti kertas, peralatan militer, dan alas kaki merupakan usaha dari Indonesia untuk melakukan penetrasi ke pasar yang sebelumnya tidak disentuh.

Beberapa kajian akademik telah dilakukan sebelumnya untuk meneliti tentang IC-CEPA sebagai kebijakan luar negeri di Indonesia di *Global South*. Salah satunya adalah penelitian oleh Musfiroh (2024) berjudul “*Indonesia’s Motivations for Signing of the Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IC-CEPA)*” yang mengkaji motif Indonesia untuk menandatangani perjanjian perdagangan dengan Chile terlepas dari catatan hubungan perdagangan kedua

negara yang tidak signifikan. Penulis berargumen bahwa IC-CEPA merupakan langkah kebijakan unik sehubungan dengan Chile sebagai mitra dagang di luar Asia yang pertama kali memasuki kerja sama perdagangan secara resmi dengan Indonesia. Sebelum IC-CEPA, Indonesia hanya mengajak kerja sama dengan negara-negara di Asia saja atau negara-negara mitra perdagangan utama saja. Bahkan di kawasan Amerika Latin pun, nilai perdagangan Chile dan Indonesia jauh lebih kecil dibandingkan dengan Brazil atau Argentina. Hasil penelitian Musfiroh (2024) menunjukkan penyelenggaraan IC-CEPA dari sisi Indonesia mengandung motif ekonomi dan motif politik. Secara ekonomi, Indonesia berkepentingan untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan ekonomi melalui perdagangan bebas dengan negara lain. Karakteristik impor Chile didominasi oleh barang konsumen yang mana menjadi jenis ekspor utama Indonesia. Kecocokan tersebut mendorong terjadinya perdagangan yang diperkuat dengan pemotongan tarif impor Chile melalui IC-CEPA. Secara politik, IC-CEPA menjadi instrumen Indonesia dalam meningkatkan status Indonesia sebagai trade-hub di kawasan Asia Tenggara. Salah satu syarat implisit bagi sebuah negara yang ingin menjadi *trade hub* dapat dilihat dari infrastruktur dan kebijakan ekonomi yang terbuka seperti *Free Trade Agreement*. Dengan menjalin kerja sama bersama Chile melalui IC-CEPA sebagai bentuk FTA, hal ini dapat meningkatkan daya tawar Indonesia di kawasan Asia Tenggara. Sehubungan dengan politik luar negeri, IC-CEPA menjadi instrumen kebijakan luar negeri yang dapat memberikan timbal balik ekonomi dan politik

yang signifikan bagi Indonesia (Musfiroh, 2024).

Penelitian serupa dilakukan oleh Ita Rosita et al. (2024) dengan judul “*The Urgency and Strategy of IC-CEPA International Cooperation on the Economic Development of Indonesia*” mengkaji faktor-faktor yang mendorong kebijakan Indonesia untuk menandatangani IC-CEPA, dengan fokus utama pada pertumbuhan ekonomi melalui peningkatan ekspor komoditas ke Chile yang diiringi dengan penguatan hubungan bilateral dengan negara Amerika Selatan. Berdasarkan fokus tersebut, para penulis berargumen bahwa IC-CEPA merupakan komponen esensial dalam menambah pemasukan negara dalam jangka panjang. Secara ekonomi, pemilihan Chile sebagai mitra strategis disebabkan oleh pemasukannya yang menengah tinggi dan relasi diplomatis yang baik antara kedua negara. Chile juga bertindak sebagai “gerbang” komoditas produk Indonesia ke negara-negara Amerika Selatan yang lain. Pertumbuhan perdagangan harus disertai dengan peningkatan produksi dan diversifikasi komoditas dari Indonesia, agar memaksimalkan IC-CEPA sebagai kesempatan dan jalan meningkatkan ekspor dan mengembangkan ekonomi.

Dari penelitian yang telah dilakukan, para penulis memiliki satu kesepakatan terkait IC-CEPA sebagai instrumen kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia dalam mencapai kepentingan ekonomi dan politik dalam konteks penguatan posisi Indonesia di *Global South*. Meskipun aspek ekonomi dan politik telah ditelusuri lewat penelitian sebelumnya, masih terdapat elemen-elemen analitis lainnya yang perlu diteliti lebih lanjut dari IC-CEPA khususnya terkait posisi Indonesia di *Global South*. Maka dari itu,

penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menyajikan analisis baru terkait IC-CEPA sebagai kebijakan luar negeri guna mencapai kepentingan diversifikasi ekspor pasar non-tradisional Indonesia di luar negeri serta perluasan pengaruh Indonesia di antara negara-negara *Global South*. Peneliti tulisan ini akan berfokus pada kepentingan ekonomi berupa ekspansi dan penetrasi barang-barang ekspor non-tradisional di pasar Chile sedangkan kepentingan non-ekonomi berupa penyebaran pengaruh guna memperoleh dukungan negara Selatan secara diplomatis serta maksimalisasi manfaat perdagangan internasional bagi ekonomi domestik Indonesia.

KERANGKA BERPIKIR IC-CEPA dan *Economic Statecraft*

Seperti yang dijelaskan di atas, IC-CEPA merupakan perjanjian perdagangan yang antara Indonesia dan Chile yang diratifikasi pada tahun 2019 (Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya, 2019). Kerjasama yang terjalin diantara Indonesia dan Chile ini merupakan bentuk dari *Free Trade Agreement*. FTA mengacu pada pengurangan hambatan tarif dan non-tarif, yang menyebabkan produk-produk Indonesia memiliki harga yang kompetitif di pasar Chile. Pengurangan tarif komoditas Indonesia membuat harga produk-produk buatan Indonesia yang di jual di Chile memiliki harga yang lebih rendah, sehingga lebih menarik (Al-Husin and Virgianita, 2024).

Dalam kerangka berpikir *Economic Statecraft* oleh Baldwin (2020), sebuah negara dapat menjalin relasi ekonomi dengan negara lain dengan tujuan mencapai kebijakan luar negerinya. Kebijakan ekonomi yang dikeluarkan dapat dikategorisasikan

sebagai kebijakan sanksi positif, atau kebijakan sanksi negatif. Kebijakan sanksi positif merupakan kebijakan yang bertujuan menguntungkan negara-negara yang terlibat. Kebijakan sanksi negatif merupakan kebijakan yang bertujuan memberikan dampak negatif terhadap negara target dengan mengganggu aktivitas ekonominya. *Free Trade Agreement* merupakan salah satu bentuk sanksi positif sebagai kebijakan diskriminatif yang menguntungkan kedua belah pihak.

Baldwin (1985) yang melihat ekonomi sebagai senjata paling efektif untuk mengubah perilaku aktor lain dalam konteks persaingan politik. Secara tradisional, *Statecraft* merupakan seni dalam menjalankan urusan negara yang mencakup dimensi kebijakan publik baik dalam maupun luar negeri untuk mewujudkan kepentingan nasional melalui manuver yang rasional dan strategis. Baldwin juga menekankan *Statecraft* dapat melibatkan penggunaan ekonomi, militer, informasi, dan diplomasi sebagai instrumen pengaruh yang dapat digunakan baik terpisah ataupun bersamaan untuk mencapai kepentingan nasionalnya. Selain itu, istilah *Statecraft* juga biasanya digunakan untuk mencakup seluruh proses pembuatan kebijakan luar negeri, dan merujuk pada cara suatu negara untuk mencapai tujuan dari kebijakan luar negeri itu sendiri. Menurut Harold dan Margaret Sprout, *Statecraft* adalah keahlian bernegara yang mencakup semua kegiatan guna melindungi nilai-nilai yang dipegang oleh suatu negara dan untuk mencapai tujuan atau kepentingannya terhadap negara lain dan atau organisasi internasional. Dari kedua definisi tersebut menggambarkan *Statecraft* sebagai upaya pemerintah untuk mempengaruhi aktor lain dalam sistem

internasional. Sprout dan Holsti juga menambahkan aktor non-negara selain organisasi internasional dan perubahan dalam keyakinan, sikap, dan atau kecenderungan untuk bertindak sebagai tambahan terhadap dampak dari pengaruh (perubahan sikap) yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah suatu negara terhadap aktor lainnya (A. Baldwin and B. Kapstein, 2020: 6-7). Baldwin (2020) mengemukakan bahwa dalam mencapai tujuan dari kebijakan luar negeri, terdapat teknik-teknik *statecraft* yang menyediakan berbagai pilihan (*alternatives*) kepada pembuat kebijakan untuk mencapai tujuan negara. Teknik tersebut muncul dalam instrumen berupa kebijakan luar negeri yang mencakup kategori ekonomi. *Economic techniques of statecraft* yang dikemukakan Baldwin merujuk usaha negara untuk mempengaruhi perilaku negara lain dengan utilisasi metode ekonomi khusus seperti embargo, sanksi ekonomi, dan bantuan (A. Baldwin and B. Kapstein, 2020: 10-13).

Dalam hubungannya dengan politik internasional, *economic statecraft* dapat dipandang sebagai tindakan politik sebab mengandung usaha mempengaruhi aktor lain (*influence attempts*). Menurut Baldwin (2020), *economic techniques of statecraft* tidak terlepas dari konsep kekuatan (*power*) yang mana negara mengerahkan kekuatan ekonominya demi mempengaruhi perilaku aktor dalam politik internasional. Baldwin menyatakan bahwa kekuatan merupakan konsep berbasis relasi dan dapat menguntungkan pihak-pihak yang terlibat dalam relasi tersebut atau tidak selamanya bersifat *zero-sum game*, serta peran sanksi ekonomi positif dalam penerahan kekuatan negara (A. Baldwin, 2020: 18-20). Maka dari itu, sangat penting untuk membedakan

target (*domain*) dan tujuan upaya dari pengaruh (*scope*) yang dilakukan oleh negara. Perbedaan tersebut mengacu pada siapa yang akan dipengaruhi dan cara mempengaruhinya. Target dan tujuan memiliki variasi dalam jumlah dan kepentingan. Setiap upaya pengaruh yang diberikan oleh satu negara biasanya mengejar lebih dari satu tujuan (A. Baldwin and B. Kapstein, 2020: 15). Pada gambaran yang lebih luas, *economic statecraft* sebagai tindakan politik dalam artian *influence attempts* wajib mencakup 3 komponen utama yaitu jenis instrumen kebijakan, target (*domain*), dan jangkauan (*scope*) dari upaya pengaruh yang bersangkutan. Di sisi lain, *economic statecraft* berpacu pada cara-cara ekonomi digunakan daripada tujuan akhir, penggunaan jalur ekonomi untuk mencapai tujuan non-ekonomi, dan mengandung definisi ekonomi sehingga ada batasan yang jelas antara teknik ekonomi dan non-ekonomi (A. Baldwin dan B. Kapstein, 2020: 31;39).

Salah satu bentuk nyata dari *economic statecraft* adalah kehadiran sanksi ekonomi negatif dan sanksi ekonomi positif yang dikemukakan oleh Baldwin (1971). Sanksi ekonomi positif merujuk pada kebijakan perdagangan yang menguntungkan dua negara atau lebih sedangkan sanksi ekonomi negatif mencakup kebijakan hukuman untuk mengancam keberlangsungan ekonomi negara target guna mengubah atau menundukkan rezim dari negara target (Caruso, 2021: 2-3). Sanksi ekonomi positif dalam perdagangan mencakup diskriminasi tarif yang menguntungkan, pemotongan tarif, subsidi ekspor dan impor, pembayaran langsung, jaminan lisensi ekspor dan impor. Dalam konteks modal (*capital*), jenis sanksi tersebut muncul dalam bentuk bantuan pinjaman atau

hibah, jaminan pemerintah terhadap investasi swasta asing, insentif modal terhadap ekspor dan impor, pajak yang menguntungkan pada investasi modal asing (A. Baldwin dan B. Kapstein, 2020: 41-43).

Pengenaan sanksi ekonomi positif berguna untuk menambah aliansi, memengaruhi tarif perdagangan dengan negara lain, dan memperoleh akses terhadap potensi ekonomi negara target. Aktivitas perdagangan bebas (*free trade*) dapat dikategorikan sebagai *economic statecraft* karena mempromosikan pertumbuhan ekonomi dan akses pasar yang lebih bervariasi. Hal ini tercermin dari pembentukan *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (GATT) pada tahun 1947 yang mempromosikan tatanan ekonomi internasional berbasis perdagangan yang lebih bebas dan tidak diskriminatif melalui prinsip *most-favored-nation*. Kebijakan perdagangan yang menguntungkan seperti hambatan tarif dan diskriminasi perdagangan relatif rendah memungkinkan negara-negara untuk mencapai tujuan kebijakan luar negerinya seperti terbukanya pasar ekspor Amerika Serikat, mendorong pemulihan ekonomi Jerman dan Jepang pasca Perang Dunia II, dan akses lebih luas terhadap bahan mentah (A. Baldwin dan B. Kapstein, 2020: 44-45). Pola perdagangan tersebut diatur oleh serangkaian aturan dan hukum dan dibuat oleh pemerintah dari negara berdaulat yang memberikan akses hukum serta politik bagi pembuat kebijakan untuk mempengaruhi jalur perdagangan. Terlepas dari teknik non-ekonomi yang secara samar digunakan, namun kebijakan perdagangan bebas memiliki peran penting dalam operasionalisasi *economic statecraft*.

Diversifikasi dalam konteks ekonomi bisa diartikan sebagai perluasan jangkauan kegiatan ekonomi di dalam suatu negara

yang penting untuk mendorong ekonomi dan meningkatkan standar kehidupan masyarakat (Delechat et al., 2024). Jadi diversifikasi pasar bisa diartikan sebagai sesuatu yang fundamental bagi sebuah negara untuk bisa menumbuhkan ekonomi yang berkelanjutan. Pendekatan ini melibatkan perluasan aktivitas perdagangan ke pasar internasional baru, sehingga mengurangi ketergantungan pada mitra. Strategi ini penting, karena mengurangi risiko yang terkait dengan fluktuasi ekonomi global dan mendorong stabilitas ekonomi (Carlos et al., 2024).

South-South Cooperation

South-South Cooperation atau Kerja Sama Selatan-Selatan (KSS) merupakan kerja sama antara dua atau lebih negara yang terletak di dunia bagian Selatan yang mencakup berbagai sektor. Dari budaya, ekonomi, pendidikan, pertahanan, sampai lingkungan. UNDP menyatakan bahwa KSS merupakan kerja sama transnasional yang melibatkan dua atau lebih negara berkembang demi meningkatkan kapasitas nasional salah satu atau kedua negara tersebut. Kerja sama dapat dilakukan bukan hanya oleh pemerintah nasional, namun dapat dilakukan oleh bisnis, pemerintah daerah, LSM, dan aktor non-negara lainnya. KSS dapat direalisasikan dalam berbagai bentuk. Kerja sama bilateral, multilateral, kerja sama regional atau global, atau kerjasama triangular (UNCTAD, 2025:5-7) Menurut Mthembu (2021:5-6). Salah satu prinsip utama dari KSS merupakan peningkatan kemandirian negara-negara selatan. Salah satu caranya adalah dengan meningkatkan perdagangan antar sesama negara selatan. Peningkatan perdagangan akan membuka jalan untuk investasi, pembangunan, dan akses teknologi.

Altınbaş (2013:32-34) menyatakan bahwa kerja sama selatan-selatan, dalam bentuk apapun dapat saling menguntungkan dengan meningkatkan interdependensi. Dengan melakukan *fair trade* tidak dengan negara-negara Utara, tetapi dengan sesama negara Selatan yang berkembang, semua pihak yang terlibat akan mendapatkan akses terhadap pasar global, dan yang dapat membuka jalan untuk pembangunan dan investasi.

Sejak konsepsinya pada tahun 1955 dengan diadakan Konferensi Asia Afrika, KSS berubah-ubah seiring berkembangnya zaman dan perubahan situasi internasional. Pasca masa Perang Dingin, dinamika negara-negara Selatan di dunia berubah dengan hilangnya Blok Barat dan Blok Timur. Bersamaan dengan meningkatnya kapasitas produksi dan PDB negara-negara yang secara tradisional dianggap sebagai negara Selatan seperti Brazil, Cina, dan India, relasi dan kerjasama antar negara-negara selatan berubah dari membuat identitas yang netral sebagai negara pascakolonial, ke integrasi pada sistem tata kelola internasional atau membangun tata kelola yang baru. (Mawdsley, 2019) Kerja sama selatan pasca perang dingin dan naiknya Cina di panggung dunia pada tahun 2010 diwarnai dengan pola hubungan yang didasarkan pada kepentingan nasional dan narasi solidaritas negara dunia ketiga. Mawdsley (2019) menyebut periode ini sebagai masa kerjasama dengan penekanan yang lebih banyak pada aksi-aksi konkret dan pragmatis dibandingkan dengan narasi dan gestur simbolis. Perubahan haluan tersebut diperhatikan di Indonesia dengan kerjasama KSS yang konkret dan mengikuti kebutuhan domestik.

Winanti and Alvian (2019) berargumen bahwa KSS sudah tidak lagi dilakukan hanya berdasarkan solidaritas negara-negara Selatan dan perasaan situasi yang sama, namun juga berdasarkan kepentingan nasional dan ambisi negara-negara Selatan yang mulai terlihat seperti Cina, India, Brasil, dan Indonesia. Dalam konteks ini, KSS merupakan alat untuk menyebarkan ketergantungan dan pengaruh di negara-negara Selatan. Oleh karena itu, aksi-aksi KSS yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia dapat dilihat dalam lensa pragmatis dan pada akhirnya *self-serving*.

Indonesia merupakan salah satu anggota Konferensi Asia-Afrika yang dilaksanakan di Bandung pada tahun 1955. KAA merupakan awal mulai perjalanan Indonesia dalam melaksanakan KSS, karena salah satu perjanjian KAA yaitu *Advancing Common Interests and Cooperation*. Perjanjian tersebut menyatakan bahwa negara KAA akan memajukan kepentingan dan koperasi bersama-sama. Contoh dari implementasi perjanjian ini adalah dari 2010 sampai 2014 saat Indonesia implementasikan Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN). Pada 2019 Indonesia membentuk Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional (LDKPI) sebagai wujud nyata bahwa Indonesia akan menyediakan bantuan internasional ke negara-negara lain. Indonesia juga aktif melakukan KSS dalam bidang kemanusiaan, mereka memberi 12,9 ton bantuan yang berisi makanan, minuman, tenda, dll ke Fiji pada tahun 2020 setelah sebuah bencana alam. Indonesia juga memberi 100,000 vaksin COVID-19 kepada Nigeria pada tahun 2022 (Hutabarat, 2023).

METODE PENELITIAN

Kajian ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif. Jenis penelitian ini didefinisikan sebagai penelitian yang naturalistik karena dilakukan pada kondisi alamiah (*natural setting*), penggunaan data kualitatif, analisis induktif, dan lebih menekankan makna daripada generalisasi. Metode penelitian ini merujuk pada prinsip filsafat postpositivisme yang interpretif dan konstruktif yang mana interpretasi akan makna dari data menjadi kunci analisis penelitian (Sutopo, 2006, p.15-18). Jenis data yang digunakan adalah data deskriptif dan numeratif (tidak diwajibkan) namun bersandar pada kemampuan peneliti dalam menginterpretasikan makna dibalik fakta dari data yang dikumpulkan (kualitatif bermakna) (Sutopo, 2006, p.9, p.23-25). Teknik analisis data yang akan digunakan adalah *content analysis* dengan pendekatan kualitatif. Teknik penelitian tersebut berfokus pada studi teks secara sistematis dan melibatkan proses reartikulasi data berdasarkan interpretasi peneliti (Krippendorff, 2013, p.23). Dalam pelaksanaan metode penelitian dan teknik penelitian di atas, maka teknik pengumpulan data akan dilakukan melalui triangulasi. Teknik triangulasi merujuk pada pengumpulan dan analisis data secara multiperspektif agar mampu menguji validitas sebuah data dari berbagai sumber. Pengambilan sumber tersebut akan menambah kelengkapan informasi pada kesimpulan penelitian (Sutopo, 2006, p.92). Terkait pengambilan sumber data, penelitian ini akan mengambil teknik pengambilan data studi pustaka dengan merujuk pada pustaka yang memiliki elemen-elemen relevan dengan tujuan penelitian ini. Sumber data yang digunakan adalah data data sekunder yang mana sumber data tidak diberikan

secara langsung kepada peneliti, namun diambil dari sumber pustaka lainnya. Jenis data sekunder dalam penelitian ini mencakup dokumen yang dirilis oleh institusi pemerintahan negara, laporan hasil perdagangan antara Chile dan Indonesia, artikel jurnal ilmiah, dan berita media massa, serta dokumen organisasi atau lembaga internasional terkait IC-CEPA.

HASIL ANALISIS

IC-CEPA sebagai Ekspansi Pasar Ekspor Non-Tradisional Indonesia

Free Trade telah menjadi instrumen yang populer bagi negara untuk mengejar kepentingan nasionalnya terutama dalam bidang ekonomi. Hal tersebut karena *Free Trade* menawarkan kemudahan akses terhadap pasar dan pengurangan hambatan. Trend ini pertama kali populer saat *General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade* didirikan pada 1948 dan *World Trade Organization* pada 1995 (Sabaruddin, S. and Marks, S. (2016). *The Potential Political Economy Impact of the Proposed Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesia. Asian Journal of Latin American Studies*, 29(1), pp.83–108.). Indonesia juga menjadi negara yang memanfaatkan free trade dalam mencapai tujuan ekonominya, Salah satunya adalah melalui IC-CEPA yang merupakan perjanjian bilateral pertama diantara Indonesia dengan kawasan Amerika Latin atau secara khusus dengan Chile. IC-CEPA ditandatangani pada 14 Desember 2017 dan diratifikasi pada 19 Februari 2019 (Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya, 2019). Tujuan dari Indonesia mendorong

kerjasama ini dengan Chile adalah untuk mendifersifikasi dan membuka akses bagi pasarnya Indonesia untuk membuka peluang baru . Selain itu melalui *Free Trade* dengan Chile, Indonesia memiliki potensi untuk memperluas komoditas ekspornya, hal ini karena permintaan impor Chile sesuai dengan komoditas ekspor Indonesia. Beberapa komoditas seperti minyak hewani, minyak nabati, minyak sawit, minyak kelapa, lemak, dan lilin memiliki permintaan yang tinggi dari pasar Chile. Hal tersebut karena Chile memiliki sektor agroindustri yang sedang berkembang, yang menjadikan Chile sebagai pasar yang menjanjikan bagi produk komoditas Indonesia. Selain itu, pasar Chile juga membuka peluang bagi komoditas manufaktur Indonesia seperti, tekstil, barang elektronik, dan peralatan mesin. Produk-produk kimia Indonesia juga memiliki potensi ekspor yang besar karena kebutuhan Chile dari sektor pertanian, manufaktur, dan energinya. Dan karena adanya pengurangan hambatan tarif dan non-tarif, membuat produk-produk Indonesia memiliki harga yang kompetitif di pasar Chile (Al-Husin and Virgiania, 2024).

Dengan penghapusan tarif impor ini (tarif 0%) pada sejumlah komoditas Indonesia, tidak hanya meningkatkan daya saing produk Indonesia di pasar Chile, tetapi juga membuka peluang bagi eksportir Indonesia untuk memasuki pasar Chile dengan lebih mudah karena tidak adanya hambatan. Selain dari terbukanya akses pasar, kerja sama ini juga mendifersivikasi pasar Indonesia dari mitra tradisionalnya. Hal tersebut dapat mengurangi risiko volatilitas ekonomi Indonesia. Karena selama ini Indonesia bergantung pada pasar yang dominan berada di Asia seperti, Jepang, China, dan Australia yang dimana dengan

ketergantungan ini membuat komoditas Indonesia lebih rentan mengalami ancaman fluktuasi. Selain itu terdapat banyak faktor yang dapat mempengaruhi fluktuasi pasar, seperti krisis ekonomi, perubahan kebijakan perdagangan, atau ketegangan geopolitik. Selain itu ketergantungan pada pasar tradisional ini juga akan sangat berdampak ketika adanya hambatan perdagangan seperti, kenaikan tarif, proteksionisme, dan pembatasan impor (Al-Husin and Virgianita, 2024). Maka dari itu dengan membuka akses terhadap pasar Chile, Indonesia membuka peluang baru untuk memaksimalkan komoditas ekspornya dan diversifikasi pasar agar tidak terlalu bergantung pada komoditas dan pasar tradisional yang juga merupakan langkah strategis untuk mengelola risiko ekonomi dan geopolitik serta memperkuat posisi Indonesia dalam perdagangan global yang dinamis.

Upaya Pengaruh (*Influence Attempts*) Melalui Jalur Perdagangan Ekonomi dengan Chile - Tujuan Non-Ekonomi

Indonesia dikenal dengan potensi ekonomi yang besar di antara negara-negara berkembang saat ini sehingga posisi Indonesia sangat diperhitungkan dalam tatanan ekonomi internasional. Populasi Indonesia yang besar dan usia produktif, sumber daya alam yang berlimpah, sektor manufaktur serta investasi mendorong pertumbuhan ekonomi yang signifikan. Hal ini tercermin dari posisi Indonesia sebagai negara dengan kekuatan ekonomi terbesar di Asia Tenggara dengan populasi terbesar keempat dunia dan daya beli ekonomi terbesar (World Bank, 2023). Perdagangan

Indonesia juga patut dicatat akan potensinya yang ditunjukkan lewat surplus perdagangan yang terjadi selama 57 bulan berturut-turut sejak bulan Mei 2020. Indonesia mencatat surplus ekspor sebesar \$3.45 miliar melebihi impor yang mana peningkatan \$1.45 miliar sejak bulan Januari 2024 (Shofa, 2025). Menimbang potensi perdagangan Indonesia, mitra dagang negara menjadi elemen penting dalam menjamin pasar dan pengaruh Indonesia di panggung ekonomi global. Salah satu kawasan yang terus menunjukkan potensi tersebut adalah Amerika Latin dan Karibia. Darwati (2023) melaporkan pernyataan dari Wakil Ketua Umum Kadin Koordinator Bidang Maritim, Investasi, dan Luar Negeri, Shinta Kamdani, bahwa perdagangan Indonesia dengan Amerika Latin dan Karibia mengalami kenaikan 8.9% dalam 5 tahun terakhir. Kemitraan dagang antara Indonesia dengan Latin Amerika dan Karibia mencetak \$13 miliar dengan catatan pasar ekspor Indonesia ke kawasan tersebut meningkat sebesar 16.4% (Erta Darwati and Rini, 2023). Kenaikkan nilai perdagangan tersebut menempatkan Latin Amerika sebagai salah satu mitra penting bagi perdagangan Indonesia di tengah maraknya agenda ekonomi *Global South*.

Pada kawasan Latin Amerika, Chile muncul sebagai salah satu negara yang diperhitungkan performa perdagangannya. Pada tahun 2021, Perdagangan Chile mencapai 11.7% melampaui keseluruhan performa perdagangan kawasan Amerika Latin dan Karibia. Pada tahun yang sama, ekspor Chile mencapai 28.0% sedangkan rata-rata ekspor global yang hanya mencetak 26.6%. Terdapat alasan di balik performa perdagangan Chile yang gencar tersebut adalah investasi asing langsung (*Foreign Direct Investment*), jalur

perdagangan yang strategis, dan *Free Trade Agreement* yang luas. Dalam satu dekade terakhir sampai 2022, FDI Chile bertumbuh dari \$81 juta ke \$700 juta serta menjalin FTA dengan 65 negara lebih. Di sisi lain, garis pantai yang panjang dan pusat transportasi yang menghubungkan Amerika Latin dan Asia. Kedua hal tersebut menyediakan jalur pelayaran yang lebih hemat waktu dibandingkan jalur Atlantik dan membuka jalur pengiriman barang lintas negara dengan negara Amerika Latin seperti Argentina dan Brazil (Fu, 2024). Chile telah membangun citra sebagai negara dengan iklim bisnis yang terbuka dan dinamis serta menjadi *safe haven* untuk investasi asing.

Menindaklanjuti potensi Indonesia dan Chile dalam sektor perdagangan, maka IC-CEPA menjadi jalur ekonomi yang tepat bagi Indonesia untuk memfasilitasi upaya pengaruh Indonesia di Chile dan Amerika Latin secara lebih luas. Chile sebagai negara yang strategis dan pasar terbukanya menjadikan IC-CEPA sebagai jalur masuk Indonesia ke kancah ekonomi *Global South* khususnya kawasan Amerika Latin. Menilik *Economic Statecraft* sebagai tindakan politik, IC-CEPA merupakan cara Indonesia untuk mencapai tujuan non-ekonomi Indonesia yaitu penyebaran pengaruh Indonesia di panggung politik internasional. IC-CEPA diyakini memfasilitasi ekspor dan impor kedua negara secara dinamis yang dapat membawa keuntungan mutual bagi Indonesia dan Chile dengan membuka pasar baru bagi produk ekspor maupun impor kedua negara. Indonesia dapat mengeksport produk manufaktur ke pasar Chile dan negara Amerika Latin sekitarnya serta mendapatkan akses terhadap bahan mentah Chile seperti tembaga guna mendukung industri elektronik di Indonesia. Hal ini

berdampak pada berkurangnya ketergantungan Indonesia terhadap pasar ekspor tradisional, peningkatan ekspor di kawasan Amerika Latin, dan kontribusi terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi domestik Indonesia (Ita Rosita et al., 2024). Potensi IC-CEPA tersebut berimplikasi terhadap ketergantungan mutual bagi Indonesia dan Chile melalui sanksi ekonomi positif yang tertuang dalam perjanjian antar kedua negara seperti investasi dan pemotongan tarif perdagangan. Dari perspektif politik, Indonesia menggunakan IC-CEPA sebagai kebijakan ekonomi di sektor perdagangan (*instrument*) untuk mempengaruhi Chile (*target*) dalam membuka pasarnya dan dukungan diplomatik (*scope*). Sebagai mitra dagang pertama Indonesia di kawasan Amerika Latin, Chile telah menunjukkan dukungan penuh terhadap keterlibatan Indonesia di berbagai kerja sama bilateral maupun multilateral. Upaya akses Indonesia untuk bergabung dalam *Organisation for Economic and Cooperation Development* (OECD) dan *Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership* (CPTPP) sangat didukung oleh Chile sebagai negara mitra strategis Indonesia dalam akses kedua blok ekonomi tersebut (Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian Republik Indonesia, 2025).

IC-CEPA juga memperkuat citra Indonesia sebagai pusat perdagangan internasional layaknya Singapura. IC-CEPA sebagai jalur ekonomi mengirimkan sinyal kepada negara-negara di lingkup internasional bahwa Indonesia menyelenggarakan ekonomi terbuka dengan bersandar pada kerja sama ekonomi yang mana kedua hal tersebut identik dengan karakter *trade hub* di berbagai kawasan. IC-CEPA sebagai FTA membuka

kerja sama ekonomi dengan Chile sebagai negara kecil namun memiliki performa ekonomi yang progresif yang memperkuat posisi Indonesia sebagai *trade hub* guna dan posisi tawar Indonesia dalam panggung politik internasional dengan negara-negara tetangga maupun di luar kawasan Asia Tenggara (Musfiroh, 2024: 24-26).

IC-CEPA juga menunjukkan bahwa *Global South* sebagai panggung politik yang terus berkembang dapat menjadi kawasan bagi negara-negara untuk memperoleh keuntungan secara mutual. Meskipun Indonesia memiliki ukuran ekonomi yang lebih besar dibandingkan Chile, namun kedua negara dipandang dapat sebagai mitra ekonomi komplementer. Chile dan Indonesia sebagai dua negara dengan kekuatan sumber daya yang berlimpah dan berambisi memperluas jangkauan ekonominya. Kedua negara mendapatkan akses terhadap pasar baru, potensi kerja sama sama di bidang investasi, dan diversifikasi pasar ekspor di kawasan Asia dan Amerika Latin (Sanhueza, 2024). Penjelasan Baldwin perihal peran *statecraft* dalam politik internasional, IC-CEPA merupakan pembuktian bahwa negara-negara dapat memperoleh keuntungan dalam konteks politik internasional *Global South*. Indonesia juga berhasil mempengaruhi komitmen Chile dan negara Amerika Latin lainnya dalam memandang Indonesia sebagai mitra dagang strategis di kawasan Asia. Potensi industri dan investasi Indonesia telah banyak menarik negara-negara Amerika Latin lainnya. Sejak IC-CEPA ditandatangani tahun 2019, negara-negara Amerika Latin lainnya mulai melirik Indonesia yang ditunjukkan lewat negosiasi Indonesia dengan MERCOSUR, grup ekonomi berisikan Argentina, Brazil,

Uruguay, dan Paraguay (Sterzer, 2022). Komitmen Chile dalam memperdalam IC-CEPA juga mulai terlihat dari negosiasi perluasan kerja sama di bidang investasi dan jasa. Tercatat bahwa investasi Indonesia dan Chile meningkat dari 160.7% menjadi 280% di berbagai bidang mulai dari pariwisata hingga perumahan. IC-CEPA yang hanya bermula pada perdagangan barang (*goods*) sekarang merambah ke sektor jasa dan investasi membuktikan bahwa Indonesia sukses dalam mempengaruhi kepercayaan dan komitmen Chile untuk memperdalam kerja sama ekonomi dengan Indonesia (Cicilia, 2024). IC-CEPA sebagai *economic statecraft* berhasil menunjukkan bahwa jalur FTA dapat mendorong Indonesia untuk mencapai tujuan non-ekonomi seperti penguatan aliansi dengan negara Chile dan penguatan posisi tawar Indonesia dalam kontestasi politik *Global South*, serta citra Indonesia sebagai mitra dagang yang berpotensi di mata negara-negara berkembang.

Implikasi IC-CEPA bagi posisi Indonesia di *Global South*

Perjanjian *Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement* (IC-CEPA) memberikan peluang besar bagi Indonesia untuk memperluas akses pasar ekspor ke Amerika Serikat melalui Chile sebagai pintu gerbang utama. Chile memiliki posisi geografis strategis di pantai barat Amerika Selatan dengan infrastruktur pelabuhan internasional pelabuhan internasional yang lengkap seperti San Antonio, Iquique, dan Valparaiso, yang memudahkan distribusi produk Indonesia ke negara-negara tetangga seperti Bolivia, Paraguay, dan Peru. Dalam perjanjian ini, sebanyak 7.669 pos tarif produk Indonesia dihapuskan,

dimana 6.704 produk langsung mendapatkan tarif 0% sejak IC-CEPA berlaku. Sementara itu, 965 pos tarif lainnya akan dibebaskan secara bertahap dalam enam tahun kedepan. Selain itu, fasilitas *Zona Franca de Iquique* (ZOFRI) memberikan kemudahan berupa penangguhan pembayaran pajak untuk ekspor ke negara ketiga, memperkuat posisi Chile sebagai *trade hub* di Amerika Selatan (Faliq & Marsanto, 2021: 175-176). Dengan demikian, IC-CEPA tidak hanya meningkatkan volume perdagangan bilateral tetapi juga mendorong diversifikasi komoditas ekspor Indonesia ke pasar Amerika Selatan yang lebih luas (Faliq & Marsanto, 2021: 178-179).

Selain memberikan peluang besar bagi Indonesia untuk memperluas akses pasar ekspor ke Amerika Serikat, kerjasama ini juga membuka ruang baru bagi peningkatan investasi serta penghapusan tarif yang dapat memperkuat posisi kompetitif produk Indonesia di pasar Chile dan negara sekitarnya. Berdasarkan hasil simulasi menggunakan model SMART, kebijakan penghapusan tarif bilateral ini diproyeksikan akan memberikan peningkatan surplus konsumen di Indonesia, khususnya pada sektor minuman dan tembakau, yang banyak dipengaruhi oleh masuknya impor anggur segar dari Chile. Dampak negatifnya adalah penurunan signifikan dalam penerimaan tarif bea masuk, terutama dari kelompok barang seperti minuman, tembakau, makanan, dan hewan hidup (Sjahril & Marks, 2016: 91). Sementara itu, struktur ekspor Indonesia ke Chile menunjukkan diversifikasi yang cukup baik, dengan komoditas andalan seperti lemari pendingin, produk alas kaki, dan karet alam diperkirakan akan mendapatkan keuntungan dari tarif yang lebih rendah,

meskipun rata-rata perubahan tarif tertimbang tidak terlalu besar (Sjahril & Marks, 2016: 94). IC-CEPA tidak hanya memperluas akses perdagangan melalui liberalisasi tarif, tetapi juga berperan sebagai pemicu investasi dan pertumbuhan sektor industri ekspor nasional. Hal ini sejalan dengan strategi pemerintah dalam meningkatkan daya saing ekspor dan menekan ketergantungan terhadap impor (Sjahril & Marks, 2016: 100).

Dalam konteks non-ekonomis, perjanjian kemitraan ekonomi antara kedua negara ini, kerja sama antara Indonesia dan Chile melalui Perjanjian Kemitraan Ekonomi Komprehensif (IC-CEPA), tidak hanya berfokus pada aspek ekonomi, tetapi juga memperkuat posisi Indonesia sebagai negara berkembang yang aktif dalam membangun jejaring ekonomi dan politik di antara negara-negara Global South. Dengan menjalin hubungan bilateral yang lebih intensif dengan Chile, salah satu negara penting di Amerika Latin, Indonesia menunjukkan komitmen untuk memperluas pengaruhnya di kawasan Global South yang selama ini kurang mendapat perhatian strategis (Sjahril & Marks, 2016: 98–99). Hal ini sejalan dengan kebutuhan Indonesia untuk memiliki blueprint kebijakan luar negeri dan diplomasi ekonomi yang lebih terarah terhadap kawasan Amerika Latin, sehingga dapat meningkatkan daya tawar dan kerjasama yang saling menguntungkan di tingkat global (Sjahril & Marks, 2016: 103). Melalui penguatan hubungan ini, Indonesia tidak hanya memperluas pasar ekspor dan investasi, tetapi juga memperkuat posisi politiknya sebagai negara berkembang yang proaktif dalam membangun solidaritas dan kemitraan strategis di antara negara-negara berkembang di dunia. Dengan demikian, IC-

CEPA menjadi instrumen penting dalam memperkuat peran Indonesia di kancah *Global South* (Sjahril & Marks, 2016: 100–101).

Diversifikasi mitra strategis melalui *Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement* (IC-CEPA) mencerminkan upaya Indonesia untuk memperluas jaringan perdagangan dan diplomasi ekonominya di luar mitra tradisional, khususnya dengan negara-negara Amerika Latin. IC-CEPA yang mulai berlaku pada Agustus 2019 ini merupakan perjanjian penting karena menjadi kesepakatan pertama Indonesia dengan negara di Amerika Latin, yaitu Chile (Sterzer & Pakkanna, 2020: 100). Melalui perjanjian ini, Chile menghapus tarif untuk 7.669 produk Indonesia, sementara Indonesia melakukan hal yang sama untuk 9.308 produk Chile, dengan penerapan penghapusan tarif secara bertahap. Selain itu, perjanjian ini juga mencakup aspek teknis seperti standar sanitasi dan fitosanitasi, hambatan teknis perdagangan, aturan asal barang, prosedur kepabeanan, serta kerja sama hukum dan teknis lainnya (Sterzer & Pakkanna, 2020: 100).

Bagi Indonesia, IC-CEPA merupakan bagian dari strategi untuk mencari pasar non-tradisional baru di Amerika Latin, yang saat ini menjadi fokus penting dalam kebijakan perdagangan luar negeri Indonesia (Sterzer & Pakkanna, 2020: 88–89). Meskipun perdagangan bilateral antara Indonesia dan Chile masih relatif rendah dibandingkan potensi yang ada, IC-CEPA diharapkan dapat membalikkan tren penurunan ekspor Indonesia ke Chile yang terjadi sejak 2017 dan mendorong peningkatan perdagangan kedua negara (Sterzer & Pakkanna, 2020: 100). Keberadaan *Attaché* Pertanian Chile di

Indonesia sejak 2015 juga memperkuat hubungan ini dengan memfasilitasi perdagangan dan identifikasi peluang bisnis baru di sektor pertanian (Sterzer & Pakkanna, 2020: 100). Secara keseluruhan, IC-CEPA menunjukkan bahwa Indonesia tidak hanya mengandalkan mitra dagang tradisional di Asia dan negara-negara besar, tetapi juga aktif membangun hubungan strategis dengan negara-negara Amerika Latin, memperluas pengaruh dan jejaring diplomasi ekonomi yang lebih beragam dan berkelanjutan (Sterzer & Pakkanna, 2020: 104).

South-South Cooperation

Indonesia merupakan negara dengan pendapatan menengah ke atas yang terletak di kawasan Asia Tenggara, dan berada di perbatasan Samudera Pasifik dan Hindia. Chile merupakan negara pendapatan tinggi di Amerika Selatan yang berbatasan dengan Bolivia, Peru, dan Argentina; sesama negara Amerika Selatan lainnya yang memiliki pendapatan menengah ke atas. (World Bank, 2024) Masa lalu Chile juga menunjukkan kesamaan dengan determinasi kemerdekaan dan sejarah perang dengan penjajah. Dalam kasus ini adalah Kerajaan Spanyol. (BBC, 2018) Chile sekarang merupakan negara demokratis dengan angka demokrasi elektoral, liberal, dan partisipasional di atas 0.70 dari 1, dan dikatakan sebagai Demokrasi Liberal. (Nord et al., 2025) Chile merupakan negara dengan klasifikasi pendapatan tinggi oleh *World Bank* di 2023 di Amerika Selatan, negara yang memiliki sejarah revolusi dan penjajahan yang masih segar di pemikiran penduduknya, yang berakibat pada politik luar negeri condong ke kerja sama dengan sesama negara selatan (Cabecinhas and Alves, 2019). Chile memiliki aspirasi untuk

meningkatkan pembangunan dan melakukan diversifikasi dengan mengekspansi pasar komoditasnya. Ditunjukkan bahwa terdapat adanya keperluan untuk melakukan diversifikasi ekonomi dan pembangunan. World Bank (2024) mengeluarkan sebuah ringkasan lanskap ekonomi Chile di 2024, dan ditemukan bahwa pertumbuhan PDB menurun akibat kurangnya konsumsi pemerintah, investasi yang berkurang, dan fluktuasi harga hasil tambang mentah, yang mengurangi neraca ekspor Chile. Terutama akibat fluktuasi pasar, pemerintah Chile mendapatkan imperatif untuk semakin cepat membuka pasar-pasar baru untuk memasarkan produk hasil tambangnya. Indonesia dapat menjadi pasar baru tersebut. Indonesia juga memiliki sejarah kolonial yang sama, dimulai dengan Belanda yang masuk dan menjadi penjajah utama di Nusantara. (Ayu and Dwi, 2024) Selama masa kepemimpinan Jokowi, salah satu fokus dari administrasinya merupakan pembangunan dan pertumbuhan ekonomi. (Ayudiana and Sulistiyandari, 2024) Salah satu cara untuk mendapatkan pembangunan adalah dengan menjalin hubungan kerja sama dengan negara-negara Selatan seperti Chile. Berdasarkan fakta bahwa Chile merupakan negara yang memiliki ekspor utama bahan tambang mentah, dan kebanyakan perdagangan adalah dengan negara-negara di belahan dunia Barat, ekspansi pasar adalah salah satu hal yang diperlukan Chile. (Monteiro, 2023) Indonesia juga merupakan negara yang sedang mencoba untuk mendiversifikasi ekspornya ke pasar yang baru dengan komoditas yang baru. Sejarah mengatakan bahwa komoditas utama yang diekspor Indonesia merupakan Migas, namun fluktuasi harga global dapat

menurunkan devisa negara akibat ketergantungan pada jenis komoditas tunggal. Indonesia dan Chile memiliki harapan untuk mengembangkan negaranya masing-masing dengan melakukan ekspansi pasar dan diversifikasi ekonomi.

Namun, relasi yang baik dengan Chile bukan berarti penutupan relasi dengan negara-negara Utara atau mitra dagang tradisional Indonesia. Indonesia memiliki relasi ekonomi yang kuat dengan negara-negara di luar dan di dalam ranah *Global South*. Indonesia dan Jepang masih memiliki hubungan dagang yang kuat. Indonesia mengimpor otomotif dan aksesoris jadi lainnya dari Jepang, dan mengekspor batubara. (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2023) Sejak 2008, Indonesia dan Jepang sudah menandatangani perjanjian *Economic Partnership Agreement* yang menurunkan atau menghapus tarif ke 90% produk yang diperdagangkan antara kedua negara, dan sejak 2010 sampai 2020, nilai perdagangan naik sebesar 15%. (Medina, 2023) Indonesia juga memiliki relasi baik dengan negara maju lain di Asia Timur: Korea Selatan. IK-CEPA secara resmi diimplementasi di 2023 dan menghapus atau menurunkan tarif terhadap 90% atau lebih produk-produk yang diperdagangkan Indonesia dan Korsel. Kebanyakan komoditas yang diekspor Indonesia merupakan hasil industri perikanan dan batubara. Indonesia mengimpor barang-barang jadi seperti minyak bumi dan chipset (Medina, 2023). Bahkan di Eropa, Indonesia menandatangani perjanjian IE-CEPA dan EFTA, yang menghapus tarif ke 4 negara Eropa yaitu Swiss, Norwegia, Liechtenstein dan Islandia. Keempat negara ini mengimpor alat kaki dan tekstil dari Indonesia,

sedangkan Indonesia mengimpor peralatan dan suplai obat-obatan. Di luar perjanjian-perjanjian ke negara-negara maju, Indonesia memiliki perjanjian dengan India, Cina, dan Pakistan baik secara mandiri atau sebagai salah satu anggota ASEAN (Medina, 2023).

Produk konsumen Indonesia seperti, makanan, baju, obat, dll sangat diminati oleh Chile. Ini bisa dilihat dari data impor Chile terhadap produk konsumen Indonesia dinilai sebesar \$28 juta USD. Nilai impor Chile bisa sangat besar karena Indonesia sendiri ekspor produk konsumen mereka dengan nilai total \$66 juta USD, yang menjadi ekspor terbesar mereka terhadap Chile (Musfiroh, 2024). Tetapi menurut beberapa peneliti, ini tidak menutup fakta bahwa Chile dan Indonesia masih memfokus perdagangan terhadap negara-negara yang dianggap lebih stabil. Para peneliti tersebut masih menganggap bahwa relasi Indonesia dengan Chile masih terbatas. Tetapi ada beberapa peneliti yang masih melihat potensi perdagangan Indonesia dan Chile. Selain dari produk konsumen, produk hewani, sayuran, minyak, dan lilin, menjadi produk ekspor Indonesia yang sejalan dengan Impor Chile. Selain itu, potensi diplomasi ekonomi multi-level sangat besar juga untuk Indonesia dan Chile, karena budaya negara Latin yang suka, termasuk Chile, yang suka membuat perjanjian bilateral dan terlibat dalam forum multilateral dengan negara-negara di kawasan lain (Al-Husin and Virgianita, 2024).

Untuk mendukung IC-CEPA, Chile telah menghapus tariff sebesar 89.6% untuk produk-produk Indonesia yang masuk (Shofa, 2024). Hal tersebut menunjukkan bahwa dengan adanya IC-CEPA, Indonesia mendapat keuntungan yang cukup besar untuk ekonominya, karena ekspornya yang tidak terlalu dibebani oleh tarifnya Chile.

Keuntungan tersebut bisa dilihat bahwa untuk keseluruhan 2023, perdagangan Indonesia dan Chile telah menghasilkan \$485.9 Juta USD (Shofa, 2024). Sebelum Indonesia dan Chile memiliki perjanjian dagang IC-CEPA, negara-negara ASEAN lainnya seperti Thailand, Malaysia, dan Vietnam sudah memiliki perjanjian dagang dengan Chile. Ketiga negara tersebut berhasil meningkatkan ekspor mereka ke pasar Amerika Latin, sedangkan Indonesia mendapatkan tarif dasar 6% untuk semua komoditas, dan mendapatkan tarif tambahan tergantung jenis produknya. Chile memiliki kebijakan *Most Favoured Nation* untuk memberikan perlakuan preferensial terhadap komoditas dari negara-negara tertentu. Chile sebagai sesama negara Selatan memiliki sejarah untuk memberikan perlakuan dagang khusus kepada sesama negara Selatan lainnya, oleh karena itu Indonesia memiliki motivasi untuk menjalin hubungan dagang yang kuat dengan negara Amerika Selatan. (Musfiroh, 2024) Data dari Kemenlu juga menunjukkan bahwa perdagangan setelah adanya IC-CEPA telah meningkat di periode 2019-2021, neraca perdagangan bilateral, atau catatan transaksi impor dan ekspor, meningkat sebesar 54% dari 275,8 juta USD menjadi 424,6 juta USD (Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 2025). Salah satu penghambat dari relasi kedua negara Selatan ini adalah kejauhan lokasi dari Indonesia dan Chile. Chile berada di Amerika Selatan, dan Indonesia berada di Asia Tenggara. Lokasi yang sangat jauh ini menghambat kerja sama lebih lanjut akibat harga transportasi yang mahal. Dapat dikatakan bahwa ini merupakan salah satu penghambat yang terlepas dari regulasi Chile atau Indonesia dalam perdagangan (Al-Husin and Virgianita, 2024).

KESIMPULAN DAN REKOMENDASI

Melalui IC-CEPA Indonesia telah mencapai tujuan strategis ekonominya dalam melakukan diversifikasi produk manufaktur di pasar ekspor dan ekspansi ekspor bahan mentah di pasar Amerika Latin khususnya Chile. Penyelenggaraan IC-CEPA dapat dilihat sebagai implementasi *economic statecraft* Indonesia melalui cara-cara ekonomi dan utilisasi koridor *South-to-South Cooperation* dalam mencapai kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia di bidang ekonomi. Indonesia dapat membuka peluang baru di pasar Amerika Latin yang sebelumnya belum terjamah ekspor Indonesia, sehingga Indonesia dapat mengurangi resiko ketergantungan terhadap pasar dan komoditas tradisionalnya guna menghindari risiko fluktuasi pasar.

Dari sudut pandang *economic statecraft*, IC-CEPA mencerminkan cara atau teknik ekonomi yang digunakan Indonesia guna mencapai tujuan ekonomi dan nonekonomi. Indonesia menggunakan instrumen FTA yaitu IC CEPA guna mendiversifikasi produk manufaktur dan memperluas pasar bagi bahan mentah Indonesia di pasar Chile dan lebih luas, kawasan Amerika Latin. Tujuan non ekonomi yang dicapai oleh Indonesia adalah penguatan aliansi Indonesia dengan Chile dan penguatan citra Indonesia sebagai mitra dagang strategis bagi negara-negara Amerika Latin yang berimplikasi pada posisi tawar ekonomi Indonesia di panggung politik *Global South*. Sejauh ini, penggunaan FTA IC-CEPA sebagai instrumen kebijakan ekonomi sukses menyebarkan pengaruh Indonesia di Chile dan kawasan Amerika Latin. Komitmen Chile yang semakin menguat terkait potensi IC-CEPA

yang ditunjukkan oleh perluasan kerja sama di bidang investasi dan jasa, dukungan diplomatik Chile, dan semakin banyaknya negara Amerika Latin yang berkolaborasi dengan Indonesia, mengindikasikan pencapaian tujuan non-ekonomi Indonesia yang tertuang dalam IC-CEPA. Selain itu, kerja sama perdagangan IC-CEPA menunjukkan bahwa *Global South* dapat menjadi kawasan politik internasional yang dinamis dan membawa keuntungan bagi para pihak yang terlibat, alih-alih berujung pada *zero sum game* maupun *positive sum game*. IC-CEPA menjadi langkah awal Indonesia untuk memperkuat eksistensi Indonesia sebagai trade hub center dan negara yang terbuka pada kolaborasi perdagangan.

Jika melihat dari pandangan *South-South Cooperation*, Relasi Indonesia dengan Chile telah menghasilkan relasi yang positif dan menguntungkan. IC-CEPA memberikan manfaat strategis bagi Indonesia, baik secara ekonomi maupun non-ekonomi. Dari sisi ekonomi, perjanjian ini membuka akses pasar baru di Amerika Latin, memperluas peluang ekspor, dan menarik investasi melalui penghapusan tarif dan pemanfaatan pelabuhan serta zona perdagangan di Chile. Meskipun ada tantangan seperti penurunan penerimaan tarif impor, potensi pertumbuhan ekspor dan peningkatan daya saing produk Indonesia tetap besar. Sementara itu, dari sisi non-ekonomi, IC-CEPA dapat memperkuat posisi Indonesia sebagai negara berkembang yang proaktif dalam membangun kerja sama dengan sesama negara *Global South*. Perjanjian ini memperlihatkan upaya Indonesia untuk memperluas jaringan diplomasi ekonomi di luar mitra tradisional, khususnya di kawasan Amerika Latin. Dengan demikian, IC-CEPA

menjadi langkah penting dalam mendukung peranan Indonesia ke ranah global yang lebih seimbang dan inklusif.

Terlepas dari dampak positif yang muncul dari IC-CEPA, perlu diingat bahwa Indonesia masih memiliki jalan yang panjang dalam membangun posisi ekonomi maupun politik ekonomi yang kuat di Global South. Ketergantungan Indonesia terhadap barang impor dan diversifikasi produk ekspor yang belum kuat mempengaruhi performa perdagangan Indonesia yang relatif tidak stabil. Oleh karena itu, penyelenggaraan FTA bersama negara lain seperti IC-CEPA, hubungan ekspor dan impor Indonesia bersama Chile perlu dimonitor agar tidak tercipta ketergantungan dari pihak Indonesia terhadap produk impor Chile serta menjamin manfaat mutual dalam perdagangan tersebut. Indonesia juga harus tetap

mendorong diversifikasi dan produktivitas ekspor Indonesia dengan mendukung industri domestik, akses pasar ekspor yang mudah, dan insentif yang jelas bagi para pelaku industri. Selain itu, Indonesia juga perlu berinvestasi dalam energi bersih guna menciptakan ketersediaan dan harga energi yang stabil agar mendukung investasi dari negara-negara mitra pada level domestik. Dalam konteks jasa dan investasi, peningkatan kapasitas sumber daya manusia Indonesia, kepastian hukum khususnya yang berkaitan dengan investasi, dan digitalisasi pada pelaku industri perlu menjadi perhatian bagi Pemerintah Republik Indonesia. Langkah-langkah tersebut disarankan agar mampu menciptakan iklim bisnis dan investasi yang sehat serta kemampuan tenaga kerja Indonesia yang sesuai standar internasional.

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