

Indonesia and the Global South: A Constructivist Approach to Diplomatic Leadership in a Multipolar World Order

Krisman Heriamsal¹

Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada
krismanheriamsal@mail.ugm.ac.id

Submitted : 23 Juni 2025 Revision: 8 Juli 2025 Accepted: 23 Juli 2025

Abstract

The global power structure has shifted from a unipolar system to multipolarity, marked by the emergence of new powers such as China and Russia and the strengthening of regional cooperation. In this context, the role of Global South countries is becoming increasingly important in shaping a new, more inclusive world order. This study highlights how Indonesia constructs and projects its identity and leadership as a representation of the Global South in the multipolar era. The purpose of the study is to analyze the construction of Indonesia's identity and the diplomatic practices used in forums such as the G20 and BRICS to advocate the interests of developing countries. This study uses a qualitative method with an interpretive approach, based on an analysis of official speeches, diplomatic documents, and scientific literature. Theoretically, this study is based on the constructivism of international relations, especially Alexander Wendt's ideas about the importance of identity and norms in shaping state interests. The results show that Indonesia actively uses normative diplomacy, historical narratives, and multilateral engagement to strengthen its position as a leader of the Global South and encourage reforms to a more just and equal global order.

Key Words: Indonesia, Global South, Developing Countries, Diplomacy, G20, BRICS

INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes Indonesia's role in advocating for and representing the Global South in a multipolar world order. This research is important for several reasons. First, in a multipolar world order, the involvement of the Global South, including Indonesia, is becoming increasingly strategic, especially in determining the direction of global governance, especially in crucial issues such as economic justice, climate change, and reform of international institutions. Second, this research is important to reflect and

critically evaluate Indonesia's role at the international level, including Indonesia's consistency towards the basic principles that have become its historical identity, especially as a pioneer of Global South solidarity since the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference. Third, the Global South faces various forms of systemic inequality related to representation and influence in various international institutions. Therefore, this research is important to affirm Indonesia's position and role in responding to these inequalities while exploring how Indonesia concretely

pushes the reform agenda through its global diplomacy practices. Finally, in addition to providing empirical contributions to the understanding of Indonesian diplomacy, this research is also important to enrich theoretical discourse in the study of international relations through an approach rooted in the experiences and aspirations of the Global South.

The Global South itself refers not to a geographic region but to a political perspective and mindset that arises in opposition to the hegemony of Western powers. Global South frequently encounter common issues such as poverty, systemic global inequality, and heightened susceptibility to climate change while also sharing a history marked by colonialism and exclusion from key global decision-making forums (Aden, 2023). Consequently, the Global South strives to establish its direction in the realms of knowledge, politics, economics, and culture to overcome the colonial legacy and ongoing global injustices.

The Global South often perceives itself as lacking adequate representation in major international bodies like the UN Security Council, World Bank, WTO, and other global institutions. These countries perceive that the structures and rules of such

institutions are dominated by the Global North (developed countries). As a result, the Global South consistently pushes for reforms of international institutions to better reflect a multipolar world and to address historical inequalities in global governance. It also views international norms and legal frameworks as embodying the values of developed countries, rather than responding to the actual needs of developing nations. This perception has fueled growing demands to decolonize and reform the global order (Burton-MacLeod & Chaulia, 2011).

The global power structure has transformed a bipolar system—dominated by two major powers (United States, Soviet Union)—into a unipolar system where only the United States is the main global power. The United States subsequently emerged as the most influential global actor economically, militarily, and politically (Toft & Kushi, 2023). However, global dynamics shifted when China, Russia, and several other countries became new powers. They have strengthened their positions in the international system through rapid economic growth, increased participation in global institutions, and strategic initiatives. This marks the transition toward a multipolar world order (Krishna

Pasupuleti, 2024). Moreover, the rise of regionalism and the development of regional organizations have accelerated this shift. Countries across various regions are placing greater emphasis on autonomy and regional cooperation as a means to balance global dominance. This transformation signifies the end of an era of single-power dominance and the emergence of a world managed by multiple competing and cooperating in making a new global order (Muzaffar dkk., 2017).

In multipolar system, Global South face both opportunities and complex challenges. On one hand, the emergence of multiple global power centers creates space for developing nations to expand strategic partnerships, strengthen their bargaining power, and form more equitable alliances in various international forums. Multipolarity also provides opportunities for the Global South to actively shape a more inclusive global agenda, notably on critical issues such as fair trade, development justice, and climate change (Gürcan, 2019). On the other hand, competition among major powers in a multipolar order can weaken the solidarity of the Global South, fragment shared interests, and place developing countries in a dilemma amid

geopolitical rivalries. The Global South continues to struggle to articulate alternative approaches that can enhance their collective standing on the global stage pendekatan alternatif yang mampu memperkuat posisi mereka di kancah global (Stuenkel, 2024). In this context, it is imperative for the Global South to strengthen collective solidarity, define common agendas, and promote platforms for South-South cooperation to ensure that the transition to a multipolar world does not reproduce new forms of inequality.

Indonesia is a developing country in Southeast Asia that is active as a member of various international forums, such as BRICS, G20, ASEAN, and the Non-Aligned Movement. This strategic position provides Indonesia with a significant opportunity to advocate Global South interest in a multipolar world and the tug-of-war of the world's great powers (Samosir dkk., 2024). Indonesia's historical experience as a post-colonial country that has consistently promoted the principle of anti-domination since the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference provides moral and historical legitimacy for Indonesia in its efforts to encourage reforms towards a more just and inclusive global order (Grovoğu, 2011). In addition, Indonesia's relatively stable

economic growth—reaching 5.03% in 2024—demonstrates the resilience and competitiveness of the national economy amidst global uncertainty (Saputra, 2025). This identity allows Indonesia to take advantage of various diplomatic platforms to strengthen the collective voice of developing countries, encourage South-South cooperation, and form alternative blocs in fighting for strategic issues such as climate change, global governance reform, and international economic justice. Thus, Indonesia not only plays a role as a regional actor but also represents the Global South's interest in restructuring the global architecture, which has so far been considered to be more in favor of the interests of Global North countries.

In this regard, in recent times, Indonesia has actively strengthened its diplomatic role to represent the interests of the Global South through various bilateral and multilateral initiatives. For example, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sugiono, emphasizes that multilateralism reform is the main priority of Indonesian diplomacy, with a focus on renewing the global structure to be fairer and more inclusive for developing countries (Ihsan, 2025). In addition, Indonesia also officially joined as a full member of BRICS in January 2025, where one of the strategic issues

brought up was efforts to strengthen Global South solidarity and encourage more balanced global governance reform (Diaspora, 2025). Meanwhile, President Prabowo Subianto, in international forums like the World Governments Summit and meetings with Chinese and French leaders, emphasized the importance of Indonesia as a bridge between the Global North and Global South and voiced support for Palestinian independence and the two-state solution (Prastiwi & Syurgandari, 2025). These steps reflect Indonesia's efforts to strategically shape a more balanced and just world order for all countries.

Based on the above explanation, this study aims to answer the main question: How does Indonesia shape and construct its identity as a leader of the Global South, and how does this identity construction influence Indonesia's diplomatic role and strategy in advocating for the interests of developing countries within the multipolar world order? This study will also highlight the diplomatic strategies employed by Indonesia to ensure that the aspirations of developing countries are effectively represented in the multipolar world order.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Constructivism

Constructivists focus on identity, norms, and social interaction in shaping state behavior in the international system. Constructivists argue that norms, ideas, identities, and rules are essential elements for understanding the behavior of international relations actors, including how these actors interpret the world and themselves. Based on this argument, Constructivism helps explain how Indonesia's identity as a developing country, a southern country, a postcolonial country, a proponent of anti-domination principles since the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference, and a supporter of inclusive multilateralism is constructed to strengthen its legitimacy and strategic role in a multipolar world. Rather than being understood as a reaction to material interests or military power, Indonesia as a representation of the Global South in a multipolar world is better understood as the result of social interaction, internalization of norms, and articulation of collective identities built through diplomatic practices, history, and South-South solidarity.

Constructivists believe that identity and social norms influence how states act. States not only pursue material interests but are also influenced by

values, ideas, and how they understand their role in the world. Therefore, Constructivism emphasizes the importance of norms, ideas, and identities as the main foundations in analyzing state behavior and shaping their interests, including policies and interactions between actors (Barnett, 2019). In the Indonesian context, the constructivist framework can be used to explain how its historical identity as a postcolonial state and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement shapes its diplomatic behavior, particularly in advocating for the interests of the Global South. Thus, Indonesia's actions in the global arena reflect collective norms and values embedded in its history and ideology, as theorized in the constructivist approach.

Alexander Wendt, an influential figure in Constructivism theory, noted that Constructivism has three central claims. First, although Constructivism differs from realism and liberalism, Constructivism recognizes that the state is the main actor in international politics. Second, the international system is not only shaped by material power, such as military or economic but by shared meanings between states, such as who is a friend and who is an enemy or what is considered legitimate action. In this context, according to

Constructivism, ideas, norms, values, culture, and identities determine the structure of the international system. Third, a country's identity and interests are socially constructed through interactions and practices between countries. Countries do not have fixed identities or interests that emerge naturally but are shaped through practices and relationships between countries and how they interact with other countries (Wendt, 1992). In this case, what is considered a national interest can change depending on how a country sees itself and how it is seen by other countries (Wendt, 1994).

According to Wendt, before an actor can determine their interests, they must first form an identity. Wendt emphasized that identity is not determined by material factors but rather by the similarity of ideas and norms in viewing something or a situation (Wendt, 1992). Identity plays an important role in country interactions because it can influence how countries act and interact. Wendt divides identity into four types. First is personal identity, which is an identity related to an individual's or country's goals and priorities. Second, type identity arises from similarities in behavior, values, opinions, or experiences with other actors. Third, role identity is formed

from prevailing culture and norms. Fourth is collective identity, which combines role and type identity (Wendt, 1999).

Regarding interests, this term can be understood as the desires or goals that a country wants to achieve. Wendt explains that interests are formed by identity. However, the concept of interest, according to Wendt, is different from the view of realism. Wendt defines national interests as objective interests. He further explained that interests are composed of four key elements: physical survival, independence, economic prosperity, and a sense of collective pride. There are negative and positive aspects to these components. Negative aspects can be insults from other countries or the international community, while positive aspects include mutual respect and cooperation between countries (Wendt, 1999). According to Wendt, the explanation of both variables is a vital component of constructivism. Zhan Mengshu abstracted Wendt's idea: desire (identity) + belief (interest) = action.

Starting from the main analysis above, a constructivist approach is used to explain how Indonesia's consistent involvement in various multilateral organizations—as a representation of the Global South—is

shaped by its identity and interests. In this context, the author argues that Indonesia's identity as a developing country and a leader of the Global South has long been formed, especially through its historical role as a pioneer of the Asia-Africa Conference. This identity greatly influences Indonesia's perspective on ideal global governance—namely, an inclusive system that considers the interests of Global South countries rather than being dominated by the interests of the Global North. The accumulation of these identities and interests has given rise to Indonesia's foreign policy practices, which are reflected in active multilateral diplomacy and its consistency in voicing the aspirations of the Global South. Thus, in a constructivist framework, Indonesia's behavior as a leader of the Global South is not solely driven by calculations of material interests but also by historically and normatively constructed identities that shape its preferences for solidarity, justice, and equality in international relations.

One important aspect of social interaction discussed by Wendt is strategic practice, one of the primary mechanisms in forming collective identity among countries. According to Wendt, strategic practice is a country's

action in its ongoing interaction with other countries to form, reproduce, or change its identity and interests. Wendt noted that a country's tendency to engage in ongoing cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, can have an impact for country's interests and identity. For example, consistent cooperative actions by a country towards another country can form a shared identity, such as the narrative of "we are allies" rather than "we are competitors." Identities and interests can change during interactions. So, continuous cooperation can create a sense of togetherness that can happen unintentionally (because of frequent cooperation) or intentionally (because of the desire to form a shared identity). Therefore, according to constructivism, strategic practice can change the egoistic and anarchic international system into a cooperative international community (Wendt, 1994). This approach is important to understand that Indonesia's consistency in voicing the interests of developing countries is not just a pragmatic policy but is part of a strategic practice that shapes and reproduces Indonesia's identity as part of the Global South. This identity then gives birth to appropriate interests, strengthens international solidarity, and encourages the transformation of

global norms towards a more cooperative direction.

Global South

From the Global North perspective, the Global South is often seen as a group of underdeveloped countries experiencing economic growth, which are positioned as objects of aid and development intervention. In contrast, from the perspective of the Global South itself, this term represents an epistemic and political position that becomes a field of resistance against Western domination, economic exploitation, and cultural imperialism. Thus, the concept of the Global South does not refer solely to geographical location but to the historical and structural configuration of global inequality. Countries located north of the equator, such as Bolivia and India, can be included as the Global South, while countries in the southern hemisphere, such as Australia, can be classified as the Global North. Therefore, the Global South also refers to a space of decolonial resistance, where new forms of politics, knowledge, and spirituality continue to be developed in response to the legacy of ongoing coloniality (Mignolo, 2011).

This study adopts an understanding of the Global South from a non-

geographic perspective, namely as an epistemic and political construction representing populations and territories that have historically experienced colonialism, exploitation, and marginalization and are now actively resisting this legacy. In this framework, the Global South is a space where individuals and communities critically question, reject, and challenge Western domination in knowledge, politics, and culture (Mignolo, 2011). Thus, the Global South refers to a territorial entity and a historical part of the world system. This means the Global South are those who have been the subjects of the global imperialist project but are now developing alternative ways of thinking, living, and building governance that seek to overcome the impacts of coloniality. Rather than reproducing a development framework based on the Western paradigm, the Global South is pioneering a universal future—an order rooted in dignity, justice, and values of life that respect each other and transcend the boundaries of colonial modernity.

In line with Walter Mignolo's thinking, according to Paul Amar (2012), the notion of the Global South is founded on the premise that power, knowledge, and global security architecture have historically been dominated by the

Global North, especially Western Europe and North America. This domination occurs through various mechanisms, such as imperialism, neoliberal globalization, and humanitarian interventions that are often military. Nevertheless, the Global South is viewed not just as a marginalized region, but as a space capable of exercising agency and fostering innovation. Within this framework, nations like Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa, and Indonesia have increasingly taken on proactive roles in peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian missions, reshaping global norms and international security practices. This development challenges the dominant assumption that only the Global North has the authority to formulate and disseminate a legitimate global paradigm (Amar, 2012).

Trefzer, Jackson, McKee, dan Dellinger (2014) menyatakan bahwa asumsi dasar tentang Global Selatan berakar pada kritik terhadap pembagian dunia ke dalam kategori Global Utara sebagai yang kaya dan berkuasa, dan Global Selatan sebagai wilayah miskin dan berkembang. Rather than understanding this division as a fixed and homogeneous geographical entity, they argue that the Global South represents spaces of

marginalization, economic exclusion, and political powerlessness without relying on geographical location. Thus, the dynamics of the Global South can be found even in developed countries, while elements of the Global North can also be found in societies in developing countries. Furthermore, Trefzer et al. emphasize that the Global South cannot be reduced to a passive entity in the global power structure. Instead, it is an active space for knowledge production, resistance practices, and social and political innovation (Trefzer dkk., 2014).

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses an analytical-qualitative method with an interpretive approach. This method was chosen because the research aims to understand the meaning, messages, and identity construction found in written and visual texts without using statistical models. The data used includes both secondary and primary sources. Secondary data was collected through a literature review of sources such as academic journals, books, news articles, and official websites of Indonesian government institutions, including the Ministry of State Secretariat, the Presidential Secretariat, and the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. A systematic approach was used to identify and evaluate written materials relevant to the research questions. These include official texts like government speeches and statements about the Global South, Indonesia's leadership in the Global South, and its membership in international forums such as the G20 and BRICS. The goal is to understand the government's intentions and messages in shaping Indonesia's image and identity on the global stage.

Primary data comes from official speeches of the Indonesian government that were published as videos on official YouTube channels, such as those of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Presidential Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and major media outlets like Kompas. The speeches were selected purposefully based on their relevance to narratives of Indonesian leadership in the Global South, foreign policy direction, and historical continuity from Sukarno's era to the Prabowo Subianto administration. Examples include the President's speech at the BRICS High-Level Dialogue on Global Development, his speech at the 15th BRICS Summit, the 2025 Annual Press Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and remarks at the 49th

anniversary of the PDI-P party. These speeches were chosen because they are seen as formal tools for building and expressing national identity to both domestic and international audiences. The analysis focuses on keywords, key themes, and narratives that highlight South-South cooperation, global justice, and Indonesia's role as a bridge-builder in global geopolitics.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Construction of Indonesia's Identity as a Leader of the Global South

Indonesia's identity in Global South is influenced by at least three key factors. The first is its historical involvement in the Asia-Africa Conference and Non-Aligned Movement. Since its independence, Indonesia has positioned itself as an important part of the Southern countries that reject the dominance of great powers and demand a more equitable global order. A pivotal moment in forming this identity occurred when Indonesia took the lead in organizing the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955 in Bandung. The event became a symbol of solidarity among formerly colonized nations and marked the early foundations of the Non-Aligned Movement (Lee, 2023). The Asia-Africa Conference was the first formal

meeting between postcolonial countries that were newly independent or those fighting for independence. In this forum, Indonesia voiced the principles of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, the right to self-determination, equality, and South-South cooperation (Weber & Winanti, 2016). This event became a foundation in creating Indonesia's identity as the Global South's leader, as it highlighted Indonesia's stance as a voice for postcolonial countries that demanded a fairer world order free from the domination of great powers.

Commitment to these principles continued in Indonesia's active involvement at the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. In this position, Indonesia consistently encouraged the creation of a neutral space amidst the polarization of the Cold War and fought for the interests of developing countries so that they would not become objects of exploitation by great powers (Weber & Winanti, 2016). In addition, Indonesia also promoted dialogue between North and South countries and helped address global issues such as poverty alleviation while maintaining its commitment to the interests of the Global South (Hermawan & Habir, 2015). This consistency not only reflects Indonesia's solidarity with developing countries but also increases

Indonesia's bargaining power and position in the international arena (Erfan dkk., 2024). Thus, Indonesia was committed to global stability and security while encouraging cooperation among developing countries. In particular, this active involvement strengthens Indonesia's identity as a leader who fights for the aspirations and Global South interest on the international stage.

Second, national narratives and foreign policies shape Indonesia's identity as a Global South leader. Many statements of the Indonesian government, such as the President, Vice President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other government institutions, emphasize Indonesia's position as a leader of developing countries. In his speech at the 49th Anniversary of the PDI Perjuangan in Jakarta in 2022, the President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, emphasized that through the G20, Indonesia will re-strengthen its leadership that was once carried out in the Sukarno era. In this context, Indonesia will advocate for the Global South interest on the global stage and strive for more inclusive global governance for developing countries (Jingga, 2022).

"Tahun ini Indonesia juga mendapatkan sebuah

kehormatan, kepercayaan internasional, yaitu menjadi Presidensi G20 yang ini akan kita manfaatkan untuk memperjuangkan kepentingan Indonesia, dan juga kepentingan negara-negara berkembang. Indonesia akan terus berjuang membangun tata kelola kesehatan, membangun tata kelola dunia yang adil, yang lebih kokoh dalam menghadapi ketidakpastian dan kompleksitas masalah yang semakin banyak di dunia. Kita akan mengulang dan memperkuat kepemimpinan Indonesia yang dulu pernah dilakukan oleh presiden pertama kita, Bung Karno," (Kementerian Sekretariat Negara RI, 2022).

This statement strongly signals Indonesia's leadership position and aspirations among the Global South countries, historically and in the context of current global challenges.

A similar narrative was also conveyed by Joko Widodo in 2024 in his speech at the Joint Leaders' Forum High-Level Multistakeholder Partnership session and the Second Indonesia-Africa Forum held in Bali. He highlighted that developing countries are always the most affected by global challenges, so new tactical steps are needed to realize more equitable and inclusive development for developing countries (Jingga, 2024). Joko Widodo also emphasized that Indonesia will be at the forefront in defending the

interests of the Global South by playing a role as a bridge to fight for the aspirations and interests of developing countries at the global level (Kementerian Luar Negeri, 2024a).

Quoting Joko Widodo's statement:

"Indonesia berkomitmen menjadi bagian dari solusi global, membela kepentingan Global South sekaligus menjadi bridge builder dalam memperjuangkan kesetaraan, keadilan, dan solidaritas dalam mempercepat pencapaian SDGs" (Kementerian Sekretariat Negara, 2024).

This statement contains a message about the strategic role that Indonesia wants to take on the global stage, especially as a leader of the Global South. By emphasizing Indonesia's commitment to defending the interests of developing countries, Jokowi shows global solidarity and emphasizes the ambition of Indonesia in playing role as representative of the Global South in an increasingly multipolar world order.

The narrative about Indonesia's leadership in the Global South did not stop during President Joko Widodo's administration. This leadership continued and was strengthened during the administration of President Prabowo Subianto. When he was still

serving as Minister of Defense and at the same time a presidential candidate, Prabowo had given a signal about the orientation of the foreign policy that he would take if elected President. In an interview with international media, Prabowo highlighted that a core principle of Indonesia's foreign policy is its dedication to supporting the interests and aspirations of Global South nations, which are frequently sidelined in global decision-making. This stance reflects Indonesia's longstanding foreign policy identity, rooted in its role in Non-Aligned Movement (Rizky, 2024). Prabowo Subianto said:

"Indonesia, as you may know, is one of the co-founders of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. So, advocating in favor of the Global South and developing nations, advocating for a world system that does not favor the developed North at the expense of the Global South, is in the DNA of our foreign policy" (O'Connor, 2024).

Furthermore, Prabowo Subianto pledged that Indonesia would actively advocate for reforms to the UN Security Council and serve as a bridge between the Global South and Global North as a commitment to principles of cooperation and dialogue. He said:

"One of the key areas where I will focus our effort is the reform of the United Nations Security Council.

However, as president, I will also work hard to expand Indonesia's role as an interlocutor between North and South. As you may know, one of the tenets of our foreign policy is change in the world through persistence, cooperation and dialogue and I intend to continue in this tradition," (O'Connor, 2024).

This statement shows that the construction of Indonesia's identity in the Global South has been formulated and voiced even before he officially came to power. He wanted to show the continuity of Indonesia's historical identity as a pioneer of the Non-Aligned Movement while indicating that Prabowo actively shaped the narrative of Indonesia's leadership at the global level as part of his foreign policy vision. This narrative continued when Prabowo was elected president of Indonesia. Although he has just started his term, various official government statements and foreign policy directions that have begun to be formulated show that Indonesia's identity as a leader of developing countries remains an important foothold in the orientation of Indonesian diplomacy going forward. Statements from the Indonesian government and official documents outlining Indonesia's diplomatic vision reflect a continued commitment to

upholding the country's longstanding role in advocating for the Global South.

At the 2025 World Government Summit, Prabowo Subianto said that Indonesia will continue to play role as a connector between Global North and Global South, emphasizing the importance of dialogue. This role continues Indonesia's Non-Aligned Movement position, emphasizing principles such as equality, independence, and sovereignty (Susilo, 2025). In addition, during a state visit to the Republic of Turkey in April 2025, President Prabowo emphasized the significant roles that Indonesia and Turkey play in the international arena, particularly as prominent nations within the Islamic world and key leaders of the Global South. He emphasized that Indonesia is committed to being a positive force, leader, and strategic partner for developing countries globally. Quoting Prabowo Subianto's statement:

"Kami harus menjadi kekuatan positif dan kekuatan penting di dunia Islam. Kami juga harus tampil, tanggung jawab kami, tanggung jawab kita berdua sebagai pemimpin dari Global South, juga sebagai mitra strategis dalam tatanan global" (BPMI Setpres, 2025).

Indonesia's identity as a leader of the Global South is also prominently

showcased in the 2025 Annual Press Statement delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the statement, Sugiono emphasized that the direction of Indonesia's foreign diplomacy is no longer merely functioning as a bridge between global powers but also has the ambition to play role as a global leader. This narrative reflects the identity strategy that Indonesia wants to build in the international arena, namely as a developing country that is not only an object of global policy but also helps shape a more just and inclusive global architecture. One concrete manifestation of this strategy is Indonesia's push to change the international system and structure, including the global financial system, to reflect better the interests and leadership of Global South countries (Muhammad, 2025).

"Indonesia juga akan berada di lini depan penggerak reformasi multilateral untuk mendukung dan memperkuat PBB sehingga menjadi lebih fit-for-purpose. Termasuk arsitektur keuangan internasional yang tangguh dan inklusif, dan memberi ruang bagi kepemimpinan Global South" (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2025).

Third, Indonesia's identity as a leader of the Global South countries is formed through its participation in

various international forums. In addition to its involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia's position as a leader of the Global South is further strengthened through its participation in various diplomatic initiatives, membership in international organizations, and its active role in multilateral forums. Following the end of the Cold War, Indonesia emerged as one of the founding members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. Subsequently, in 1994, Indonesia served as the host of the APEC Summit. During this summit, member countries agreed to pursue the shared objective of lowering trade and investment barriers throughout the Asia-Pacific region, leading to an agreement to facilitate greater economic integration (Hermawan & Habir, 2015). When Indonesia hosted the 1994 APEC Summit in Bogor, it helped spearhead what became known as the Bogor Goals—a regional pledge to realize free trade and investment. The timetable called for developed economies to meet this objective by 2010 and for developing economies to do so by 2020. This initiative reflects Indonesia's leadership in promoting fair and open economic integration, which aligns with the aspirations of Global

South countries (Feridhanusetyawan dkk., 2009).

Indonesia is also a founding member of ASEAN, an organization established to promote stability in Southeast Asia where the Secretariat of ASEAN located in Jakarta (Sari, 2019). Indonesia is not only among the founding members of ASEAN but is also the de facto leader of the organization, owing to its significant influence, large population, strategic geographic location, and strong dedication to regional integration. Since becoming an ASEAN member, Indonesia has demonstrated significant leadership. Indonesia often influences the direction of the organization's policies. Indonesia also actively proposes and promotes various joint policies or approaches within ASEAN. For example, promoting the non-intervention principle and peaceful resolution of conflicts, which later became the basis of ASEAN diplomacy to date (Putra, 2015). Indonesia was instrumental in establishing and implementing the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. In it, Indonesia promotes democracy, human rights protection, and comprehensive regional security (Sari,

2019). Indonesia's leadership is also demonstrated through its activeness in maintaining ASEAN's neutrality, pushing for the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties agreement in 2002, and bringing ASEAN's voice to global forums such as the G20 (Saputra, 2025).

The leadership of Indonesia in ASEAN demonstrates its dedication to regional stability and integration and gradually contributes to shaping its identity as a leader among developing nations. By advocating for principles such as sovereignty, non-interference, democracy, and human rights within the ASEAN context, Indonesia enhances its reputation as a nation capable of representing and reconciling the interests of the Global South in a shifting global landscape. By bringing regional issues to international forums, Indonesia demonstrates its representative capacity as a representative of developing countries, strengthening its position and identity as a leader of the Global South.

After the Asian financial crisis 1997-1998, Indonesia was invited to join the G20, a global economic forum of developed and developing countries. Indonesia is the only country from Southeast Asia to join this forum, which gives it a strategic position to voice the

interests of developing countries (Hermawan & Habir, 2015). In this case, Indonesia plays a strategic role in the G20 as a liaison between developed and developing countries, focusing on inclusive and sustainable development. Through its leadership, primarily when serving as the G20 presidency in 2022, Indonesia has emphasized its commitment to global issues such as health, digital transformation, and energy transition, as well as encouraging reform of the international financial system that is fairer for developing countries (Samosir dkk., 2024). This is in line with Joko Widodo's statement that:

"Memastikan G20 bermanfaat tidak saja untuk anggotanya, namun juga bagi dunia, dan utamanya negara-negara berkembang. Let us recover together, recover stronger," (CNN Indonesia, 2024).

Indonesia's move to join BRICS in 2025 can be interpreted as a strategic effort to reinforce its identity as a leading voice for the Global South. This decision carries symbolic significance and highlights Indonesia's intention to take on a more prominent role in championing the interests of developing nations within the global arena (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2025). This step

also shows Indonesia's serious efforts to encourage the creation of a fairer global balance of power and reduce the dominance of institutions and norms that Western countries have dominated. In particular, Indonesia's joining BRICS can reflect President Prabowo's foreign policy vision, which wants to position Indonesia as a "bridge" between the Global North countries and Global South countries (Sulaiman, 2025). BRICS, in this context, is considered a credible alternative platform for international groups predominantly aligned with Western interests. For the Global South, the existence of BRICS offers a new space to fight for common interests, especially on issues of economic inequality, climate change, and global governance reform. Thus, Indonesia's membership in BRICS not only expands its diplomatic network but also strengthens its position as a moral and political force in the collective struggle of developing countries.

The construction of Indonesia's identity as a Global South leader shows historical continuity and the ability to adapt to changing global dynamics. Indonesia has consistently emphasized its representative role for developing countries since the Asia-Africa Conference and its involvement in

global forums such as the G20 and BRICS. Its historical legacy as a pioneer of the Non-Aligned Movement continues to be brought to life through foreign policy narratives emphasized by national leaders, from Soekarno to the era of Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto. Through its policies, state speeches, and institutional positions in various international forums, Indonesia forms its identity not just as a developing country but as a normative actor that brings the aspirations of the Global South to the global stage. Amid an increasingly multipolar world architecture, Indonesia maintains fundamental values such as sovereignty, equality, and solidarity and actively articulates its vision of a more inclusive, just, and participatory global order.

However, Indonesia is not the only developing country striving to play a leadership in the Global South. India, for example, has consistently shown a similar commitment by advocating for the interests of the Global South in various multilateral forums, including the G20. India positions itself as a strong voice for the Global South (Kumar, 2024). According to Ashok Sajjanhar, former Indian Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Latvia, Global South have often been

marginalized in international forums dominated by major world powers. Therefore, India has taken proactive steps to act as a sincere spokesperson for advancing the aspirations and interests of those often overlooked in the global order.

"India has also emerged as a strong and clear voice of the global South. There is a persistent feeling among several small countries that their concerns and problems do not get the attention they deserve" (Sajjanhar, 2023).

In addition, at the G20 forum, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that India has empathy for Global South countries because it shares similar experiences and backgrounds as a developing country. He said: *"These are countries with (Global South) which we empathise. Since we too are part of the developing world, we understand their aspirations,"* (Outlook Business, 2023). This statement indicates that India feels a historical and collective connection with these countries. Therefore, India sees itself as having the moral and political legitimacy to represent the interests of the Global South in international forums such as the G20.

In 2024, India held the 3rd Voice of the Global South Summit virtually under the theme "An Empowered Global

South for a Sustainable Future." This forum served as a platform for countries in the Global South to express shared concerns, exchange experiences, and propose collective solutions to the most pressing global challenges (El-Assasy, 2024). The summit continued a similar initiative launched in January 2023, themed "Voice of the Global South for Human-Centered Development." This forum reflects India's commitment to playing a leadership role in strengthening solidarity and cooperation among developing countries (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2023). The initiative is inspired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's vision of "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas aur Sabka Prayas" (Together with All, Development for All, Trust of All, and Efforts by All). It is rooted in the ancient Indian philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, which teaches that the world is one family (India News Network, 2024).

While both India and Indonesia play an active role in the leadership of the Global South, they express this commitment through the narrative of a strategic framework for cooperation in the ASEAN and Indo-Pacific regions. In this narrative, India and Indonesia are positioned as equal partners with a

common goal—to strengthen regional cooperation and support the Global South agenda. The emphasis on synergy and coordination is a key aspect of their political communication. This was reflected in the joint press conference held by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Indonesian government at Hyderabad House in New Delhi in January 2025. Modi expressed his willingness to work closely with Indonesia to advance the interests and priorities of the Global South countries. Modi said:

"Now we are also welcoming the membership of Indonesia in BRICS. At all these forums, we will work in coordination and cooperation for the interests and priorities of the nations in the Global South" (Modi, 2025).

Indonesian Diplomacy in the G20: Advocacy of Global South Interests

The Group of Twenty (G20) consists of 19 countries and the European Union. It primarily functions as a platform for discussing global economic, financial stability, responding to climate change, and advancing sustainable development. The G20 consists of the world's largest economies, both developed and developing countries, to encourage cooperation that can produce inclusive

and sustainable economic growth (Berawi, 2022). This forum was formed in 1999 as a meeting place for central bank governors and finance ministers. However, after the financial crisis in 2008, the G20 underwent significant changes when countries' leaders became directly involved in its meetings. Based on the inclusiveness and decision-making based on agreement, the G20 does not produce binding legal decisions but instead encourages voluntary commitments from its members to address various global issues (Purohit & Mathur, 2024).

The G20 is a very important platform for Indonesia to mediate between the interests of developed country and developing country. From the beginning of its membership, Indonesia has represented developing countries and consistently advocated for issues that address their specific needs (Ruddyard, 2020). One of the issues raised is global financial inclusiveness. For Indonesia, the global financial system often does not represent the reality and interests of developing countries. Thus, raising this issue in multilateral forums, including the G20, is important. At the 2009 Pittsburgh G20 Summit amid the global financial crisis, Indonesia urged greater support and attention from industrialized

countries, including G20 leaders, to pay much attention to the impact of the crisis on developing countries and the importance of supporting their development (Sen, 2011).

Indonesia then proposed the establishment of an aid fund called the General Expenditure Support Fund (GESF). This fund is intended to help developing and poor countries experiencing financial difficulties after the 2008 global crisis. The aim is to provide financial support from the IMF and World Bank to build infrastructure, create jobs, and achieve Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially non-members of the G20 but have economic potential. This proposal received support from the G20 countries, developing countries in Asia and Africa, and international financial institutions because it was considered a positive step towards a more equitable and inclusive global economic system (Tanaga dkk., 2011). Quoting Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's statement regarding the GESF initiative:

"Mekanisme Global Expenditure Support Fund (GESF) dibuat untuk membantu negara berkembang menangani pertumbuhan ekonomi dan keberlangsungan pembangunannya. Dengan aliran dana ini akan mendorong perkembangan ekonomi khususnya negara-negara di Asia

terhadap pemulihan ekonomi dunia. Dana ini akan membantu negara-negara berkembang miskin, setidaknya minimal selama tiga tahun." (Tanaga dkk., 2011)

The issue in the Global South that Indonesia also raised at the G20 was the infrastructure problem, which often hinders developing countries' economic growth. At G20 Summit in Mexico, 2012, Indonesia proposed infrastructure investment as a priority agenda at the G20 meeting. Indonesia encouraged G20 member countries to put attention on infrastructure financing in supporting sustainable development and economic growth in developing countries. This initiative not only reflects national interests but also raises the voice of the Global South in creating infrastructure to realize a better economy. Indonesia's proposal received widespread support and was successfully included in the G20 Finance Ministers' communiqué in the same year (Wibisono, 2012).

As a continuation of its initiatives, the G20 established the Study Group on Financing for Investment (SGFI) in February 2013, with Indonesia and Germany as co-chairs. This group aims to study long-term investment financing, including infrastructure, as the main instrument to encourage

economic growth and job creation in developing countries. The first face-to-face meeting of SGFI was held in Bali in May 2013, marking Indonesia's commitment to host a global discussion on financing for development work (Kementerian Keuangan RI, 2013). Since then, the issue of sustainable infrastructure development has become a permanent agenda in the G20 forum, in line with the aspirations of Global South countries to realize equitable, inclusive, and sustainable development.

Indonesia also plays a significant role during the Covid-19 pandemic. This is based on the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted the economies of Global South countries, especially in important sectors such as tourism, trade, services, and investment. This has led to a decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), economic contraction, and increased social and economic vulnerability in the Global South. In addition, limited access to resources and global support has deepened existing socio-economic inequalities (Yadav & Rena, 2024). In response to this situation, Indonesia has taken an active role in voicing the conditions of Global South countries and encouraging developed countries to

pay more attention to the economic problems experienced by the Global South due to the pandemic (Hermawan, 2021).

In addition, the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine in Global South countries faces various challenges, mainly due to the policy of vaccine nationalism and vaccine hoarding by developed countries. This condition causes inequality in vaccine access because rich countries prioritize domestic needs and secure excessive amounts of vaccines. As a result, the impact of the pandemic is getting longer in low-income countries, including the Global South (Kelly & McGlasson, 2022). As a form of advocacy for the interests of the Global South in the G20 forum, Indonesia has been actively promoting the importance of equitable access to vaccines and essential medical devices for vulnerable countries. In this context, Indonesia wants to ensure that the G20's response to the pandemic continues to pay attention to the needs of Global South countries (Yadav & Rena, 2024). This is evident in Indonesia's statement at the 2020 G20 Summit, where Joko Widodo as a President emphasized the importance of equitable vaccine distribution. In his statement, Joko Widodo said that:

"Dunia tidak akan sehat kecuali semua negara sudah sehat, dan vaksin adalah salah satu amunisinya. Vaksin harus dapat diakses dan tersedia bagi semua negara tanpa kecuali-- akses terhadap vaksin Covid-19 harus dapat tersedia bagi semua negara tanpa terkecuali. Komitmen politik negara-negara G20 sangat dibutuhkan untuk memobilisasi pendanaan global bagi pemulihan kesehatan" (Adyatama, 2020).

In 2022, Indonesia will hold the G20 Presidency for one year, starting on December 1, 2021. This position will allow Indonesia to organize a series of international meetings in Indonesia, culminating in the 17th G20 Summit in Bali in November 2022. Indonesia's leadership in this forum shows its increasing role and influence in global dynamics, especially in the context of international economic cooperation (Pramana, 2022). In addition, this momentum is used by Indonesia to expand its strategic role in advocating for the Global South interest. For example, in Joko Widodo's statement said that Indonesia's presidency in G20 will be used to advocate for the interests of developing countries (Kementerian Sekretariat Negara RI, 2022).

One of the priority agendas raised during Indonesia's Presidency is the Exit Strategy to Support Recovery. This

agenda is focused on providing support and protection for developing countries still in the process of economic Recovery due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The strategy was designed to anticipate the continued impact of exit policies previously implemented by developed countries, whose economies had recovered more quickly. It is feared that these policies could pressure the economic stability of middle- and low-income countries (Komarudin & Fadlillah, 2024).

The ideas put forward by Indonesia, such as the Global Economic Security Forum (GESF), inclusive infrastructure investment, fair vaccine distribution, and post-COVID-19 economic recovery strategies, do not only reflect Indonesia's active participation in the G20 forum. Moreover, these initiatives demonstrate Indonesia's role in encouraging the transformation of the global agenda and norms to reflect better the principles of inclusivity, solidarity, and development justice that favor Global South countries. Indonesia's role in the G20 shows that a country's influence in the international system is determined by material strength and the ability to shape relevant identities, values, and narratives in the context of an increasingly multipolar world.

Indonesia in BRICS: Global South Diplomacy

BRICS was first formed in the early 2000s by economist Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs to refer to four countries with great economic potential, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). This initiative began to move from being an investment category to a political forum when Russia hosted the first summit in 2009. In 2010, South Africa joined this forum and changing the name of this group to BRICS. This forum was established initially to counter the influence of global institutions like the IMF and World Bank, which were seen as overly controlled by Western nations. It also sought to promote reforms in the global economic governance system to create a more balanced power distribution (Patrick dkk., 2024).

Over time, BRICS has evolved into a strategic alliance of developing nations aiming to promote a more equitable and inclusive global order. Demonstrating its commitment, the group established the New Development Bank in 2015 and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement in 2014 as alternatives to the prevailing influence of Western-led financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank (Brics Policy Center, 2018).

As global geopolitical tensions increase, especially after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, BRICS is increasingly asserting its position as a symbol of resistance against U.S. and Western dominance in the global power structure. At the 2024 BRICS Summit held in Kazan, Russia, the group officially expanded its membership by welcoming four new countries—Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, marking the transformation of BRICS into a more representative and influential multilateral forum (Patrick, 2024).

As of January 2025, the number of BRICS member countries has reached 10 countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Indonesia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Indonesia. In addition, BRICS has eight partner countries: Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. The main difference between partner and member countries is the right to participate in high-level meetings and formulate strategic decisions. Member countries benefit economically through investment, collaboration, and special trade agreements (Fadilah, 2025). The increasing number of countries involved in BRICS confirms BRICS'

intention to become a more inclusive multipolar geopolitical and geoeconomic power, challenging the global system that has so far been centered on Western power. As of January 2025, BRICS nations account for 46% of global GDP and represent 55% of the world's population (Holtzmann & Voort, 2025).

Indonesia expressed its interest in joining BRICS when attending the BRICS Plus Summit in Kazan, Russia, in 2024. Since then, the process towards Indonesia's official membership in BRICS has begun. Foreign Minister Sugiono stated that Indonesia views BRICS as a platform to fight for the common interests of developing countries, known as the Global South. He also emphasized that: "*We will see whether BRICS can act as the right forum to discuss and develop the common interests of Global South countries*" (Kementerian Luar Negeri, 2024b). Previously, Indonesia has been involved in several BRICS activities, including at the BRICS Summit level. In its participation, Indonesia also voiced the interests of developing countries. For example, in 2022, Indonesia participated in the Side Event of the BRICS Summit High-level Dialogue on Global Development. There, President Joko Widodo highlighted the

importance of considering the interests and voices of developing countries amidst the challenging global situation, especially regarding food and energy security, as well as increasingly difficult financial stability (Sekretariat Kabinet RI, 2022). Quoting an excerpt from Joko Widodo's Speech:

"Berbagai inisiatif yang ada harus saling bersinergi dan saling memperkuat, harus memperhitungkan suara negara-negara berkembang, harus mengedepankan dialog—Kesenjangan pendanaan SDGs yang meningkat dari USD2,5 triliun per tahun sebelum pandemi menjadi USD4,2 triliun per tahun pasca pandemi harus segera ditutup. Pendanaan inovatif harus dimajukan, terutama peranan sektor swasta harus diperkuat. BRICS harus dapat menjadi katalis bagi penguatan investasi di negara-negara berkembang" (Sekretariat Kabinet RI, 2022).

This statement confirms Indonesia's active role in voicing interests in the BRICS forum. By emphasizing the importance of synergy between initiatives and the need to prioritize inclusive dialogue, Indonesia demonstrates its commitment to fighting for global justice, especially in closing the widening gap in SDG funding after the pandemic. The push for innovative funding and private sector involvement reflects Indonesia's progressive approach to addressing development challenges. In this

context, Indonesia appears not only as a passive participant but also as a strategic advocate that encourages BRICS countries to pay attention to the interests of the Global South.

In 2023, Indonesia again demonstrated its commitment to advocating for the interests of the Global South by attending the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. In his speech, President Joko Widodo spoke on behalf of Indonesia and as a representative of Global South. He raised the issue of inequality in the global economic order, which is considered to widen the development gap between global north and global south. Jokowi encouraged BRICS to play a strategic role in encouraging reforms to a more just and inclusive global governance and fighting for development justice for developing countries (KOMPASTV, 2023). This stance affirms Indonesia's position as an important actor that voices the aspirations of the Global South in the global geopolitical arena. Quoting Joko Widodo's statement:

"Kehadiran saya hari ini bukan hanya sebagai pemimpin Indonesia, tapi sebagai sesama pemimpin The Global South yang mewakili 85 persen populasi dunia, yang menginginkan win-win formula. Kehadiran saya di sini juga didasari keinginan untuk

terus menghidupkan spirit Bandung yang masih sangat relevan sampai saat ini, di mana solidaritas, soliditas, dan kerjasama antar negara berkembang perlu terus diperkuat—BRICS dapat menjadi bagian terdepan untuk memperjuangkan keadilan pembangunan dan mereformasikan di tata kelola dunia yang lebih adil" (Sekretariat Presiden, 2023).

Following its involvement in BRICS during the period 2022-2024, Indonesia officially became a full member of BRICS on January 6, 2025, under the leadership of Prabowo Subianto (Faridz, 2025). This decision also marks Indonesia's commitment to strengthening its role and identity as a leader of the Global South countries. For Indonesia, BRICS can be a forum to encourage reform of global governance, especially in the fields of economics and international law, to be more inclusive and fair for developing countries. According to Abdul Kadir Jailani, the Director General for Asia Pacific and Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BRICS has a mission to uphold sovereign equality between countries and strengthen the collective voice of middle-class countries. By joining BRICS, Indonesia confirms its determination to be more active in advocating for the interests of

developing countries in multilateral forums (Leba, 2025).

"BRICS merupakan blok negara-negara kelas menengah. Jadi, harapannya adalah kita akan lebih menyuarakan kepentingan negara-negara berkembang" (Leba, 2025).

In May 2025, in a meeting with Ethiopian Ambassador Fekadu Beyene Aleka, Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono emphasized the importance of collaboration within the BRICS framework as a strategic effort to ensure that the aspirations of developing countries have a place in the global decision-making process (Subandi, 2025). This statement is consistent with Indonesia's stance before officially joining BRICS when Foreign Minister Sugiono said that BRICS has the potential to be a platform to fight for the collective interests of the Global South. The statement reflects Indonesia's diplomatic efforts to play a representative role within BRICS by positioning itself as a bridge of interests between developing countries and global structures that are considered less inclusive. Quoting Foreign Minister Sugiono's statement:

"Kita lihat BRICS dapat menjadi kendaraan yang tepat untuk membahas dan memajukan kepentingan bersama Global

South. Namun kita juga melanjutkan keterlibatan atau engagement kita di forum-forum lain, sekaligus juga terus melanjutkan diskusi dengan negara maju" (Putri, 2024).

Indonesia as the Global South's leader in the G20 and BRICS forums reflects how a country's identity, norms, and values can shape and influence the behavior and international system. Indonesia does not only act based on material interests alone but positions itself as a normative agent that actively shapes a more inclusive and just global order, especially for developing countries. Through initiatives such as the General Expenditure Support Fund (GESF), advocacy for fair distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine, and encouragement of global economic governance reforms in BRICS, Indonesia projects its identity as a representation of the voice of the Global South. This approach shows that a country's power in the international system can also be built through social construction—namely, the formation of an image as a "bridge" between developed and developing countries and a disseminator of ideas of justice and global solidarity. Thus, Indonesian diplomacy emphasizes that power comes from economic or military dominance and the ability to create

narratives and shape global norms through multilateral platforms.

CONCLUSION

This research demonstrates that Indonesia's leadership role in the Global South results from a deliberate process shaped by historical legacy, identity formation, and proactive global diplomacy. Indonesia's identity as a Global South leader has not emerged spontaneously; instead, it has been gradually built and reinforced through key historical milestones such as the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference, its leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement, and sustained engagement in multilateral platforms like ASEAN, the G20, and more recently, BRICS. Through the construction of this identity, Indonesia presents itself not only as an ordinary developing country but as a normative actor that upholds the principles of solidarity, global justice, and political sovereignty of Southern countries.

Indonesia's diplomacy in the G20 and BRICS forums demonstrates Indonesia's strategic capacity to influence a more inclusive and equitable global agenda for the Global South. Initiatives such as the General Expenditure Support Fund (GESF), advocacy for fair distribution of the

COVID-19 vaccine, and encouragement of global governance reform in BRICS show that Indonesia can project influence through normative power and position as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South. Although the challenges of multipolarity and fragmentation of interests among Global South countries remain real, Indonesia shows that global influence can be achieved through material power and consistent narratives, values, and political representation. Thus, Indonesia's role in the Global South reflects the transformation of developing country actors into agents of change in an international restructuring system.

This study enriches the understanding of international relations by offering a Global South perspective, which better reflects the experiences and aspirations of developing countries. This approach complements the dominant narratives from developed countries. However, the study also raises important questions about the effectiveness of forums like the G20 and BRICS in pushing for real reforms in the current international system. Therefore, it opens opportunities for further research to explore how far multilateral organizations involving Global South

countries can influence or even change the existing global governance.

REFERENCE

- Aden, D. (2023). *What is a Global South organization? Exploring the meaning of terminology and identity for Busara's knowledge production* (Thought Piece) 4). Busara Groundwork. <https://doi.org/10.62372/AKAN3644>
- Adyatama. (2020, November 22). *Jokowi Dorong Akses Vaksin Covid-19 Dibuka Bagi Semua Negara*. Tempo.co. <https://www.tempo.co/politik/jokowi-dorong-akses-vaksin-covid-19-dibuka-bagi-semua-negara-562680>
- Amar, P. (2012). Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries. *Globalizations*, 9(1), 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2012.657408>
- Barnett, M. (2019). Social constructivism. Dalam J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens (Ed.), *The globalization of world politics* (8th ed., hlm. 192). Oxford University Press.
- Berawi, M. A. (2022). G20 Presidency of Indonesia: Collective and Inclusive Agendas for World Development. *International Journal of Technology*, 13(1), 1. <https://doi.org/10.14716/ijtech.v13i1.5479>
- BPMI Setpres. (2025, April 11). Presiden Prabowo Tegaskan Indonesia dan Turkiye Harus Jadi Kekuatan Positif Dunia Islam dan Global South. *Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia*. <https://setkab.go.id/presiden-prabowo-tegaskan-indonesia->

- dan-turkiye-harus-jadi-kekuatan-positif-dunia-islam-dan-global-south/
- Brics Policy Center. (2018). New Development Bank. *Brq*. <https://bricspolicycenter.org/new-development-bank/>
- Burton-MacLeod, J. A., & Chaulia, S. (2011). Rethinking International Institutions: A Global South Agenda. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1856688>
- CNN Indonesia. (2024, Oktober 12). *Kepemimpinan RI di G20 dan Diplomasi Jokowi untuk Negara Berkembang*. CNN Indonesia. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20241011135501-633-1154291/kepemimpinan-ri-di-g20-dan-diplomasi-jokowi-untuk-negara-berkembang>
- Diaspora, R. (2025, April 25). Menlu RI Sugiono Hadiri Pertemuan Menlu BRICS Pertama Pasca Keanggotaan Penuh Indonesia. *Diaspora.id*. <https://diaspora.id/news/menlu-ri-sugiono-hadiri-pertemuan-menlu-brics-pertama-pasca-keanggotaan-penuh-indonesia/>
- El-Assasy, A. (2024). *The 3rd Voice of Global South Summit 2024*. Sada Elbalad. <https://see.news/the-3rd-voice-of-global-south-summit-2024?utm>
- Erfan, Z., Hasan, A., Umar, M., & Khasyi'in, N. (2024). Politik Hukum Antar Bangsa (Siyasah Dauliyah Indonesia Dalam Perdamaian Dunia). *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Jurisprudence, Economic and Legal Theory*, 2(2), 767–787. <https://doi.org/10.62976/ijjel.v2i2.552>
- Fadilah. (2025, Januari 10). *Siapa saja negara anggota BRICS? Simak daftarnya!* Antara News. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4576782/siapa-saja-negara-anggota-brics-simak-daftarnya>
- Faridz, D. (2025, Januari 23). *Dorong Reformasi PBB, Indonesia Bergabung dengan BRICS*. VOA Indonesia. <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/dorong-reformasi-pbb-indonesia-bergabung-dengan-brics/7946787.html>
- Feridhanusetyawan, T., Pangetsu, M., & Erwidodo. (2009). Effects of AFTA and APEC trade policy reforms on Indonesian agriculture. Dalam K. Anderson, R. Stringer, Erwidodo, & T. Feridhanusetyawan (Ed.), *Indonesia in a Reforming World Economy* (1 ed., hlm. 28–39). University of Adelaide Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9780980623871.004>
- Grovogu. (2011). A Revolution Nonetheless: The Global South in International Relations. *The Global South*, 5(1), 175. <https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.5.1.175>
- Gürcan, E. C. (2019). *Multipolarization, South–South Cooperation, and the Rise of Post-Hegemonic Governance* (1 ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429470912>
- Hermawan, Y. P. (2021, Oktober 21). Indonesia and the G20 gearing up for a more inclusive, sustainable and robust recovery. *The Global Governance Project*.

- <https://www.globalgovernanceproject.org/indonesia-and-the-g20-gearing-up-for-a-more-inclusive-sustainable-and-robust-recovery/yulius-p-hermawan/>
- Hermawan, Y. P., & Habir, A. D. (2015). Indonesia and International Institutions: Treading New Territory. Dalam C. B. Roberts, A. D. Habir, & L. C. Sebastian (Ed.), *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order* (hlm. 177–194). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137397416_9
- Holtzmann, H.-D., & Voort, A. van der. (2025, Januari 28). *BRICS—What are the key issues for 2025?* The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. <https://www.freiheit.org/brics-what-are-key-issues-2025>
- Ihsan, N. (2025, Januari 11). *Menlu Sugiono: Reformasi multilateral jadi prioritas diplomasi RI*. Antara News. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4577202/menlu-sugiono-reformasi-multilateral-jadi-prioritas-diplomasi-ri>
- India News Network. (2024). *India to host 3rd Voice of Global South Summit as a platform for sustainable development and collective empowerment*. India News Network. <https://www.indianewsnetwork.com/en/20240816/india-to-host-3rd-voice-of-global-south-summit-as-a-platform-for-sustainable-development-and-collective-empowerment>
- Jingga, R. P. A. (2022, Januari 10). *Presiden: Indonesia perjuangkan kepentingan negara berkembang di G20*. Antara News. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/2635109/presiden-indonesia-perjuangkan-kepentingan-negara-berkembang-di-g20>
- Jingga, R. P. A. (2024). *Presiden buka Forum Tingkat Tinggi Kemitraan Multipihak dan IAF Ke-2*. Antara News. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4301487/presiden-buka-forum-tingkat-tinggi-kemitraan-multipihak-dan-iaf-ke-2>
- Kelly, M., & McGlasson, M. A. (2022). COVAX, vaccine (inter)nationalism, and the impact on the Global South experience of COVID-19. Dalam V. Jakupec, M. Kelly, & M. De Percy, *COVID-19 and Foreign Aid* (1 ed., hlm. 113–133). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003273844-7>
- Kementerian Keuangan RI. (2013). *Face to Face Meeting and Workshop of G20 Study Group on Financing for Investment*. Direktorat Jenderal Strategi Ekonomi dan Fiskal. <https://fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id/baca/2013/05/27/140429404821179-face-to-face-meeting-and-workshop-of-g20-study-group-on-financing-for-investment?>
- Kementerian Luar Negeri. (2024a). *Presiden Ri Ajak Negara Global South Perkuat Solidaritas Hadapi Tantangan Global*. Portal Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. <https://arsipportal.kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/6197/berita/presiden-ri-ajak-negara-global-south-perkuat-solidaritas-hadapi-tantangan-global>
- Kementerian Luar Negeri. (2024b).

- Sampaikan Keinginan Bergabung Dengan BRICS, Indonesia Tegaskan Dukungan untuk Memajukan Kepentingan Negara Berkembang.* Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. <https://kemlu.go.id/berita/sampaikan-keinginan-bergabung-dengan-brics-indonesia-tegaskan-dukungan-untuk-memajukan-kepentingan-negara-berkembang?type=publication>
- Kementerian Luar Negeri RI. (2025, Januari 10). *Transkrip Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2025.* Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. <https://kemlu.go.id/publikasi/pidato/pidato-menteri/transkrip-pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2025?type=publication>
- Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia. (2025, Februari 4). *Indonesia Bergabung Dengan Brics, Apa Manfaat Serta Kerugiannya, Dan Bagaimana Strategi Pelaksanaannya ?* Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kemhan RI. <https://www.kemhan.go.id/balitbang/2025/02/04/indonesia-bergabung-dengan-brics-apa-manfaat-serta-kerugiannya-dan-bagaimana-strategi-pelaksanaannya.html#>
- Kementerian Sekretariat Negara. (2024, September 2). *Komitmen Indonesia tidak Berubah Sejak Konferensi Asia-Afrika 1955 | Sekretariat Negara.* Website Resmi Kementerian Sekretariat Negara. https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/komitmen_indonesia_tidak_berubah_sejak_konferensi_asia_a
- frika_1955
- Kementerian Sekretariat Negara RI. (2022, Januari 10). *Sambutan Pada Peringatan HUT Ke-49 PDIP.* Website Resmi Kementerian Sekretariat Negara. https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/sambutan_pada_peringatan_hut_ke_49_pdpip
- Komarudin, U., & Fadlillah, S. (2024). Indonesia's G20 Leadership: Navigating National Ambitions on the Global Stage. *Jurnal Politik Profetik*, 12(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v12i1a1>
- KOMPASTV (Direktur). (2023, Agustus 25). *[FULL] Isi Pidato Presiden Jokowi di KTT ke-15 BRICS, Afrika Selatan: Singgung Tatanan Ekonomi Dunia* [Video recording]. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPCIQqG5btw>
- Krishna Pasupuleti, M. (2024). Global Power Shifts: The Role of Emerging Economies in International Relations. Dalam *International Relations in the Age of Globalization: Power Shifts and Emerging Economies* (First Edition, hlm. 199–231). National Education Services. <https://doi.org/10.62311/nesx/46632>
- Kumar, S. (2024). India's G20 Presidency as a Voice of Global South. *RIS Discussion Paper Series.*
- Leba, E. E. (2025, Maret 2). *Indonesia Berselancar dalam Ombak BRICS.* Kompas.id. <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/indonesia-berselancar-dalam-ombak-brics>

- Lee, C. J. (2023). The Bandung Conference. Dalam M. Bukovansky, E. Keene, C. Reus-Smit, & M. Spanu (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of History and International Relations* (1 ed., hlm. 690–704). Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198873457.013.46>
- Mignolo, W. D. (2011). The Global South And World Dis/Order. *Journal of Anthropological Research*, 67(2), 165–188.
<https://doi.org/10.3998/jar.0521004.0067.202>
- Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2023). *Voice of Global South Summit 2023*. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
<https://www.mea.gov.in/voice-of-global-summit.htm>
- Muhammad, M. (2025, Januari 10). *Pernyataan Pers Menlu Sugiono: Indonesia Akan Lebih Aktif dalam Kepemimpinan Global*. Kompas.id.
<https://www.kompas.id/artikel/pernyataan-pers-menlu-sugiono-indonesia-akan-lebih-aktif-dalam-kepemimpinan-global>
- Muzaffar, M., Yaseen, Z., & Rahim, N. (2017). Changing Dynamics of Global Politics: Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar World. *Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)*, 1(1), 49–61.
<https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/1.1.6>
- O'Connor, T. (2024, Januari 8). *Exclusive—This ex-general plans to make largest Muslim nation a world power*. Newsweek.
<https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-ex-general-plans-largest-muslim-nation-world-power>
- Outlook Business. (2023, September 6). *Developing Nation G20 Troika Will Amplify Voice Of Global South, Says PM Modi*. Outlook Business.
<https://www.outlookbusiness.com/news/developing-nation-g20-troika-will-amplify-voice-of-global-south-says-pm-modi>
- Patrick, S. (2024, Oktober 9). *BRICS Expansion, the G20, and the Future of World Order*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/brics-summit-emerging-middle-powers-g7-g20?lang=en>
- Patrick, S., Hogan, E., Stuenkel, O., Gabuev, & Tellis, A. J. (2024). *BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en>
- Pramana, I. M. Y. (2022). The Recap of Indonesia G20 Presidency in Bali. *Bali Tourism Journal*, 6(3), 47–51.
<https://doi.org/10.36675/btj.v6i3.81>
- Prastiwi, D., & Syurgandari, A. M. (2025, Februari 14). *7 Pernyataan Presiden Prabowo dalam Forum World Governments Summit, Pamer*

- Program MBG dan CKG.*
liputan6.com.
<https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/5921935/7-pernyataan-presiden-prabowo-dalam-forum-world-governments-summit-pamer-program-mbg-dan-ckg>
- Purohit, Dr. N. K., & Mathur, Dr. S. (2024). Role of G20 in a Changing World. Dalam Prof. K. B. Sharma, Dr. C. Rathore, & Dr. R. Singhal (Ed.), *A Decade of Shaping the Future: Global Harmony, Co-operation and G20* (First, hlm. 49–61). Iterative International Publishers, Selfypage Developers Pvt Ltd.
<https://doi.org/10.58532/nbennur104>
- Putra, B. A. (2015). INDONESIA'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ASEAN: HISTORY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS. *IJASOS-International E-journal of Advances in Social Sciences*, 1(2), 188.
<https://doi.org/10.18769/ijasos.82584>
- Putri, Z. (2024, Oktober 25). *Menlu Sugiono Sebut RI Ingin Gabung BRICS: Bukan Berarti Ikut Kubu Tertentu.* detiknews.
<https://news.detik.com/berita/d-7605431/menlu-sugiono-sebut-ri-ingin-gabung-brics-bukan-berarti-ikut-kubu-tertentu>
- Rizky, F. (2024, Januari 25). *Prabowo Serukan Kepentingan Global South di Wawancara Newsweek.* tirtoid. <https://tirtoid/prabowo-serukan-kepentingan-global-south-di-wawancara-newsweek-gUTV>
- Ruddyard, F. A. (2020, November 21). *Peran G-20 Atasi Pandemi Global.* Kompas.id.
<https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2020/11/21/peran-g-20-atasi-pandemi-global>
- Sajjanhar, A. (2023). *India Takes World Centre-Stage with G20 Presidency.* The Diplomat in Spain.
<https://thediplotatinspain.com/en/2023/02/08/india-takes-world-centre-stage-with-g20-presidency/>
- Samosir, S. G. N., Utama, M. N. M., Silalahi, A. N. A., & Barella, Y. (2024). Indonesia's Role on G20: Indonesia's Role on G20. *Aktivisme: Jurnal Ilmu Pendidikan, Politik dan Sosial Indonesia*, 1(3), 90–100.
<https://doi.org/10.62383/aktivisme.v1i3.312>
- Saputra, B. (2025, Februari 18). *Indonesia has important role in Global South: Minister Hartarto.* Antara News.
<https://en.antaranews.com/news/345345/indonesia-has-important-role-in-global-south-minister-hartarto>
- Sari, S. (2019). PERAN INDONESIA DALAM IMPLEMENTASI ASEAN POLITICAL SECURITY COMMUNITY. *Jurnal Dinamika Global*, 4(01), 24–65.
<https://doi.org/10.36859/jdg.v4i01.100>
- Sekretariat Kabinet RI (Direktur). (2022, Juni 24). *Pidato Presiden RI pada Side Event KTT BRICS High level Dialogue on Global Development, Jumat (24/6)* [Video recording].
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wAExcq1_kJA
- Sekretariat Presiden (Direktur). (2023, Agustus 24). *Pidato Presiden*

- Joko Widodo pada KTT ke-15 BRICS, Johannesburg, 24 Agustus 2023 [Video recording]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlluZa_Xmhc
- Sen, K. (2011). 'A Hard Rain's a-Gonna Fall': The Global Financial Crisis and Developing Countries. *New Political Economy*, 16(3), 399–413. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2011.540323>
- Stuenkel, O. D. C. (2024). The new world order and the Global South. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 40(2), 396–404. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graee008>
- Subandi, O. (2025, Mei 23). *Indonesia-Ethiopia Perkuat Aliansi BRICS Demi Kepentingan Global South* | *tempo.co*. Tempo. <https://www.tempo.co/internasional/indonesia-ethiopia-perkuat-alian-si-brics-demi-kepentingan-global-south-1523910>
- Sulaiman, Y. (2025, Maret 6). Indonesia's BRICS accession underscored by Prabowo's self interest. *East Asia Forum*. <https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/03/06/indonesias-brics-accession-underscored-by-prabowos-self-interest/>
- Susilo, N. (2025, Februari 14). *Prabowo: Indonesia Jembatan "Global South" dan "Global North"*. Kompas.id. <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/prabowo-indonesia-jembatan-global-south-dan-global-north>
- Tanaga, S., Hardjowijono, G. H., Sriyuliani, W., Hermawan, Y. P., & Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Ed.). (2011). *The role of Indonesia in the G-20: Background, role and objectives of Indonesia's membership*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Toft, M. D., & Kushi, S. (2023). America the Unipolar Hegemon. Dalam *Dying by the sword: The militarization of US foreign policy* (hlm. 176–211). Oxford University Press.
- Trefzer, Jackson, McKee, & Dellinger. (2014). Introduction: The Global South and/in the Global North: Interdisciplinary Investigations. *The Global South*, 8(2), 1. <https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.8.2.1>
- Weber, H., & Winanti, P. (2016). The 'Bandung spirit' and solidarist internationalism. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 70(4), 391–406. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1167834>
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391–425. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764>
- Wendt, A. (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *American Political Science Review*, 88(2), 384–396. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2944711>
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics* (1 ed.). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183>
- Wibisono, K. (2012, Juni 22). *RI pushes for infrastructure*

financing at G20 summit. Antara News.
<https://en.antaranews.com/news/83030/ri-pushes-for-infrastructure-financing-at-g20-summit>

Yadav, U., & Rena, R. (2024).
IMPACT OF PANDEMIC COVID-19 IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH AND POLITICAL RESPONSE ON THE ECONOMY: A STUDY ON SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES. *Journal of Economic Research & Business Administration*, 148(2), 57–70.
<https://doi.org/10.26577/be.2024-148-b2-05>